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In the age of Anthropocene, or massive human manipulation of the environment, there is 
much that we human beings have done to put our planet at risk. But there is also much 
that we can do today to bring it back to a sustainable path, provided that we act swiftly and 
effectively. Stabilising global carbon emissions in 2050 to no more than a 2°C (and possibly 
no more than 1.5°C) rise in the average global temperature above pre-industrial levels 
requires a reduction of at least 60% in the carbon intensity of global GDP (assuming a 2.5% 
annual GDP growth). This would necessitate a radical change in the mix of technologies 
used to produce and consume energy as part of an industrial transformation, and the 
relatively near-term deployment and rapid diffusion of innovative products, processes, and 
services.	Not	to	mention	behavioural	changes	in	firms,	consumers,	and	government.	Such	
deployment and diffusion is considered to be the major determining factor in the overall 
cost of implementing a decarbonisation strategy. 
This report considers potential policy options to promote ‘systemic innovation’ that foster 
decarbonisation,	with	a	specific	focus	on	the	EU.	By	using	the	term	‘systemic’,	we	point	
to a variety of domains in which innovation can occur – not only technological, but also 
organisational innovation, (brought about by disruptive new business models); institutional 
(by revising both legal and economic incentives); and societal (requiring a change in 
consumption and behaviour), and emphasise how entire systems (e.g., energy, mobility, 
shelter) can be transformed through socio-economic change. 
Compared	to	the	growing	literature	in	this	field	(which	the	report	takes	as	a	starting	point),	
we perform what could be described as a ‘double alignment’ exercise, since we explore 
ways in which regulation and public policy can foster innovation, and discuss which aspects 
of the innovation process can in turn foster decarbonisation. It could also be described as 
a double backcast exercise, since we start from a vision of zero-carbon emissions by mid-
century, describe possible socio-technical changes that could bring about this result, and 
then discuss policy alignment strategies that can make these changes possible. In doing 
so, the paper aims to create a framework that could enable EU institutions to identify and 
mitigate those EU policies that are either suboptimal or self-defeating, and take action by 
revising its policy mix to achieve what has been described as ‘deep decarbonisation’, or even 
better ‘sustainable decarbonisation’, since it will have to be reconciled with other important 
policy	objectives,	such	as	employment,	financial	stability,	respect	for	fundamental	rights,	
etc.  
EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY
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Nine myths that pervade the current debate
The international and EU debate is still characterised by a number of myths and 
misconceptions that must be dispelled if the right course of action is to be taken. We 
highlight nine myths in our report.
What may be possible are mutual gains in economic welfare, reduction of GHGs, and 
employment;	yet	significant	gains	in	private-sector	profit	or	even	GDP	may	not	necessarily	
be possible or desirable. At a minimum, socio-economic transitions would create winners 
and losers. It is important to depart from policies exclusively focused on GDP or market 
share and include societal measures of economic and social welfare, and adopt long-term 
societal well-being as the ultimate goal of EU policy.
Many analysts argue that there are technologies already in existence that could be put 
to use, but which are hampered by a lack of appropriate market and regulatory signals, 
sufficient	market	demand,	and/or	lock-in.	In	many	sectors,	Europe	has	no	idea	or	innovation	
deficits,	but	in	many	instances,	a	deployment	[diffusion]	deficit.
There is innovation in products and processes, which while fostering increases in GDP 
simply employs more material (natural and physical capital) and energy – and increasingly 
destroys jobs. A more nuanced innovation policy, taking into account the effects on 
employment and long-term societal well-being of invention, innovation, and diffusion, 
needs to be adopted. Innovation for whom? This question needs to be asked.
The US experience with aircraft, computers, the internet, space technology, and 
pharmaceuticals (to name just a few examples) clearly demonstrates the power of 
government funding research. State-funded research and diffusion-oriented policies are 
among the most powerful tools to speed up decarbonisation.  
Myth #1  It is possible to realise mutual gains in industrial competitiveness, 
reduction of GHGs, and employment. 
Myth #2   Technological innovation in products and services is essential  to 
achieving deep decarbonisation. Europe is suffering from an ‘innovation deficit’
Myth #3  Innovation per se fuels the industrial state and creates jobs.
Myth #4  Governments cannot pick winners. Winners pick governments
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An industrial policy not only encompasses invention, innovation and diffusion, it also 
envisions, i.a., the training – and re-education – of scientists, engineers, data and ICT 
specialists, etc., but also service and health-care providers, in addition to well-conceived 
employment and social policy. 
There is overwhelming empirical evidence that properly designed regulation – especially 
stringent regulation and standards – have stimulated new products, processes, and 
work practices that would not otherwise have occurred. Often transformative, disruptive 
innovation comes from outside the incumbent producers or providers, which implies that 
care	must	be	taken	to	prevent	incumbents	and	special	interests	from	unduly	influencing	
both the industrial and the regulatory policy process. 
This problem will exist only if no international cooperation is sought on decarbonisation 
policy. If enough major economies could agree on a coordinated approach to carbon pricing/a 
uniform	global	price	on	carbon	that	spreads	coverage	broadly	enough	[which	 is	not	 the	
case	with	nations	acting	independently],	carbon	leakage	would	become	a	less	important	
issue.	Trade	scholars	have	uniformly	called	for	a	revision	to	the	WTO	trade	rules,	specifically	
the Subsidies Code. Otherwise, border adjustments on energy-intensive products and 
services consistent with revised WTO practices may need to be encouraged.
Trade	does	indeed	primarily	benefit	the	private-sector	exporters	and	importers,	contributing	
to	wealth	and	income	inequality,	but	not	always	with	benefit	to	consumers	and	workers.	
EU trade initiatives (TTIP and other policies) need to be carefully assessed – and changed 
if necessary – for their potential to contribute to mitigating global climate change, as well 
as their adverse impact on employment. 1
Myth #6   Regulation inhibits beneficial innovation
Myth #7  Carbon leakage presents a practical disincentive and limits what 
regulation can achieve in terms of decarbonisation. 
Myth #8   Trade in non-energy-related goods and services is a win-win proposition 
for all parties to trade
Myth #5   Industrial policy is synonymous with innovation policy
1  See the important new study “The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade” by 
Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2016): http://www.nber.org/papers/w21906.
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It	is	clear	that	a	multilateral	effort	is	needed	for	significant,	high-risk	industrial	development,	
combining	 skills,	 insight,	 and	 financial	 capital	 and	 joint	 risk	 taking	 –	 such	 as	 has	 been	
suggested for a  ‘Global Apollo Programme to Combat Climate Change’.
Cases in which the scope and direction of the policy is not in line with the goal of 
decarbonising	the	economy	as	officially	set	by	the	EU.	Key	examples	are	the	persistence	
of fossil fuel subsidies in many EU countries and the absence of a real shift in taxation 
from labour to carbon in a number of member states, despite efforts in this direction by 
the European Commission.
Cases in which there was no policy action, or where there is legislation but it does not cover 
essential aspects that would be key for long-term decarbonisation. Here, very important 
examples	 include	the	lack	of	action	in	fields	that	represent	substantial	shares	of	carbon	
emissions	such	as	aviation	and	maritime	shipping,	and	the	energy	efficiency	of	buildings.
Cases in which policies lack stringency, and thus are unlikely to be incentivising behaviour 
that would fall in line with EU’s decarbonisation goals. Here, one example is the EU 
Emissions Trading System, which seems unable to trigger the innovation investment 
Myth #9  Nations can ‘go it alone’ 
Type 1  Inconsistent policies. 
Type 2  Incomplete or non-existent policies
Mapping misalignments in the EU acquis 
Specific	 EU	 policies/strategies/approaches	 receiving	 attention	 in	 this	 report	 are	 those	
focusing on innovation, better regulation, trade, and industrial policy/economic growth. 
The	latter	may	well	be	in	conflict	with	advancing	sustainable	development	and	an	EU	low-
carbon system transformation. Indeed, concerns for industrial competitiveness as well 
as prospects for the future of employment routinely surface, coupled with the mounting 
concern	 that	 achieving	 the	goals	of	COP21	may	be	 far	 from	sufficient	 to	 achieve	deep	
decarbonisation. Short- to medium-term strategies need to be consistent with and reinforce 
longer-term strategies for deep decarbonisation.
Like all industrialised economies, the EU and its member states have adopted a vast array 
of	policies	that	directly	and	indirectly,	explicitly	or	implicitly	exert	a	significant	effect	on	the	
environment	and	the	climate.	The	types	of	misalignments	that	we	highlight	are	classified	
as follows:
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Cases in which there are problems with time, since market players are given either too 
much or too little time to comply; compliance itself is taking too long; or policymaking 
occurs too slowly; or cases in which the scope of the policy is in line with overall 
decarbonisation objectives, but enforcement is too weak to secure compliance over time. 
The most straightforward example is certainly the legislation on car and light duty vehicles 
emissions, which was recently subject to ex post evaluation in mid-2015, right before the 
Volkswagen scandal emerged in all its magnitude. Other examples include energy labels 
and the Directive on the energy performance of buildings.
In	addition	to	these	specific	policies,	misalignments	are	found	also	in	innovation	policy	and	
in	the	EU	better	regulation	agenda.	Specifically,	we	argue	that:
• Innovation policy should be more systemic, simple and socially relevant 
(or, as often termed, ‘challenge-led’). There is a need to consolidate the various 
communities and platforms offered by the EU. Many emerging societal challenges call 
on	 innovation	policy	to	depart	 from	sector-specific	 industrial	policy,	and	take	a	more	
systemic and transformative approach that crosses sector boundaries. EU policy 
should enable experimentation and learning, and avoid creating biases in favour of 
incumbent business models. This requires policy instruments to test new business 
models	 and	 services	 that	 can	 benefit	 end-users	 and	workers,	 yet	without	 lowering	
protection levels for consumers. How to achieve this goal should be the main concern 
of EU policymakers in the coming years, starting from the revision of Horizon 2020 and 
the governance of EU innovation policy, from its R&D-centric ‘innovation policy’ today 
to an enabling and holistic understanding of ‘policies for innovation’.
Type 4  Lack of effectiveness due to problems of implementation, 
monitoring and enforcement. 
Misalignments in innovation policy and the better 
regulation agenda
needed in a number of sectors to achieve decarbonization goals. In addition, air quality 
rules embedded in the LCPD (Large Combustion Plants Directive), the NEC (National 
Emission Ceilings) Directive, and the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED) are in need of 
more stringent standards.
Cases in which policies lack stringency, and thus are unlikely to be incentivising behaviour 
that would fall in line with EU’s decarbonisation goals. Here, one example is the EU 
Emissions Trading System, which seems unable to trigger the innovation investment 
Type 3  Lack of stringency. 
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• A disconnect between the needs of long-term strategies and the short-termism 
of the better regulation agenda can be observed both in the methods used to 
perform	ex	ante	 impact	assessment	(typically,	cost-benefit	analysis),	and	even	more	
evidently when it comes to the REFIT (i.e., ex post evaluations of entire policy areas) 
and Cumulative Cost Assessments, which constitute the two most comprehensive 
types of ex post evaluation carried out by the Commission. Recent initiatives such as 
the endorsement by the Dutch Presidency of the so-called ‘innovation principle’ and the 
recent call for ‘innovation deals’ appear to be of limited use in terms of aligning policies 
towards long-term goals, and even possibly prone to capture by incumbent interests. 
The situation only gets worse if one observes the current under-development of better 
regulation tools in other institutions, especially in the Council of the EU (where better 
regulation is still absent) and in the overwhelming majority of member states. 
• Beyond the better regulation system, long-term goals have gradually disappeared 
from the governance of the European Semester, which came to represent the most 
prominent existing mechanism for the coordination of public policies enacted at the EU 
and member state level. This happened along with the gradual demise of the Europe 
2020	strategy,	which	lost	momentum	in	Europe	first	as	a	result	of	the	financial	crisis,	
later	due	to	the	Greek	and	eurozone	crises,	and	finally	due	to	the	new	course	adopted	
by the Juncker Commission, more focused on the ‘ten priorities’ and less interested in 
sustainable development. A revised strategy would need to take into account the 2030 
goals, but also longer-term goals to avoid falling into the medium-term target trap, and 
help Europe proceed towards deep decarbonisation.
Especially in view of the upcoming creation of a ‘European Innovation Council’ (EIC) 
and the mid-term review of Horizon 2020, there is need for challenge-led, streamlined 
platforms	where	research,	development,	and	demonstration	are	tackled	for	specific	societal	
challenges in a multi-stakeholder fashion, open to new entrants, new technologies, new 
business models workers and citizens, with a view to widespread deployment and scale. 
These platforms should also be entrusted with transmitting policy-relevant input to EU 
policymakers. 
Step 1   Set up mission-led platforms in charge of transferring state of the art 
information to policymakers. 
A ten-step strategy for Europe
In the report we develop arguments for the EU to undertake ten crucial steps in order to put 
itself on the pathway to deep decarbonisation. Such steps are presented in logical order, 
from the input provided to policymakers to ongoing monitoring and evaluation of policies, 
with a constant reference to systemic innovation. The ten steps can also be implemented 
independently, although activating as many of these procedures would certainly improve 
the EU’s ability to foster long-term societal well-being through more effective evidence-
based policymaking. The proposed ten steps are outlined below. 
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Step 2   Ask these platforms to produce options for deep decarbonisation 
pathways for the most relevant policy challenges. 
Rather than becoming yet another agency with a relatively narrow mandate (i.e., scale-
ups), the EIC should become the key intermediary between the research and innovation 
world and the policy realm. The existence of a strong EIC could be seen as a precondition 
for smarter science-based, innovation-friendly policy at the EU level, especially if coupled 
with revised better regulation guidelines oriented towards long-term societal challenges, 
rather	than	evaluated	in	terms	of	short-term	cost-benefit	analysis.	
The	current	better	 regulation	guidelines	still	place	 insufficient	emphasis	on	 issues	such	
as policy coherence with other societal goals, long-term impacts, risk analysis, adaptive 
policymaking, systemic innovation and decarbonisation. Several changes are proposed in 
the	definition	of	the	baseline,	in	the	method	used	to	compare	options,	and	in	appraising	
impacts on innovation.
Even if the European Commission were not to change its better regulation guidelines to 
shift	the	focus	from	efficiency	towards	coherence	with	other	long-term	societal	goals,	the	
European Parliamentary Research Service would better focus on coherence rather than on 
stricto	sensu	cost-benefit	analysis.	This	role	of	the	EPRS	would	be	more	consistent	with	
a situation in which long-term goals are embedded in the European Semester, and thus 
become more binding on EU member states; and would trigger a more meaningful debate 
between institutions on the extent to which proposed EU policy initiatives help the EU 
move in the direction of long-term sustainable development.
Step 3  Set up the EIC with the right competences. 
Step 4  Modify the better regulation guidelines to capture the potential of 
regulation-induced innovation. 
Step 5  Ensure that the European Parliament Research Service checks policy 
coherence
Platforms would have to work towards the development of pathways towards long-term 
sustainable development, including of course deep decarbonisation. Challenges such as 
the energy transition, the future of mobility and shelter will have to be approached with a 
view to the long-term, and accordingly also through ad hoc pathways that also consider all 
the policy trade-offs that might emerge during the transition. Pathways would need to be 
designed and developed in cooperation with EU institutions. 
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EU institutions should build a coherent vision for the next decade (2030) by joining all 
efforts currently being made on long-term policies, including i.a., those on decarbonisation, 
sustainable development, ‘beyond GDP’ and the future of policymaking. Most of these 
efforts are being coordinated by the European Commission. Such a vision should not be 
limited to 2030, but should also be checked for consistency with longer-term goals such as 
the zero carbon economy. 
Once the long-term EU sustainable development agenda has been formulated in terms of a 
Europe 2030 strategy with an eye to the longer term, member states should be motivated 
to jointly contribute to the agenda. The most logical way to achieve this result is to (further) 
mainstream the sustainable development dimension within the European Semester. First, 
in	the	Annual	Growth	Strategy	and	in	the	subsequent	Country-Specific	Recommendations	
the European Commission should devote at least equal attention to long-term reforms 
Each member state should develop a decarbonisation pathway aiming at least at 2050. The 
most effective way would be to incorporate such pathways into the European Semester 
and to make their implementation an effective precondition for approval of national reform 
programmes and even the attribution of cohesion funds. Member states should then ensure 
cooperation,	 coordination	 and	 financial	 support	 to	 the	 multi-stakeholder,	 challenge-led	
platforms that we described above under step 1, in what would become single platforms for 
research and innovation, able to attract multilateral funding for the exploitation of available 
technologies and the piloting of new business models and technological solutions.
Step 7  Revise Europe 2020 in a more meaningful and long-term-oriented way, 
including a more nuanced industrial innovation strategy. 
Step 9  Embed sustainable development goals in the European Semester. 
Step 8  Have countries develop their own decarbonisation pathways with adequate 
governance mechanisms, but join in a multilateral funding and technology-sharing 
effort. 
A similar emphasis on long-term policy impacts and sustainable development goals could 
be placed by the Council in discussing its proposed amendments to proposed new EU 
legislation. At the same time, the representatives of national governments in various 
Council formations could use long-term national sustainable development pathways when 
deciding their positions, possibly motivating their decisions also on that basis.
Step 6   Exert pressure on the Council to ensure it motivates amendments on the 
basis of long-term goals. 
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Leveraging EU trade policy in support of decarbonisation is an indispensable step, without 
which many of the other actions would be doomed to remain only partly effective. The EU 
trade agenda should increasingly focus on guiding the debate on the review, revision, and 
implementation of climate-friendly WTO rules, especially for what concerns the possibility 
to	place	a	price	on	carbon	through	global	mechanisms,	or	through	the	clarification	of	the	
legal treatment of domestic solutions such as border tax adjustments. 
Step 10  Use EU trade agenda and climate diplomacy to ensure leverage of 
existing WTO rules, and their revision if necessary, to effectively place a price on 
carbon and minimise carbon leakage. 
oriented	 towards	 sustainable	 development	 compared	 to	 what	 it	 devotes	 to	 financial	
stability.	Second,	a	specific	conditionality	linked	to	decarbonisation	and	more	generally	to	
sustainable development could be introduced for the attributions of cohesion funds. Third, 
national reform plans and proposed spending plans at the national and sub-national levels 
should be accompanied by an in-depth impact evaluation, which demonstrates that there 
are no better alternatives than the ones proposed, in order to reach Europe’s sustainable 
development goals. 
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Over the past few years, the global community has shown an unprecedented level of concern 
for the risks posed by climate change and the resulting need for strategies to drastically 
reduce carbon emissions, to the extent that the ‘business as usual’ scenario is considered 
to be the least affordable one. The global international agreement achieved in the COP21 
in Paris in 2015 coalesced this concern into commitments on the part of most nations – 
both fully industrialised and developing – to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
This agreement must now be translated into concrete policy actions to meet what many 
consider to be one of the greatest-ever challenges facing human beings, and one that they 
have to design and implement themselves so as not to compromise the planet. This is 
even more urgent and complex if one considers that, as will be explained in this report, the 
Paris	accords	represent	an	essential,	yet	insufficient	condition	to	successfully	address	this	
challenge. Rather, there will be a need for systemic change, including radical changes to our 
production processes, modes of distribution and consumption behaviour, strengthened by 
the deployment and, crucially, the rapid diffusion of low-carbon technologies on a massive 
scale. 
This report seeks potential policy options to improve the EU regulatory process and ensure 
that EU policies promote systemic innovation to foster decarbonisation. By using the term 
‘systemic’,	we	point	to	a	variety	of	domains	in	which	innovation	can	occur	[i.e.	not	only	
technological, but also organisational (brought about by disruptive new business models), 
institutional (by revising both legal and economic incentives), and societal (requiring a 
change	 in	 consumption	 and	 behaviour)]	 and	 emphasise	 how	 the	 entire	 systems	 (e.g.,	
energy, mobility, shelter) can be transformed through socio-economic change. Compared 
to	the	growing	literature	in	this	field	(which	the	report	takes	as	a	starting	point),	we	perform	
what could be described as a ‘double alignment’ exercise, coupled with a ‘double 
backcast’.2  A double alignment because since we explore ways in which regulation and 
public policy can foster innovation, and discuss which aspects of the innovation process 
can in turn foster decarbonisation. And a double backcast because we start from a vision 
of zero-carbon emissions by mid-century, describe possible socio-technological changes 
that could bring about this result, and then discuss policy alignment strategies that can 
make these changes possible. In doing so, the paper aims to propose a new framework 
for decision-making that could help EU institutions to identify and mitigate the EU policies 
that	are	either	suboptimal	or	self-defeating.	It	also	aims	to	offer	specific	policy	options	for	
the European Commission to consider, in order to achieve what has been described as 
‘deep decarbonisation’, or even better ‘sustainable decarbonisation’, i.e. compatible with 
the ultimate goal of long-term societal well-being.
The remainder of the report is structured as follows. Section 1 sets the stage for our 
analysis by uncovering prevailing myths related to innovation, sustainability and 
decarbonisation, and discussing the growing need for a new ‘whole of government’ policy 
 2Our reference is to the backcast exercise performed by Sachs et al. (2015).
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approach based on both supply-side and demand-side measures, and actions in several 
policy areas, from industrial policy to trade. This section crucially sheds light on our next 
steps, which in many respects question the European status quo. Section 2 looks more 
specifically	 at	 existing	 EU	 policies	 in	 the	 sectors	 and	 policy	 domains	 considered	 to	 be	
most relevant for decarbonisation; at the EU better regulation agenda, and at innovation 
policy to discuss its alignment with long-term decarbonisation goals. Section 3 offers a 
number of recommendations for how to ensure a better alignment of EU policies with 
the	 decarbonisation	 goals.	 Section	 4	 concludes	 by	 summarising	 our	main	 findings	 and	
outlining some avenues for future research. 
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1. CONTEXT AND 
BACKGROUND 
In the age of Anthropocene, or massive human manipulation of the environment, there 
is much that we human beings have done to put our planet at risk (Purdy, 2015). 
But today, there is also much that we can do to bring it back to a sustainable path, 
provided we act swiftly and effectively. Even without considering the preservation of 
natural capital and other species, decarbonisation is necessary also for humans, as climate 
change is already generating adverse effects in terms of health, life expectancy, systemic 
risks and the resilience of our production systems, and these effects are likely to worsen 
exponentially over the coming decades (ESRB, 2016). In other words, climate change 
has become an economic problem, capable of affecting global wealth and production. 
The	publication,	 in	2014,	of	 the	fifth	 IPCC	 report	on	 climate	 change	has	 contributed	 to	
a growing awareness of the urgency of action in this domain (see Figure 1 for a graphic 
representation	of	pathways	to	achieve	targets	thought	necessary	to	sufficiently	minimise	
global warming). According to the IPCC report, stabilising global carbon emissions in 2050 
to no more than a 2oC degree rise in the average global temperature above pre-industrial 
levels requires a 60% reduction in the carbon intensity of global GDP (assuming a 2.5% 
annual GDP growth), which requires a radical change in the mix of technologies used 
to produce and consume energy as part of an industrial transformation. This, in 
turn, requires the near-term deployment and rapid diffusion of innovative products, 
processes, and services, as well as behavioural changes in firms, consumers, and 
government. Such deployment and diffusion is considered to be the major determining 
factor in the overall cost of implementing a decarbonisation strategy. As such, it would 
also be a major determinant of the political feasibility and overall likelihood of uptake and 
success of that strategy.
As a result of the enhanced level of attention, international commitments are now 
emerging. Some 193 countries agreed to the new UN Sustainable Development Agenda 
in September 2015, and included Climate Action as one of the 17 new goals to be achieved 
by 2030 (as goal no. 13). The underlying targets include, among others, a commitment 
to integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning 
(renewable energy targets now exist in as many as 164 countries, see IRENA 2015); and a 
commitment to engage in mitigation of climate-adverse impacts, especially in developing 
and least developed countries. A few weeks later, 196 countries attended COP21 in Paris 
and reached an unprecedented agreement to limit global warming to less than 2 degrees 
Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels; to achieve zero net anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions during the second half of the current century; and to pursue efforts 
to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C – a goal that, according to a number of scientists, 
is even more stringent in that it implies reaching zero emissions at some point in time 
between 2030 and 2050.3
3The Paris accord will become binding as soon as at least 55 member countries will ratify it. 
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These commitments, however resounding, have been hailed by authoritative commentators 
as	insufficient	to	advance	deep	decarbonisation	(Sachs,	Schmidt-Traub	&	Williams	2015);4 
and by many as just a step towards what they consider to be a necessarily much more 
complicated implementation path. The Energy Transition Commission (2016) has also 
warned that meeting COP21 targets will not come close to achieving a 1.5°C rise to stem 
serious climate disruption. What is needed is a 3% improvement in energy productivity per 
year and a 1% decarbonisation per year. The current INDCs fall fairly short of achieving the 
necessary shifts. Further, the commitments made by the Paris signatories are unbalanced 
between the supply and demand levers, and are very limited in scope outside the power 
sector (RMI, 2016)5.  In its policy recommendations the ETC divides the challenge into two 
Source: IPCC (2014)
Figure 1 – Emission pathways scenarios as illustrated by the IPCC fifth 
assessment report
Note:	This	figure	presents	all	secenarios	from	the	IPCC	Fifth	Assessment	Report,	including	GHG	representative	
concetrantration pathways (RCP). Scenarios in the lowest light-blue band correspond to concentration range of 
430-480 ppm, likely to keep temperatures below 2ºC by the end of the century; scenarios in the lowest dark 
blue band, correspond to the concentration ranges of 480-530 ppm are more likely than not and as likely as not 
to stay below 2ºC. Emission levels for the year 2100 are indicated by blocks on the right.
4Sachs et al. (2015) have drawn attention to the danger that policies implementing the means to achieve these emission 
targets may actually work to the detriment of the longer-term goals after 2050 and 2070 to more fully decarbonize industrial 
and industrializing states. Interestingly, Goldman Sachs experts argue, contrary to Jeffrey Sachs, that Coal-to-gas (C2G) 
switching	or	energy	efficiency	measures	could	deliver	emission	savings	at	relatively	low	cost	and	at	significant	scale.	See	
http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/pages/new-energy-landscape-folder/report-the-low-carbon-economy/report.pdf
5The ETC Report states that “Decarbonizing the power sector is essential, and decarbonized power can be used in an 
increasing range of economic activities. However, we also need to decarbonize other sectors and value chains. This will require 
reshaping transport systems, building and urban design, industrial processes, and agricultural activities to enable either 
cost-effective	zero-emissions	electrification	or	a	zero-carbon	non-power	energy	supply.	In	both	cases,	radical	improvements	
in energy productivity are also required. Achieving this will require the widespread use of new energy technologies, more 
circular production systems using recycled materials and more re-usable components, pervasive digitization to reduce 
energy waste, as well as more integrated strategies for land, energy, and water use. It will only be possible if technological 
and	design	change	is	complemented	and	enabled	by	changes	in	individual	behavior,	by	new	business	and	financing	models,	
and by predictable policies and regulations which send a strong, clear signal to markets (ETC 2016, p.4).
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6See i.a. Pichelmann for DG ECFIN, European Commission (2015): “over the medium-term a scenario might prevail by which 
the pace of productivity growth will be slower in the EU than in the emerging economies. Such a trend combined with 
demographic and climate change constraints in the EU would make agendas for structural reform, greater competition, 
trade opening, the transition to more knowledge-based economies, and deeper European integration and international 
cooperation even more necessary, while at the same time less socially acceptable if in this process too many people 
are left behind. The EU will have to develop a project integrating adequately fairness issues”. And the OECD: “restoring 
robust	economic	growth,	addressing	systemic	risk	and	instability	in	finance	while	ensuring	investment	in	the	real	economy,	
slowing productivity, growing inequality in wealth distribution and persistent poverty, as well as ensuring the environmental 
sustainability of global economic development” (OECD, 2015).
7ESRB (2016). Sachs et al. (2015) warn that achieving the COP21 targets by “picking the low hanging fruit” would make it 
difficult	to	embark	on	a	goal	of	deep	decarbonization	because	of	the	deployment	of	suboptimal	technology-based	solutions	
and	changes	to	infrastructure.	In	contrast,	the	ESRB	Report	(executive	summary),	states:	“[b]elated	awareness	about	the	
importance of controlling emissions could result in an abrupt implementation of quantity constraints on the use of carbon-
intensive	energy	sources…[A]	sudden	transition	away	from	fossil-fuel	energy	could	harm	GDP,	as	alternative	sources	of	energy	
would	be	restricted	in	supply	and	more	expensive	at	the	margin…[and]	there	could	be	a	sudden	repricing	of	carbon-intensive	
assets,	which	are	financed	in	large	part	by	debt.	According	to	this	view,	this	would	lead	to	a	“hard	landing”	exacerbated	by	a	
lack	of	technological	progress.	Inasmuch,	as	discussed	below,	we	are	not	convinced	that	an	innovation	deficit	is	at	the	root	of	
these dire predictions, preparing for preparing for changes through the deployment of already-developed technologies may 
not lead to the massive disruptions the report anticipates. See also Fagerberg (2015) who argues that the needed innovation 
is	achievable	with	the	adoption	of	specific	policies	and	initiatives.
8Suffice	it	to	consider	that,	as	estimated	by	McGlade	and	Ekins	(2015),	if	the	rise	in	average	global	temperatures	is	to	be	kept	
below 2°C, then approximately 35% of current oil reserves. 50% of gas reserves and nearly 90% of coal reserves should 
be seen as unusable. It is interesting to couple this observation with Weyzig et al. (2014), who estimates the exposure of 
European	financial	institutions	to	fossil-fuel	firms	as	exceeding	one	trillion	Euros.	
9HSBC (2013) estimated that a sudden transition away from fossil fuels might lead to up to 50% decrease in market 
capitalization for oil and gas companies, including both the risk of stranded assets and reduced demand. 
parts: 1) reducing emissions stemming from the energy supply by increasing the share 
of zero-carbon energy in the supply mix and 2) moderating growth in the demand for 
energy. We would place the sources in three, rather than in two categories: 1) the energy/
electricity	industry	that	extracts,	refines,	produces	and	transmits	energy	and	its	precursors	
that power the system, 2) transportation/mobility, housing/shelter, and food/nutrition that 
use energy to function, and 3) the industrial system that supplies the materials and physical 
capital that are essential for the economic system to function successfully in transportation/
mobility, housing/shelter, food/nutrition, and the provision of other consumer products. 
This expanded categorisation is more useful for policy redesign.
Complicating factors are numerous, however. First, global warming is not the only 
outstanding challenge faced by our societies, and it is important to address it in a way that 
does not compromise other equally urgent lines of action (e.g., the World Bank’s Shared 
Prosperity agenda)6:  a recent report by the European Systemic Risk Board highlighted 
the	 social	 and	 financial	 risks	 associated	 with	 a	 sudden,	 late	 action	 to	 curb	 emission	
levels.7  Second, it is important to realise that this process is likely to create both winners 
and losers. While society as a whole will gain enormously from decarbonisation in the 
medium and long term, in the short term some industry players will exit the market; entire 
industries (mostly, the ones based on fossil fuels production or distribution or those who 
are	displaced	by	firms	using	technologies	with	much	lower	GHG	emissions)	may	be	wiped	
away;8	the	global	financial	market	will	experience	serious	turbulence;9 and some workers 
will	see	their	jobs	at	risk	if	their	training	and	skills	are	not	updated	to	reflect	new	market	
needs. Third, some countries will be more affected than others, and this, too, can create 
collective	action	problems	in	a	governance	scenario	that	is	still	awaiting	a	clear	definition,	
with commitments that are unlikely to be enforceable and will be left to an imperfect form 
of management-based governance framework (Coglianese, 2015). Fourth, the short-term 
outlook for decarbonisation-oriented policies might not be aligned with the electoral cycle, 
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which might create even weaker incentives for policy-makers to embrace the long(er)-term 
challenge. Fifth, as we explain below, there is no way that long-term decarbonisation goals 
can be achieved without a concrete, proactive and collaborative participation of national 
governments and private players. This is a public-private endeavour that requires trust 
and	significant	mutual	commitment,	and	might	even	entail	sacrificing	short-term	profit	for	
some of the parties, in the face of likely unequal longer-term gains. 
Should this not suffice, the decarbonisation task is made even more Herculean by 
the inadequacy of the existing legal and financial framework. Both at the international 
and domestic level, legal rules and public policies are often providing the wrong incentives, 
facilitating transactions that do not achieve the underlying long-term goal of pursuing 
decarbonisation (or any other sustainability-related goal). GDP still catalyses most of 
the	 attention	 (including	 that	 of	 global	 financial	 markets)	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 measuring	
countries’ performance; international donors often link their fund allocations to variables 
that have nothing to do with sustainability (e.g., the ease of doing business); and trade 
rules up to now are still largely carbon-insensitive, and end up encouraging low-cost, high-
carbon products over more sustainable ones (but see the discussion below on carbon 
leakage in Myth #7). National governments often decide on their agendas and assess and 
monitor the impacts of their rules in a way that has nothing to do with decarbonisation; 
in many countries, governments regulate markets and develop industrial policies in an 
uncoordinated way, especially from the point of view of the transition towards a low- 
or (zero-) carbon economy. Many policies, from taxation to public procurement, provide 
incentives and trigger market behaviour that is not conducive to long-term decarbonisation 
goals. And indeed, organisations such as the OECD (2015) have highlighted the urgency 
of	 policy	 alignment	 and	 coherence	 as	 a	 necessary,	 though	 not	 sufficient,	 condition	 for	
advancing towards a zero carbon economy.
Faced with such complexity and coordination, many commentators and policy-
makers have reverted to innovation as the ‘ultimate solution’ (or the last resort) 
for tackling global warming (see, for example, Fagerberg, 2015). In Paris during COP21, 
innovation was given the same prominence as energy, and a “mission innovation” was 
launched by 20 governments with the aim to promote the development and diffusion 
of new technologies. This announcement was immediately echoed by the creation of a 
Breakthrough Energy Coalition, a private initiative that involves an international group 
of 28 investors to bring companies that have the potential to deliver affordable, reliable 
and carbon-free power from the research lab to the market.10 Invoking innovation is 
easier said than done, however, and is per se not sufficient. On the one hand, R&D 
investment in renewable energy seems to be still dwarfed by investment in technologies 
related to fossil fuels (which still account for 70% of new energy investment according 
to the IEA11), to the extent that the OECD estimated the need for an additional R&D 
investment of as much as 1 trillion dollars per year to decarbonise the economy while 
maintaining	a	sufficient	level	of	energy	supply.12 On the other hand, additional investment 
seems	to	chiefly	depend	on	major	policy	and	regulatory	effort	to	achieve	a	sufficient	level	
of regulatory stability and certainty, and promote those types of systemic, transformative 
innovations that can provide the decisive contribution to decarbonisation in the long term 
(see the discussion of systemic innovation in section 1.2.2). This in turn means that many 
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10http://newsroom.unfccc.int/clean-energy/mission-innovation-clean-energy/
11IEA 2015.
12Kaminker	and	Stewart	(2012).
13Note that based on Eurostat data industrial production in the EU28 never went back to pre-crisis levels. It reached the 
highest value in April 2008 and then fell continuously for one year until in April 2009 when it was more than 22% points 
below its former peak. Afterwards the indicator steadily increased again and regained over 90% of its pre-crisis value by 
May 2011, and has had highs and lows since then. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:EU-28_
Industrial_production_total_and_MIGs_monthly_data_seasonally_adjusted_2005-2015.png
traditional innovation policy tools, typically based on technological innovation and R&D 
support, are to be thoroughly revisited and brought in line with current needs.
Against this background, the situation of the European Union is perhaps even more 
complicated, even if some EU member states appear more advanced than most other 
world economies in their path towards environmental sustainability (Sachs et al., 2015). 
After being a pioneer in its climate mitigation efforts, over time the EU has set more 
ambitious goals in its climate action strategy, and today it aims to cut emissions to 80% 
below 1990 levels by 2050, with intermediate milestones in 2030 (40%) and 2040 (60%). 
Climate action appears to have only marginally affected the EU policy process, however, 
and in particular its better regulation agenda. Moreover, the decarbonisation debate has 
gradually been ‘decoupled’ from the more prominent debate on growth and jobs. As a result, 
and perhaps not surprisingly, Europe (as well as the US) appears to have become a living 
portrait of the policy misalignment that could jeopardise the achievement of much-needed 
sustainability goals, as denounced by commentators and international organisations.
The most telling example in this respect, as explained below in more detail, is the 
still uncertain fate of the Europe 2020 strategy for “smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth”, which – however imperfect – represented an early, pioneering attempt to create 
links between related, but often separate, concepts such as innovation, the environment, 
and sustainable growth and employment (EEB 2015; Renda 2014). Europe 2020, however 
imperfect in its governance and uncertain in its positioning within the broader context of 
the European Semester, marked an important milestone since it set a vision for Europe’s 
priorities and evolution in the medium term; and was potentially an important step towards 
the alignment of policies (including innovation policy and industrial policy) in support of 
long-term goals (Renda, 2014). But the strategy has been gradually eroded and made less 
meaningful by the economic downturn and by the ‘perfect storm’ that hit Europe since the 
end	of	the	last	decade,	and	is	now	leading	towards	a	deflationary	spiral,	notwithstanding	
the efforts of the ECB to pump liquidity into the system through quantitative easing (Sinn, 
2016),	not	to	mention	the	possible	negative	effects	of	the	recent	UK	vote	for	Brexit.	As	
it became clear that the 2020 targets were unattainable (ironically, with the exception of 
environmental ones, due to a serious fall in industrial production as a result of the 2008 
financial/economic	crisis)13 and short-term emergency measures dominated the scene, the 
Europe 2020 strategy was gradually abandoned. Its expected review, originally scheduled 
for the second half of 2014, was never completed by the European Commission, and 
hence a concrete proposal on how to re-launch Europe’s strategy for smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth was never brought to the attention of the European Parliament and 
the Council. The absence of a comprehensive framework in which to address the links 
between EU policies, innovation, sustainable development and decarbonisation deprived 
Europe of the instruments it needed to navigate its way out of the perfect storm – what 
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1.1  Nine myths on innovation, sustainable development 
and the low-carbon economy
Why is this untrue?
This formulation is derived from the goals of the Lisbon Strategy and its successor Europe 
2020, and is now being questioned.14 What may be possible are mutual gains in economic 
welfare,	 a	 reduction	 of	 GHGs,	 and	 employment;	 however,	 significant	 gains	 in	 private-
sector	profit	or	even	GDP	may	not	necessarily	be	possible	or	desirable,	and	policies	will	
increasingly create both winners and losers, with consequent distributional effects. The 
limitations of both GDP and productivity as adequate metrics for economic welfare and 
predictors of employment are now well recognised (see Ashford & Hall, 2011a).15 This will 
require a reformulation and re-articulation of EU goals for 2030, 2050, and beyond. 
The	 distinction	 between	 policies	 directed	 towards	 increasing	 traditionally-defined	
competitiveness and those directed towards enhancing economic welfare is that the 
former	are	profit-driven	and	best	informed	by	GDP,	while	the	latter	are	human-needs	(or	
end-use functions) driven – including employment – and described by other and broader 
metrics	 [see	 (i24c	2016)].	Because	 the	 term	 ‘competitiveness’	 is	now	so	often	used	 in	
policy	discussions,	an	alternative	is	to	be	clear	that	the	term	is	not	restricted	to	profit	or	
increases in GDP or market share – derived from the usual private-sector-dominated metrics 
-- but rather also includes societal measures of economic and social welfare, including 
employment. See especially Aiginger et al. (2013), who argue for a more comprehensive 
definition	of	competitiveness.
Myth #1  It is possible to realise mutual gains in industrial 
competitiveness, GHGs reduction, and employment 
we would call an industrial policy for achieving sustainability. As things stand, Europe risks 
going from leader to laggard in sustainable development, and to end up invoking innovation 
for the sake of it, as an end rather than as a means (EEB, 2015).
Much has been said and written about decarbonisation. Countless reports and scholarly 
articles have shaped this debate, sometimes taking a more balanced and enlightened view, 
and sometimes taking more partisan positions. Accordingly, several years of discussion 
have led to the emergence of a number of myths, which must be dispelled before we 
proceed towards what we consider to be a balanced, carefully designed policy strategy to 
face the decarbonisation challenge and all the constraints and opportunities that come with 
it.	This	is	why	this	section	tries	to	briefly	describe	nine	myths	related	to	this	crucial	debate.	
See also a complementary compilation of myths by Aiginger (2016).  
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14See ESPAS (2015) “Global Trends to 2030: Can the EU Meet the Challenges Ahead?”
15There	is	good	GDP	and	bad	GDP.	All	GDP	measures	reflect	expenditures	related	to	transactions	which	are	as	different	as	
selling cars and treating lung disease caused by air pollution from those cars. See i.a., Philipsen, D. (2015), The Little Big 
Number: How GDP Came to Rule the World and What to Do about It, Princeton University Press. 
Why is this untrue?
(See the box on the diffusion/innovation debate) The technology innovation process consists 
of	invention,	innovation,	and	diffusion.	There	are	many	analysts	[e.g.,	Amory	Lovins	(2011)	
and	Robert	Ayers	(2016)]	who	argue	that	there	are	many	technologies	already	in	existence	
that could be put to use, but which suffer from the inadequacies of appropriate market 
and	 regulatory	signals,	 in	sufficient	market	demand,	and/or	 lock-in	due	 to	 inappropriate	
policies,	not	to	mention	influence	and	agency	capture	by	incumbent	technology	providers	
(see	Bhattacharjee	and	McCoy	2012	for	an	extensive	 incentives	analysis	 influencing	the	
diffusion of energy technologies). For earlier work focusing on options for achieving 
reductions in GHGs, see Pacala and Socolow (2004) and Blok et al. (2012). Further, more 
than technological innovation is needed. Institutional, organisational, and societal/social 
innovation is also essential and should always be kept in mind by policy-makers as part of 
the bigger picture of what innovation can do for long-term societal well-being.16
Myth #2  Technological innovation in products and services is essential 
for deep decarbonisation. Europe is suffering from an ‘innovation 
deficit’ 
In order to sensibly discuss the diffusion/innovation debate, it is useful to consider the 
sources of greenhouse gas emissions. It is acknowledged that transportation/mobility, 
housing/shelter, and food/nutrition are not only 80% of Europe’s resource use and 60% of 
its household expenditures (i24c 2016), but also they are the areas of economic activity that 
consume	energy	and	materials,	and	provide	services,	that	lead	to	significant	greenhouse	
gas (GHG) emissions and environmental contamination. More upstream, the energy/
electricity	 industry	 extracts,	 refines,	 produces	 and	 transmits	 energy	 and	 its	 precursors	
that power the system, and the industrial system supplies the materials and physical 
capital that is essential for the economic system to function successfully in transportation/
mobility, housing/shelter, food/nutrition, and the provision of other consumer products. 
By design, the world is driven by what Daly (2008) calls a “throughput mentality”, rarely or 
insufficiently	internalising	the	externalities	that	accompany	the	production	and	consumption	
of goods and services. On the contrary, both production and consumption are encouraged 
and subsidised, creating a pseudo-equilibrium, which occasionally collapses as a result of 
a	financial	bubble	(Ayers,	2015;	Stiglitz,	2010).	The	rules	under	which	industrial	economics	
BOX - THE DIFFUSION/INNOVATION DEBATE
The sources of greenhouse gas emissions
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16For example, Sachs et al. (2015) examine DDPs without modelling new technologies, only looking at the ones being 
commercially available or currently being tested.
operate	 do	 not	 favour	 conservation,	 energy	 efficiency,	 or	 the	 essential	 determinants	 of	 growth	
(for a provocative report addressing the necessity of a new approach, see Stiglitz (2015) and also 
Dernbach (2011). Not only is there a serious absence of rules dealing with the various compromises to 
sustainability,	there	is	a	deficit	of	monitoring,	enforcement,	and	compliance	of	the	rules	that	do	exist.
Beyond improvements addressing the externalities contributing to GHGs emissions and pollution 
(what comprises an overarching environmental policy approach), the policies are not directed towards 
the transformation of the industrial system involving 1) a very low carbon system, 2) low-waste value 
chains associated with the economic activities mentioned above, and 3) a circular economy related 
to enhancing dematerialisation and de-energizing the production of goods and services (see Ekins 
et al., 2015). These could comprise a re-designed industrial policy approach. Together they constitute 
an integrated sustainable industrial policy for the environment, a kind of industrial ecosystem, as 
some have called it. While both innovation and diffusion might be important for improving both the 
environment and economic welfare, existing challenges to governance do not imply that they are 
magic bullets, and the optimal balance among them is not likely to be the same for addressing the 
different sources of GHG emissions. Both supply-side and demand-side policies are in need of re-
examination and re-design.
A number of reports and studies address the goal of decarbonisation, but one stands out for its 
conciseness and focus on manufacturing (Ahman and Nilson 2015).
The debate in the literature
Despite	considerable	evidence	that	a	diffusion	deficit,	rather	than	an	innovation	deficit	characterises	
the need to deploy existing technological approaches, articles and reports continue to reinforce the 
latter.  Especially revealing is the recent article in Foreign Affairs by Sivaram and Norris (2016). The 
emphasis is to support R&D on the power grid, citing the importance of the Breakthrough Energy 
Coalition, involving 28 investors from 10 countries, unveiled by Bill Gates and President Obama’s 
announcement of the formation of Mission Innovation involving a 20-country commitment focusing 
on power generation and transmission, and arguing for future public-private partnerships to advance 
the needed innovation. 
Romm	(2016)	offers	a	convincing	debunking	of	this	perspective,	arguing	that	“[t]he	truth	is	that	we	
have dawdled so long on serious climate action that we must rapidly slash CO2 emissions, which 
requires	over	a	100	times	more	money	spent	on	deployment	[diffusion]	than	R&D.”	Further,	based	on	
the history of successful innovation, the author argues that we should not expect that breakthrough 
technologies can be developed in time. Looking closer at the debate, when the term R&D is used, 
sometimes advocates are arguing for basic R&D, and sometimes moving technologies from bench 
or	 lab	up	to	practical	scale	are	 intended	by	that	 term,	such	as	what	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	US	ARPA-E	
endeavour. The difference is important, and semantics should not obscure key differences in what 
is	being	advocated	or	planned.	Clarity	and	focus	in	the	details	of	specific	projects,	and	what	is	being	
specifically	recommended,	would	help	the	policy	planning	process.	In	this	regard,	the	reader	is	referred	
to	a	recent	report	by	i24c	(2016)	in	which	it	is	stated;	“[t]he	energy	sector,	Europe	has	no	ideas	deficit,	
but	in	many	instances,	a	deployment	[diffusion]	deficit.”
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Why is this untrue?
Much innovation in products and processes simply employs more material (natural and 
physical capital) and energy. While fostering increased GDP it increasingly destroys jobs, 
as the labour content of production decreases and contributes to a heavy non-energy-
related environmental footprint and un- or under-employment in both blue- and white collar 
professions (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014). As discussed under Myth#2 above: Europe, 
like	the	United	States,	may	be	suffering	more	from	a	‘diffusion	deficit’.	A	more	nuanced	
innovation policy, taking into account the effects on employment of invention, innovation, 
and diffusion needs to be adopted so that interventions in the appropriate part of the 
innovation cycle, e.g., deployment rather than basic R&D, can be used to achieve positive 
consequences for employment.17
Why is this untrue?
The US experience with aircraft, computers, the internet, space technology, and 
pharmaceuticals (to name but a few examples) clearly demonstrates the power of 
government research funding, e.g., see the US examples of DARPA and ARPA (Mazzucato, 
2014; Bonvillian & Van Atta, 2011). In a recent contribution, Mariana Mazzucato convincingly 
argued that state-funded research (e.g., the ARPA-E in the US) is achieving major 
breakthroughs in at least one of the key technologies that will provide a contribution to 
decarbonisation, i.e., batteries for energy storage. In addition, what is important for the 
purposes of this report is that while private sector efforts such as Elon Musk’s Tesla have 
taken important steps towards the production of “an existing, pretty powerful battery 
technology”, ARPA-E has been pursuing technological innovation in the purest sense, by 
“creating	new	ways	of	doing”	things	that	“have	the	potential	to	be	significantly	better.”18 
Bill Gates himself acknowledged that only the state, in the form of public institutions like 
ARPA-E, can lead the way to an energy breakthrough.19
Why is this untrue?
An industrial policy not only encompasses invention, innovation and diffusion, it also 
envisions, i.a., the training – and re-education – of scientists, engineers, data and ICT 
specialists, etc., but also service and healthcare providers, in addition to well-conceived 
employment and social policy options (Ashford and Hall 2011). Trickle-down theory – often 
accompanied by the mantra ‘a rising tide raises all boats’ – embodying the belief that 
Myth #3   Innovation per se fuels the industrial state and creates jobs 
Myth #4   Governments cannot pick winners - winners pick governments
Myth #5   Industrial policy is synonymous with innovation policy
17See Goldman Sachs on lack of scale of some techs http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/pages/new-energy-
landscape-folder/report-the-low-carbon-economy/report.pdf. And http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/
uploads/2016/01/Dechezlepretre-et-al-policy-brief-Jan-2016.pdf. 
18See Mazzucato (2014). 
19Gates (2012) 
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Why is this untrue?
There is overwhelming empirical evidence that regulation, especially stringent regulation 
and standards, properly designed, have stimulated new products, processes, and work 
practices that would not otherwise have occurred (Ashford et al., 1985; Porter & van der 
Linde, 1992; Pelkmans & Renda 2014; see also OECD, 2016b for a recent comparison 
of stringency). However, often transformative, disruptive innovation comes from outside 
the incumbent producers or providers, which implies that care must be taken in order 
to	prevent	 incumbents	and	special	 interests	 from	unduly	 influencing	both	 the	 industrial	
and the regulatory policy process. Negotiated agreements and self-regulation need to 
be	 viewed	with	 appropriate	 scrutiny	 [Ashford	&	Caldart	 (1999);	Coglianese	 (2015)].	 For	
what	 concerns	more	 specifically	 decarbonisation,	Dechezleprêtre	 et	 al.	 (2016)	map	 the	
relationship between the number of low-carbon inventions for which patent protection 
has been sought by inventors located in OECD countries between 1990 and 2012, along 
with an indicator of the stringency of climate change policy developed by the OECD (Botta 
&	Kozluk,	2016).	The	graph	is	shown	below	and	shows	a	correlation	between	innovation	
efforts and the stringency of policy.21 
Myth #6   Regulation inhibits beneficial innovation 
20See Steward (2015) “Building an EU Industrial Policy Focused on Innovation” presented at the i24c Workshop on Innovation 
for Industrial Competitiveness, 9 September 2015. Professor Steward. See also: vivideconomics (2015) “Understanding 
European Industrial Competitiveness and Drivers of Innovation in the New Global Economy” prepared for i24c.
21Quote i.a., Lanjouw and Mody (1996), Jaffe and Palmer (1997), Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003), Johnstone et al. (2010), 
Dechezleprêtre	and	Glachant	(2014).
economic	advance	 in	 the	private	sector	benefits	society	and	workers	as	well	 has	been	
basically discredited. The economic crisis of 2008 stands out as a stark reminder. In a recent 
commentary on the relationship between industrial policy and innovation policy, aiming to 
establish an ‘industrial compact’ focusing on system changes envisioning techno-economic 
and socio-technical transformations, Steward (2015) argues that the industrial compact 
should be “broad in scope, have purposive directionality, deliver system transformation 
and rely on network capabilities”20	and	not	expect	that	enhancing	industry	profit	alone	will	
benefit	others	in	the	society.		
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Source:	Dechezleprêtre	et	al.	2016.	Data	from	the	PATSTAT	database	and	OECD	Climate	policy	stringency	
indicator (2014). Individual countries are weighted by their GDP in order to calculate the average policy 
stringency across the OECD.
Figure 2 - Innovation and stringency of climate change policies
Why is this untrue?
‘Emissions	 leakage’	 is	 generally	 defined	 as	 the	 increase	 in	 foreign	 emissions	 that	 is	
the consequence of domestic actions to reduce emissions that encourages the export 
of	 manufacturing	 abroad	 [Fischer	 (2015)	 p.	 298].	 Not	 only	 may	 foreign	 producers	 use	
cheaper	(and	dirtier)	energy	sources,	they	may	also	be	generally	less	efficient	than	first-
world	domestic	firms	in	their	manufacturing	operations.	The	consequence	is	usually	that	
global	energy	prices	go	down	as	other	[exporting]	countries	consume	more	fossil	fuels.	
The	implications	for	competitiveness	can	be	significant,	as	can	the	impacts	on	world	trade	
activities (Carbon Trust, 2009; Fischer, 2015; Mavroidis & de Melo, 2015; Wu & Salzman, 
2014). “China’s exports are eight times as carbon-intensive as those of the EU and three 
times	as	those	of	the	US”	[Atkinson	et	al.	(2011),	as	quoted	in	Fischer	(2015)	p.	305].
In fact, the export of manufacturing (e.g., from the EU and the US to China) and services 
(e.g.,	 to	 India)	 has	 been	 accelerated	 and	 intensified	 by	 the	 absence	 of	 enforceable	 or	
Myth #7   Carbon leakage presents a practical disincentive and limits 
what regulation can achieve in terms of decarbonisation 
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enforced regulations in those locations, allowing domestic importers in developed countries 
to	“trade	on	the	externalities”	and	thereby	increase	their	profits,	with	negligible	reduction	
of prices to consumers – as well as a reduction of jobs at home. Trade rules should allow 
discrimination between products and services that are attended by undesirable side 
effects like adverse health, safety, environmental or climate change effects (WTO asbestos 
decision),	as	well	as	adverse	employment	effects	[see	Capaldo	(2014)	on	the	development	
on	the	TTIP].	In	a	recent	publication,	also	the	World	Economic	Forum	(2015)	acknowledged	
that sustainable and effective trade policy, including most notably the prominent role of 
decarbonisation in regional and bilateral trade agreements, is one of the enabling factors 
of long-term decarbonisation.22
If enough major economies could agree on a coordinated approach to carbon pricing/a 
uniform	global	price	on	carbon	that	spreads	coverage	broadly	enough	[which	 is	not	 the	
case	with	nations	acting	independently],	carbon	leakage	would	become	less	of	an	issue	
[Fischer	(2015)	p.	298].
Barring the adoption of a global price for carbon in the near future, the concerns of 
especially developed countries wanting to curtail global GHG emissions may well turn to 
options affecting international trade to address their concerns for adverse effects on their 
international competitiveness, namely 1) subsidies for the development and deployment 
of cleaner technologies, so-called ‘green subsidies’ (Charnovitz, 2014) and 2) border 
carbon adjustments (BCAs) (Condon & Ignaciuk, 2013). While countervailing duties may 
well be allowed under Section XX of the GATT to prevent the import of goods produced 
with inappropriately high energy (disadvantaging developing countries), subsidies for 
environmental improvements are no longer exempt from ‘actionable subsidies’ prohibited 
by the WTO. Trade scholars have uniformly called for a revision to the WTO trade rules, 
specifically	the	Subsidies	Code	(Charnovitz,	2014;	Condon	&	Ignaciuk,	2013;	Fischer,	2015;	
Mavroidis & de Melo, 2015; Wu & Salzman, 2014; ETC, 2016). 
Why is this untrue?
Both the experience with NAFTA and the WTO have clearly demonstrated not only 
a loss of health, safety, and environmental protection, but also a worsening of wages, 
working conditions, and human and working rights in one or both parties to trade (Greider; 
Scott).	Money	flows	from	the	developing	world	to	the	developed	world	where	returns	on	
investment	are	the	highest.	Trade	does	indeed	primarily	benefit	the	private-sector	exporters	
and	importers,	contributing	to	wealth	and	income	inequality,	but	does	not	always	benefit	
consumers and workers. EU trade initiatives (TTIP and other policies) need to be carefully 
assessed – and changed if necessary – for their potential to contribute to mitigating global 
climate change, as well as their adverse impact on employment.23
Myth #8   Trade in non-energy-related goods and services is a win-win 
proposition for all parties to trade 
22WEF “Scaling technologies to Decarbonize Energy”, October 2015. 
23See the important new study “The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade” by 
Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2016): http://www.nber.org/papers/w21906.
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Why is this untrue?
It	is	clear	that	a	multilateral	effort	is	needed	for	significant,	high-risk	industrial	development,	
combining	 skills,	 insight,	 and	 financial	 capital	 and	 joint	 risk	 taking	 –	 such	 as	 has	 been	
suggested	 for	 a	 	 ‘Global	 Apollo	 Programme	 to	 Combat	 Climate	 Change’	 (King	 et	 al.,	
undated). With real and uncertain costs in transitioning to different energy futures, 
collaborative efforts should be pursued wherever possible so that long-term goals not be 
undercut by short-term competitive advantage and free-riding.24 In illustrating the global 
nature of clean energy technology and the importance of technology transfer (diffusion), 
Gallagher (2014) argues that 1) clean energy technology innovation has globalised; it is 
no longer a national process, 2) the most important barriers are cost, lack of policy, and 
insufficient	access	to	finance,	and	3)	the	best	incentives	are	market-formation	policies	and	
the	provision	of	affordable	finance.
Taking decarbonisation seriously is such a daunting and urgent task that it requires the 
mobilisation of all existing resources and policy levers that governments can use. This 
includes focusing on the core policies that can exert a direct impact on the transition 
towards a low-carbon economy, and coupling them with a consistent overall government 
approach to innovation and better regulation to ensure that all aspects of public policy 
reflect	the	growing	importance	of	reaching	decarbonisation	goals.	This	will	require	a	major	
effort, with a level of ambition that surpasses that of the resounding Paris accord; and 
major	changes	in	the	methods	and	approaches	followed	by	governments	in	the	definition,	
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies. 
More	specifically,	changing	the	policy	mix	will	be	dramatic	since	it	will	require	re-engineering	
the current mainstream approach to policymaking. As a matter of fact, by design, modern 
capitalism	 is	 driven	by	 a	 ‘throughput	mentality’,	 rarely	 or	 insufficiently	 internalising	 the	
externalities that accompany the production and consumption of goods and services.25 On 
the contrary, many current policies encourage and subsidise production and consumption, 
creating a pseudo-equilibrium that ends up occasionally collapsing in the creation of 
financial	bubbles,	such	as	occurred	 in	2008	[see	Ayres	(2014)	The	Bubble	Economy	and	
Stiglitz	(2010)	FreeFall].	The rules under which industrial economics operate do not 
favour conservation, energy efficiency, or the essential determinants of growth.26 
Not only is there a serious absence of rules dealing with the various compromises to 
sustainability;	there	is	a	deficit	of	monitoring,	enforcement,	and	compliance	of	the	rules	
Myth #9   Nations can ‘go it alone’ 
24See	K.	S.	Gallagher	(2014)	The	Globalization	of	Clean	Energy	Technology:	Lessons	from	China.	MIT	Press.
25Herman Daly (2008)
26For a provocative report addressing the necessity of a new approach, see Stiglitz (2015) “Rewriting the Rules for the 
American Economy: An Agenda for Growth and Shared Prosperity”; see also Dernbach (2011), “Creating the Law of 
Environmentally Sustainable Development.”
1.2 From the throughput mentality 
to a new policy mix 
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Beyond improvements addressing the externalities contributing to GHGs emissions and 
pollution (which comprises an overarching environmental policy approach), many existing 
policies are not directed towards transformation of the industrial system involving 1) a 
very low or zero carbon system, 2) low-waste value chains associated with the economic 
activities mentioned above, and 3) a circular economy related to enhancing dematerialisation 
and de-energising the production of goods and services (Allwood and Cullen 2012; Ekins 
et al. 2015). These could comprise a re-designed industrial policy approach. Together they 
constitute an integrated sustainable industrial policy for the environment, a kind of industrial 
ecosystem or energy innovation ecosystem as some have called it.27 Both innovation and 
diffusion are important for improving the environment and economic welfare, but existing 
challenges to governance imply that they are far from being magic bullets. Regulation and 
regulatory governance are essential in many respects: 
• Establishing a greater degree of regulatory certainty and predictability that currently 
otherwise hampers investment in, and the diffusion of, new low-carbon technologies. 
This	 includes	 affecting	 expectations,	 in	 particular	 for	 financial	 intermediaries,	 of	 the	
technologies that are likely to receive regulatory scrutiny in the medium and long term.
 
• Setting targets and outcomes that, if adequately stringent, would incentivise the 
deployment of new technologies that are compatible with long-term decarbonisation 
and	standards	that	facilitate	the	exit	of	the	most	inefficient	products	and	firms	off	the	
market.
• Creating incentives for consumers to switch to more sustainable patterns of 
consumption and for existing or new market players to challenge existing business 
models and create innovative products and processes that could lead to a smoother 
transition towards a low- or zero-carbon economy.
In this respect, the core policy framework that affects long-term decarbonisation includes 
the following elements:
• ‘Core’ policies (including both supply-side and demand-side policies) that directly 
affect decarbonisation. These include, in line with what was observed by the OECD 
(2015), the removal of fossil fuel subsidies, fuel taxation, carbon pricing, cap-and-trade 
and direct regulation and various forms of renewable energy promotion. Those policy 
strategies include putting a price on carbon emissions; adopting policies targeting carbon 
intensity measures; resource planning strategies; appropriate subsidies; establishing 
emissions standards for contracts or supply portfolios; and regulation of environmental 
impacts other than GHGs. Their aim is, i.a., to send a robust and credible price signal 
to internalise the cost of emissions; and to trigger behavioural and production changes 
through regulatory measures whenever pricing is not effective. They can take the form 
of	 both	 supply-side	 and	 demand-side	 policies,	 and	 can	 try	 to	 influence	 the	 energy	
27I24c (2016b).
that do exist, calling into question regulatory governance arrangements. This is especially 
the	case	with	 the	financial	 architecture	of	 the	eurozone,	but	also	extends	 to	 the	entire	
system	of	financial	flows.		
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extraction	and	production	phases,	restrict	the	market	for	specific	materials	considered	
as	unsustainable,	expand	the	market	for	sustainable	ones,	or	address	final	uses	(e.g.,	
transportation,	agriculture)	or	even	final	users	to	exert	an	impact	on	the	overall	level	of	
emissions	generated	by	specific	value	chains.
• Horizontal policies, which include several policy domains, including i.a., public 
procurement and trade policy. Both these policy areas affect the extent to which 
governments ‘demand’ low-carbon products, thus creating a market for them. If one 
considers that public procurement represents a relatively large share of the domestic 
market	(close	to	one-fifth	of	GDP	in	Europe),	it	becomes	clear	that	a	robust	commitment	
towards purchasing only sustainable products (and where appropriate, innovative and 
sustainable products) can help governments pave the way towards decarbonisation. 
Similarly, harnessing trade policy can become an important enabler of the future 
decarbonised economy.  
• Innovation policy encompasses several supply-side and demand-side measures, 
including expenditure measures (public R&D, support for private R&D, funding schemes 
for entrepreneurs, equity and debt capital provision, etc.); regulatory measures 
(e.g., intellectual property rights, technology transfer regulations, etc.); demand-side 
policies (strategic use of public procurement, pre-commercial procurement, etc.); and 
orchestration activities oriented towards societal challenges (e.g., mission-led multi-
stakeholder platforms, overall government incentive programmes etc.). 
• Better regulation	entails	the	adoption	of	specific	tools,	procedures	and	metrics,	which	
must be interpreted as broadly leading to more transparent, accountable, evidence-based 
policymaking. The most widely mentioned better regulation tools include adequate and 
transparent legislative and regulatory planning, widespread stakeholder consultation, 
the use of ex ante impact assessments, adequate monitoring arrangements, ex post 
evaluations of individual pieces of legislation/regulation or groups thereof, dedicated 
programmes	aimed	at	streamlining	and	 improving	 the	condition	of	specific	 industry	
players, ad hoc reviews of legislation, etc. As widely acknowledged (e.g., at the OECD 
level), better regulation produces its most effective outcomes when accompanied by 
a suitable governance framework, which typically includes the appointment of one or 
more regulatory oversight bodies, and the creation of appropriate skills in administration.
• A sustainable development strategy is essential to steer government initiatives towards 
decarbonisation. We believe that a meaningful strategy for sustainable development 
is to be preferred to a strategy restricted to the goal of decarbonisation per se: as a 
matter of fact, an all-encompassing strategy that analyses alternative decarbonisation 
pathways in terms of their possible impacts on other, equally important societal goals 
such	as	i.a.,	employment,	financial	stability	and	the	protection	of	fundamental	rights,	is	
the	first	best	for	governments	wishing	to	take	decarbonisation	seriously.	Such	a	long-
term strategy (which should extend to almost the end of the century) must then lead 
to	the	identification	and	deployment	of	adequate	indicators	and	assessment	methods,	
to be used in the daily activity of policymakers when using better regulation tools. 
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Figure 2 - Innovation and stringency of climate change policies
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
As shown in the graph above, we contend that governments should start from the latter 
point	 (defining	 a	 sustainable	 development	 strategy)	 to	 then	move	 towards	 a	whole-of-
government better regulation agenda that places sustainable development and in particular 
decarbonisation front and centre when considering any relevant regulatory and legislative 
action in the future, including retrospective reviews of the existing stock of legislation 
and regulation. As we explain below, we believe that such actions should be informed by 
open, inclusive, consolidated multi-stakeholder platforms that act as interlocutors of the 
government by preparing state-of-the-art technology and business roadmaps and helping 
the administration devise suitable strategies to avoid technology lock-in, regulatory capture, 
incumbency problems and other suboptimal outcomes. Only then can governments identify 
the	best	possible	approaches	to	both	horizontal	policies	and	sector-specific	regulation.
Below,	we	reflect	in	more	detail	on	changes	needed	in	core	policies,	in	innovation	policy,	
and in better regulation systems. 
1.2.1   Core policies 
For	what	concerns	core	policies	that	exert	a	significant	impact	on	decarbonisation,	there	
is an emerging consensus that both supply-side and demand-side policies are in need of 
re-examination and re-design. And regulation, which governs both the supply- and the 
demand-side, should be used extensively to manage incentives and steer outcomes. 
A prominent role should certainly be attached to policies aimed at reducing fossil 
fuel consumption, since the latter is responsible for the bulk of global GHG emissions. 
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Some 42% of emissions from the consumption of fossil fuel in 2013 was destined to 
electricity supply (IEA, 2015), which makes the electricity sector particularly important 
for any strategy hoping to reach meaningful results in terms of decarbonisation. Energy 
efficiency,	reducing	the	consumption	of	electricity	necessary	to	provide	energy	services	
such as heating, cooling, lighting, and the operation of appliances, is widely regarded as 
the most promising approach to reducing GHG emissions associated with the electricity 
sector.	 But	 even	with	 aggressive	 energy	 efficiency,	 it	will	 be	 necessary	 to	 change	 the	
emissions	profile	of	the	electricity	sector	as	part	of	efforts	to	achieve	scientifically	based	
GHG emissions reduction targets.
Global	GHG	Emissions	in	2010:	Linking	Sources	to	Services.	Bojana	Bajželj,	Julian	M.	Allwood,	and	Jonathan	
M. Cullen (2013) Designing Climate Change Mitigation Plans That Add Up, Environ Sci Technol. 2013 Jul 16; 
47(14): 8062-8069.
Figure 3 – World GHG Emissions Flow Chart, 2010
More	specifically:
• Supply-side policies have become preponderant in industrial and innovation policy 
over the past decade. They include i.a., direct subsidies, support schemes, old-
fashioned	 industry-specific	 plans,	 R&D	 support	 and	 tax	 schemes.	Today,	 these	 are	
affected	by	significant	problems,	especially	 since	 they	are	path-dependent	and	 thus	
unable to adapt to systemic innovation. They are often trapped in regulatory frameworks 
designed	 for	 one	 specific	 type	 of	 production	 process,	 and	 reflect	 a	 through-put	
production	system	that	 is	dominated	by	 incumbents	 locked	 into	suboptimal	specific	
technologies and modes of service provision. They are also reinforced by both subsidies 
and commitments/arrangements within their supply chains. As a result of this latter 
condition, even when better technologies already exist, they rarely enjoy the advantages 
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of subsidised alternatives and are not encouraged by captured regulatory systems/
agencies that maintain the status quo. This is problematic as disruptive innovations are 
needed in many sectors to reach important goals, but they are not only unlikely to be 
favoured by incumbents; in some markets, incumbents are unlikely to be the sources 
of those innovations.28	A	striking	example	is	provided	by	the	inefficient	construction	of	
residential homes that occurs on-site, creates unnecessary material waste, pollution 
and	worker	accidents,	produces	uneven	seasonal	employment,	reflects	the	interests	
of construction unions, is reinforced by existing housing regulations, and is more 
expensive	than	flexible	modular	construction	(see	Ashford,	Hafkamp,	Prakke,	Vergragt	
2001). Additional, abundant legendary examples can be found in food production and 
transportation.29	Apart	from	specific	wasteful	inefficiencies,	another	problem	faced	by	
the growth-driven economy is that it encourages turnover and consumption, which 
can	 directly	 conflict	 with	 deep	 decarbonisation	 goals.	 Producer-created	 demand	 is	
generated from the supply-side actors, for example people are encouraged to buy 
larger	automobiles	by	car	manufacturers	because	the	profit	margins	are	greater	than	
with	smaller	cars	(see	J.	K.	Galbraith,	1958).	Further,	the	tax	treatment	of	investment	
and	profits,	and	the	numerous	key	factors	of	production	(natural	and	physical	capital,	
labour,	energy,	and	ICT),	greatly	influence	what	is	produced	and	provided	by	supply-side	
actors. Herman Daly has long posed the question: if society wants more employment 
and less pollution, why are we taxing labour and not pollution? Under concerns for 
global climate change, why are we shying away from a carbon tax?30 As discussed, as 
long	as	GDP	dominates	our	ranking	of	firms,	industries,	and	countries	–	reflecting	our	
preoccupation with policies that encourage competitiveness in the traditional sense, 
growth-driven strategies will prevail.
• Demand-side policies are not only relevant, they can sometimes be more important 
than supply-side policies. Existing alternatives to products and services that could 
contribute to decarbonisation are often unknown to economic consumers – be they 
firms	 or	 individuals.	 Government	 and	 industry	 often	 bemoan	 an	 ‘innovation	 deficit’	
while	better	solutions	might	well	address	a	‘diffusion	deficit’	when	it	comes	to	advances	
in energy generation, transmission, and utilization.31 In the context of encouraging a 
circular economy and acknowledging the “invisible energy embodied in our industrial 
economy” – particularly in the use of steel and aluminium – see Allwood and Cullen 
(2012) where both supply-side and demand-side policies are required to meet energy-
use reduction goals. Sorrell (2015), however, cautions that optimism regarding the 
effectiveness or likelihood of the adoption of demand-side policies needs greater 
scrutiny.32	He	observes	 that	 reducing	energy	demand	may	prove	more	difficult	 than	
is commonly assumed, in particular since mainstream economics “is likely to have 
underestimated the dependence of … growth upon increased energy consumption”; 
as well as the likelihood of often neglected “rebound effects” (i.e., energy demand 
28(Ashford and Hall 2011a and 2011b; Christensen 1997)
29In the context of encouraging a circular economy and acknowledging the ‘invisible energy embodied in our industrial 
economy’ -- particularly in the use of steel and aluminium -- see Allwood and Cullen (2012) 
30Daly (2008), which criticises the “Growth Commission” report.
31See Lovins (2011) and Ayers (2015).
32“Reducing Energy Demand: A Review of the Issues, Challenges and Approaches” Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Reviews 47-82, at page 81. 
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increases,	or	does	not	decrease	as	expected	as	a	result	of	improved	energy	efficiency,	
thus frustrating policy actions towards lower demand). Sorrell (2015) also observes that 
price signals must be accompanied by additional policies triggering more sustainable 
behaviour (see below), which are currently “underrepresented in the current policy 
mix which remains largely focused upon energy supply and incremental changes 
within existing systems”. Finally, the same author argues that unprecedented attention 
towards large-scale transformations in the ‘sociotechnical’ systems that provide energy 
services such as thermal comfort and personal mobility are required: this, in turn, calls 
on governments to provide ‘direction’ in a meaningful and viable way, and “to do so 
in a way that overcomes the inertia of sunk investment and delivers the speed of 
change required to avoid dangerous climate change”. Within demand-side policies, 
behavioural approaches are considered increasingly important to trigger changes in 
consumption patterns that would either trigger reductions in energy use, or open up 
new market opportunities for more sustainable products and services. The lack of visible 
metrics to inform the consumer in a meaningful way also contributes to inappropriate 
consumption. For example, the advertised price of purchasing an automobile is not 
usually accompanied by its total life cycle cost including upkeep, repair, disposal, and 
resale value. Critics of the growth-driven model of consumption uniformly call for a 
reining in of advertising that continues and serves to expand the current basis for 
consumption.33 By contrast, government ‘counter-advertising,’ procurement, targeted 
subsidies, and tax system changes could facilitate a shift towards greener products 
and services. Similarly, the creative implementation of properly designed trade policies 
could favour the export and import of more desirable products and services.
• Importantly, it must be recognised that regulation of products, materials, energy content, 
efficiency	and	use,	as	well	as	advertising	to	encourage	or	discourage	consumption	can	
create a market for innovation (Ashford, et al. 1985; Ashford and Hall, 2011b; Porter 
1999; Pelkmans and Renda, 2014). Regulation is one of the few areas of intervention 
that can simultaneously create both demand and supply side changes. In light of the 
weaknesses of pure demand-side policies articulated by Sorrell above, regulation may 
be	 particularly	 important	 for	 its	 impact	 on	 demand	 by	 constraining	 or	 defining	 the	
nature,	kind,	and	extent	of	permitted	demand,	e.g.,	by	requiring	stringent	fuel	efficiency	
standards. The recent recommendation formulated by the Dutch presidency, that the 
EU should promote an “innovation principle” needs to be understood as encompassing 
both changes in innovation and changes in diffusion (see the discussion in the next 
section). Both supply-side and demand-side interventions are needed. Furthermore, it 
is not only technological innovation, but also organisational, institutional, and societal 
innovation that should receive attention.
33See Jackson (2012) and Schor (2005).
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1.2.2  Innovation policy: systemic and mission-oriented
Much faith and hope in transforming industrial systems has been placed on the concept 
of innovation. After all, the root of the word implies change. The innovation process is 
acknowledged to encompass three related and interactively connected activities: invention, 
innovation,	and	diffusion.	Invention	is	the	first	working	prototype	of	a	technology;	it	can	
involve	a	product,	a	process	or	a	manufacturing/services	system.	Innovation	is	the	first	or	
new market application, while diffusion refers to proliferation of the innovation throughout 
an industry. When the innovation is then used in other industries, applications, or national 
contexts, we often also use the term technology transfer to describe diffusion. Finally, if 
significant	adaptation	is	required	in	a	new	context,	it	is	sometimes	referred	to	as	a	separate	
innovation. Intellectual property protections – a temporary monopoly -- are considered 
important to secure adequate returns for the inventor and developer.
While	governments,	as	well	as	the	private	sector,	generally	devote	significant	resources	
to create innovations, especially in saleable products, although process innovations also 
receive attention, it is important for our purposes to distinguish what motivates a particular 
innovation	and	who	provides	the	financial	capital	to	spur	both	innovation	and	diffusion.
Innovation may occur driven by technology push forces, or by market pull (see Figure 5). 
Industrial sectors routinely engage in the R&D necessary to develop saleable technologies 
with the hope that the market will absorb them, even in the absence of nascent market 
demand. This occurs naturally (as an evolutionary process) and can take decades, and 
traditional industrial policy providing government assistance is often said to ‘oil the wheels 
of	innovation’	in	hopes	of	the	nation	enjoying	financial	rewards	(see	the	discussion	below).	
Figure 5 – Technology push v. Market pull
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The role of the government in promoting innovation is presented in Figure 6, indicating 
all the traditional ways in which innovation might be stimulated (Ashford and Hall, 2011b).
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The	 interventions	 depicted	 in	 the	 figure	 are	 of	 course	 familiar	 to	 those	 involved	 with	
traditional industrial policy that focuses on singular product or process changes. System 
innovations, discussed below, such as the transportation system or the agricultural 
system necessarily involve multiple economic actors interacting in larger venues and this 
model does not adequately represent the complexity involved in system transformations. 
Technology	push	innovations	are	pursued	by	profit-seeking	firms	and	by	countries	seeking	
to	enhance	domestic	and	trade	revenues	(capital	supplied	by	firms	and	subsidised	through	
R&D innovation programs and cost-sharing through business tax deductions – and in the 
case of trade and aid, Export Credit Agencies, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Overseas 
Development Grants).
By	contrast,	there	are	often	nascent	or	expressed	market	needs	demanding	to	be	satisfied.	
Market	pull	innovations	can	also	be	pioneered	(Jänicke	&	Jacob)	by	firms	recognising	an	
unmet societal or market need and direct their innovative efforts towards that end. Often the 
demand	is	difficult	to	assess	and	can	wane	over	time.	An	example	is	the	need	for	a	better	
chemotherapeutic	approach	 to	cancer,	or	greater	 impetus	 to	find	a	cure	 for	Alzheimer’s	
disease.	 Often,	 the	 R&D	 need	 is	 cutting-edge	 and	 financially	 risky.	 Government	 often	
supports	the	initial	forays	into	research,	as	exemplified	by	the	development	of	computers,	
aircraft, and the internet (Mazzucato, 2014). 
Figure 6 – Traditional industrial policy
Source: Ashford and Hall (2011b)
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When it comes to stimulating innovation (and diffusion) of system transformations – or 
technologies that have remained unchanged for decades -- there seems little doubt that 
government	setting	of	specific	medium-	to	long-term	mandatory	targets,	plus	economic	
support, is indispensable for achieving transformations within a reasonable period of time 
(Ashford et al, 1985; Ashford & Hall, 2011b; Pelkmans & Renda, 2014). Regulation and 
mandated targets essentially collectivise public demand or needs through the setting 
of	standards	and	requirements	[See	Reinaud	et	al	 (2016),	p.	27)	for	a	discussion	of	the	
importance of market-pull instruments for energy technologies such as feed-in-tariffs, 
green	certificates,	etc.].	Costs	are	imposed	on	the	private	sector	with	cost-sharing	achieved	
through business and R&D deductions. Sometimes subsidies are provided. 
Governments need to understand the different forces giving rise to innovation and diffusion, 
and not succumb to traditional industrial policy if serious transformations – especially 
involving the displacement of incumbents or system changes – is what is needed. The 
regulatory initiatives such as Better Regulation and REFIT (as discussed in section 2.3) do 
not seem to focus on the change processes that are needed.
Over the past two decades, the concept of co-evolutionary innovation has been introduced 
by Dutch researchers injecting government and stakeholder guidance into the selection 
process entailing strategic niche management and transition management (Grin et al., 
2010). This co-evolutionary process is advocated for system innovation, but its promoters 
admit the transformations can also take decades to achieve. A criticism of depending on 
these co-evolutionary processes to achieve systemic sustainable transformations can be 
found in Ashford & Hall (2015). 
A	hallmark	of	system	innovation	influenced	by	the	‘Dutch	School’	is	that	it	involves	–	in	a	
multi-stakeholder negotiation otherwise known as the ‘Polder Process’ -- the stakeholders, 
government, and especially incumbents which are likely to be limited in their capacity to 
go beyond incremental innovation. Indeed, in a recent document (OECD 2016a, p, 10), 
in which a key Dutch School advocate of system innovation provided the basis for the 
report	 on	 System	 Innovation,	 it	 is	 stated:	 “[c]hanges	 in	 large	 socio-technical	 systems	
take time, sometimes twenty to thirty years”. The global climate change process cannot 
wait	 that	 long	 for	 significant	 transformations	 to	 take	 effect.	We	 certainly	 believe	 that	
system transformations are key to achieving change and innovation involving technogical, 
organisational, institutional, and economic actors, but a much more directive role is 
needed for government to meet the challenges through an integrated approach utilising 
regulations, targets, and appropriate economic signals. What is recommended in the 
System Innovation Report sounds good, but it is wrong-headed, takes too long, and is very 
likely	to	be	overly	influenced	by	incumbents	and	limited	by	their	technological	capacity.	The	
government must take on the role of trustee for the needed transformations – and trustee 
of	the	technologies	and	firms	of	the	future,	often	not	yet	represented	at	the	negotiation	
table –  not of referee, teacher, or generator of consensus. Our view is seriously at odds 
with the essence of the System Innovation Report, even though the report recognises the 
danger	of	incumbent	influence,	which	is	absent	from	earlier	writings	of	the	Dutch	school.	
The	actual	thrusts	of	the	recommedations	do	not	cure	its	fundamental	flaws.
Finally, one of the bottlenecks in commercialisation of useful technologies may come late 
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in the innovation cycle. The innovation literature emphasises the importance of deployment 
– the step in which a technology moves from bench-top, lab, or small scale use to actual 
commercial use in practice. Semantic preferences differ as to whether this is described 
as	the	 last	step	 in	the	 innovation	activity	or	the	first	step	 in	diffusion.	Semantics	aside,	
what is important is that the R&D to accomplish this transition is not basic research, but 
truly applied research, a distinction often glossed over in discussions of innovation policy. 
Barriers	to	deployment	are	often	influenced	by	incumbents	whose	technologies	compete	
with the new technology and seek to delay or prevent its entry.
Using data on the diffusion of renewable energies from 15 European countries from 1990 
to	 2012,	 Aflaki	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 give	 important	 empirical	 support	 to	 demand-pull	 diffusion	
driven by government policies that promote the growth of renewables. While they did not 
study the role of regulation as a demand-pull strategy, they did identify other demand-
side government policies that support the notion that “government support should be 
directed at stimulating aggregate demand rather than at establishing niche markets 
(reflecting	 the	 Dutch	 school’s	 emphasis	 on	 evolutionary/co-evolutionary	 innovation).	
Variability and uncertainty in these policies were found to dampen diffusion, supporting 
our recommendation that establishing clear and stringent future performance targets 
for the development of non-carbon energy technologies is crucial for accelerating their 
deployment and adoption.
1.2.2.1 Systemic innovation and the role of technology
There is growing agreement among experts that long-term decarbonisation goals can be 
achieved only with the help of systemic innovation. This, as already explained, does not 
necessarily	mean	that	innovation	has	not	already	occurred.	For	example,	in	an	influential	
study Amory Lovins estimated in 2011 “a 2.6-fold-bigger US economy by 2050 with no 
oil, coal, or nuclear energy, one-third less natural gas, a $5 trillion dollar net savings, 82-86 
percent	lower	carbon	emissions,	and	no	new	inventions”	solely	through	profit-motivated	
business	activity.	Lovins	also	argued	that	the	“twin	transition	to	efficiency	and	renewables”	
“requires no new federal taxes, subsidies, mandates, or laws. The policy innovations 
needed to unlock and speed it need no Act of Congress.” In the same vein, Sachs et al. 
(2015), in exploring their deep decarbonisation pathways, assume no major technological 
disruptions over the coming decades, and only base their assumptions on technologies 
that are either commercially available or expected to become so in the near future. 
 
The World Economic Forum (2015) observed that some of the key technologies that can 
contribute to the decarbonisation of energy are already at a mature stage, attracting high 
levels	of	investment,	although	they	still	have	significant	potential	for	growth	and	further	
cost reduction; whereas others are at the stage where more basic research, applied R&D 
or pilot testing are needed to take them to maturity and reach the ‘market tipping point’ 
where investments will unlock larger potential. The European Parliament also acknowledged 
in 2015 that 
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1.2.2.2   Beyond R&D: tackling diffusion
there are many potential technologies already in use or being 
developed ranging from forestation to bio-energy with carbon 
capture and storage to enhanced weathering and mineral 
carbonation to name just a few. However announcements of 
revolutionary breakthroughs should be taken with a grain of salt, 
keeping in mind that the new technologies might not scale up from 
laboratory experiments to industrial scale deployment, and that 
costs may be high and hard to reduce.
As indicated by the same World Economic Forum Report (2015), short-term technologies 
(which	will	take	up	to	five	years	for	acceleration)	include	solar-PV,	wind	power,	and	third	
generation	nuclear	energy;	energy	efficiency	in	buildings;	energy	efficiency	in	transportation;	
and	efficient	industry	processes.	On	the	other	hand,	medium-term technologies (which 
will take up to 15 years for acceleration) include advanced power storage; carbon scrubbing 
technologies (CCS and CCU); advanced nuclear reactors; next generation power electronics; 
next generation biofuels; hydrogen technology; advanced geothermal and ocean energy.
Against this background, it is not at all clear that Europe or any other industrialised country 
faces	a	serious	 innovation	deficit.	Rather,	 the	problem	may	be	diffusion	or	deployment	
of far-developed technologies, or – put more simply – ensuring that the most promising 
existing technologies have a place in the market. But how can deployment, diffusion, and 
technology transfer be fully promoted? Here too, policy measures include both supply-side 
and demand-side interventions. 
Besides R&D focused on innovation, however, there is growing awareness of the need for 
a number of additional measures that increasingly belong to the innovation policy domain. 
These measures look at the potential uptake and diffusion of existing technologies in the 
marketplace – an essential precondition for their expected virtuous environmental impacts 
to materialise. 
First, while picking winners has been successful by governments promoting big science 
innovation (Mazzucato, 2014), institutions may often lack adequate knowledge of 
‘which winners to pick’, and as such would not necessarily be able to choose the right 
technology to focus on to accelerate deployment. For this reason, multi-stakeholder 
involvement should supplement governmental intervention. As reported by the OECD 
(2015),	“the	kinds	of	breakthrough	innovations	that	can	generate	significant	environmental	
benefits	can	come	from	fields	as	diverse	as	ICT,	materials	sciences	and	biotechnology”;	and	
within these areas, several options exist. Innovation policy can contribute to this challenge 
if governments invest in the skills possessed by civil servants, and most importantly if 
the institutional framework for innovation includes transparent multi-stakeholder, mission-
oriented R&I platforms that can convey technical information and technology forecasts to 
policymakers. 
Second, even if R&D were successfully promoted on a given technology, the market 
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conditions for its uptake might not necessarily exist: in particular, not all innovative 
technologies	are	produced	by	incumbent	players,	and	in	most	cases	they	imply	a	reshuffling	
of the status quo in a given sector. For example, many new business models in the energy 
or	financial	sector	are	not	being	adopted	by	incumbent	players,	who	are	typically	less	agile	
and more affected by sunk costs compared to new entrants; and in other cases, e.g., for 
smart grids, the need to cooperate with other players (e.g., telecoms, IT companies) could 
end up threatening the market position of the incumbent electricity companies, leaving them 
with little urge to move forward. In contrast, see Reinaud et al. (2016) for documentation of 
incumbents that have become innovators/players in this innovation space.
Third, lack of skills, collective action problems and path-dependency in consumption 
habits	are	often	major	obstacles	 to	 the	uptake	 [deployment]	of	disruptive	 technologies	
and business models. Lack of skills can emerge both along the value chain (for example, 
repairers may lack the skills needed to work on electric vehicles); collective action problems 
can emerge whenever technological uptake is favoured by interoperable standards 
(e.g., recharging stations for electric vehicles or hydrogen-powered cars). Finally, path 
dependency can emerge whenever the technological breakthrough requires changing long-
term contracts and switching providers; changing the way in which a given service or 
product is used by residential customers; changing equipment; etc. All these conditions 
have to be part of an overall assessment of the measures that would be needed in order to 
facilitate the smooth, swift penetration of more sustainable technologies into the market, 
with	consequent	benefits	in	terms	of	transition	towards	a	low-carbon	economy.	
All these problems deserve careful scrutiny, also for what concerns the role of the public 
sector, which is typically invoked whenever markets fail (as in the case of collective 
action problems). As observed, i.a., by Mariana Mazzucato (2014), governments play a 
fundamental role in changing economic direction by creating and shaping markets, taking 
on risks at research and development stages, and at stages of technological diffusion by 
supporting	manufacturing	and	commercialisation.	Governments	influence	the	direction	of	
innovation when they manage training and educational institutions, produce information, 
set regulations, supply funds (with conditions attached), purchase goods and services, 
and sets targets. The case of decarbonisation is no exception. There seems to be growing 
consensus on the need for strong public presence and direction, not just through regulation, 
but also through systemic innovation policy, to lead the world back onto a sustainable path 
towards decarbonisation. 
1.2.3  A circular policy process for the 
circular economy age
Our analysis of the need for constant consideration of policy trade-offs and long-term goals 
in the policy process leads to a relatively new way to approach government activity, and 
in particular the so-called “policy cycle” (Renda 2015; European Commission 2010). While 
approaching long-term goals, governments should ensure that they consider all short-term 
and long-term impacts, as well as all available data, before they lay down the baseline 
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34In the case of the EU policy process, this distinction is less easily drawn compared to the case of domestic policy. We refer 
here to primary legislation as denoting major new policy initiatives of the European Commission, with far-reaching expected 
economic, social and environmental impacts. Secondary legislation includes narrower initiatives within already established 
legislative frameworks, and implementing and delegated acts.  
scenario, prospective counterfactual analysis and assessment of alternative policy options 
that typically form the ex ante impact assessment phase. This exercise should potentially 
be carried out both for primary and secondary legislation:34 the former, especially, should be 
tabled and discussed on the basis of solid (technology) foresight and adequate consideration 
of long-term policy priorities. This creates the first challenge for governments that 
want to align their policies with long-term sustainable development goals: ensure 
adequate input into the ex ante impact assessment for consistency with possible 
pathways towards a low-carbon economy. For example, in the United States this can 
be very challenging for government since a structured ex ante impact analysis system 
only exists for secondary legislation, whereas the policy process for primary legislation 
seems to be less oriented towards a systematic assessment of prospective impacts. In the 
EU and in other jurisdictions the situation is different, since primary legislation (or in the 
case of the EU, major new legislative initiatives of the European Commission) is subject 
to ex ante impact assessment, and there is (in principle) an obligation for the European 
Parliament and the Council to update the impact assessment document throughout the 
ordinary legislative process. 
Ensuring consistency with long-term policy goals such as decarbonisation already in the ex 
ante phase of legislation might require a number of changes in the policy process. These 
include the following:
• Introducing a whole-of-government approach to the analysis of long-term policy 
impacts. For example, the government might work on the basis of a common 
economic, social and environmental baseline scenario when crafting policies. In the 
case of decarbonisation, it would be important to formulate a whole-of-government 
“decarbonisation pathway” (Sachs et al. 2015) that would then inform government 
action in all relevant policy domains. Economic studies that project the economy in the 
long term might be translated into concrete general economic models for estimating 
long-term impacts, which should then be used as a reference by administrations 
wishing to propose new rules (e.g., the EU JRC has worked on a common baseline for 
the whole EU, but this has remained at the stage of a research study). 
• Ensuring the collection of all available data even before a regulatory intervention is 
fully shaped. One of the most recurrent critiques of the better regulation system of 
many OECD countries is that stakeholders do not get a chance to intervene by proposing 
new actions at a very early stage of policymaking (Noveck, 2015). Adopting an open 
government strategy at the early phases of the policy process can be very helpful for 
government wishing to gather and use data and results from various prior initiatives in 
the policy assessment: recent initiatives to gather and collect data such as ‘hackathons’ 
or ‘datapaloozas’, coupled with a strategy to open up to stakeholders information held 
by government can be used to make the most of the available information. 
• Set objectives that are consistent with long-term goals.	In	some	jurisdictions,	defining	
objectives is a key part of the ex ante impact analysis process. In the EU, for example, 
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officials	 in	 charge	 of	 ex	 ante	 impact	 analysis	 have	 to	 specify	 general,	 specific	 and	
operational objectives, but the link between general objectives and long-term goals is 
not	always	explicit,	let	alone	clear;	and	the	difference	between	specific	and	operational	
objectives	is	often	difficult	to	grasp.	Ideally,	governments	should	couple	the	definition	
of	 a	 comprehensive	 long-term	agenda	with	 the	definition	of	 targets	 and	 indicators,	
and methodologies to keep track of those indicators. These methodologies would 
then become the DNA of policy appraisal from an ex ante and ex post perspective. 
 
• Ensure that alternative options considered for a given policy intervention include all 
feasible options, set up a data collection system, and adequately consider flexibility 
and adaptation to possible technological and systemic changes. Policy alternatives 
typically considered in ex ante impact assessment are often selected from a menu of 
recommended options, and range from light-touch options (e.g., awareness raising 
campaigns) to behavioural approaches (e.g., nudging individual behaviour, using 
social peer-pressure); the use of market instruments (e.g., cap and trade systems); 
management-based regulation; and more prescriptive forms of regulation. Yet little 
guidance is available in many countries as regards the possible risks and long-term 
consequences of adopting any of those regulatory approaches. In addition, a long-term 
perspective might require that under uncertainty, more reversible choices are made: 
but this need for a more sequential approach to regulatory solutions has so far never 
fully permeated the better regulation debate.
• Adapt the methodology used to compare options. Most international organisations and 
national	governments	recommend	the	use	of	cost-benefit	analysis	as	the	most	reliable	
and effective criterion for choosing among policy alternatives. And indeed, this method 
has a number of virtues, including the fact that it can be used by economists regardless 
of the geographical location and the sector involved, and can also be used by the centre 
of government as a control tool to ensure that the incentives of administrations at the 
periphery of government are aligned with those of the centre, within a typical principal-
agent	 framework	 (Posner,	 1999).	The	 use	 of	mainstream	 (neoclassical)	 cost-benefit	
analysis largely disregards distributional impacts, however, and assumes that income 
can be used as a good proxy for happiness and well-being. When using this type of 
cost-benefit	 analysis,	 administrations	 attach	monetary	 values	 to	 saved	 or	 improved	
human	lives	and	heavily	discount	future	regulatory	benefits,	sometimes	minimising	the	
value associated with goals such as decarbonisation. Furthermore, they assume that 
an individual’s happiness or well-being only depends on what (income) that individual 
possesses, and not by what others have, or whether income is evenly distributed (so-
called “methodological individualism”, see Renda 2011). They assume that what makes 
a policy ‘desirable’ is the sum of individual willingness to pay for a given future state 
of the world, and as such incorporate all behavioural biases such as short-sightedness, 
short-termism, over-optimism biases and mere lack of inter-generational altruism into 
their calculations. All these assumptions have proven shaky when tested empirically; and 
they are far from morally neutral. What is even more worrying is that some jurisdictions 
around the world (including the European Commission) also use CBA to assess the 
impact	of	primary	legislation,	whereas	in	the	US	no	specific	tool	is	being	used.	In	order	
to fully take into account decarbonisation, there are a number of alternative methods 
44
ALIGNING POLICIES FOR LOW-CARBON SYSTEMIC INNOVATION IN EUROPE
Nicholas Ashford, MIT and Andrea Renda, CEPS and Duke
that	could	be	used:	they	include	weighted	cost-benefit	analysis	(Adler,	2012);	‘Rawlsian’	
approaches	 that	 set	 specific	priorities	 that	 take	precedence	over	other	 impacts	 (so-
called lexicographic order); trade-off analysis that explicitly accounts for distributional 
impacts and technology evolution (Ashford, 2007); or multi-criteria analysis linked to 
a	 number	 of	 specified	 impacts,	 coupled	 with	 transparently	 set	 indicators	 (possibly	
included in a country’s long-term strategy), which could include a decarbonisation 
pathway. The latter seems to be the most preferable and viable for many jurisdictions, 
especially those that scrutinise primary legislation through ex ante impact assessment. 
• Consider interactive and cumulative impacts. Assessing the impact of legislation 
on decarbonisation entails that administrations take into account both the stock and 
the	flow	of	rules.	This	means	that	the	impact	of	an	individual	rule	often	depends	on	
how the rule interacts (or clashes) with other international, national, regional, public 
or private rules and standards that a given entity (company, individual, civil society 
organisation)	is	exposed	to.	Accordingly,	the	so-called	cumulative	costs	and	benefits	of	
legislation	should	be	adequately	considered,	together	with	the	interactive	benefits	(or	
co-benefits).	The	latter	occur	when	a	specific	type	of	policy	intervention	creates	benefits	
also in terms of other policy impacts. For example, environmental policy normally 
brings	health	benefits.	A	 study	by	Bollen	et	 al.	 (2009)	 for	 the	Dutch	Environmental	
Agency showed that a stringent air quality policy can lead to a reduction in emissions 
of greenhouse gases. The authors estimated that if China pursued a stringent air 
policy to reduce the number of premature deaths from chronic exposure to outdoor 
air pollution by 70%, by 2050 (compared with a baseline trend without policy), this 
policy	would	lower	GDP	in	2050	by	7%;	but	air	quality	benefits	would	be	equivalent	
to 7.5% of GDP, while greenhouse gas emissions would be 40% lower. Christian 
Friis Bach (Under Secretary-General of the United Nations, Executive Secretary of 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) recently observed that taking 
into	account	 co-benefits,	“it	 is	estimated	 that	up	 to	90%	of	 the	 reductions	 in	GHG	
emissions required to prevent temperatures rising above 2°C could be achieved 
through measures that are in the direct interest of the countries undertaking them”35. 
 
• Monitor the impacts of legal rules and evaluate them periodically through 
retrospective reviews. Monitoring has emerged as perhaps the most important phase 
in policy appraisal, since policymakers often have problems assessing all risks and 
possible challenges that can emerge, especially in the implementation and enforcement 
phases of the life of a rule. Many features of legal rules are, borrowing from the 
language of marketing, ‘experience goods’, i.e., their impact and effectiveness can only 
be judged after a period of practical implementation. Accordingly, smart governments 
lay down the preconditions for adequate monitoring already during the ex ante phase, 
by answering the question “how am I going to monitor the impact of this rule?” In many 
cases, this requires the setting of ad hoc mechanisms for generating and processing 
data in the forms of performance indicators or, at least proxies for effectiveness of the 
rule. Obviously, this again brings up the question of what the appropriate metrics are 
and whether they exist. In addition, as shown in the latest OECD regulatory policy 
35http://www.euractiv.com/section/climate-environment/opinion/assessing-co-benefits-could-accelerate-action-on-climate-
change/ 
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outlook (November 2015), a growing number of governments use a variety of forms 
of ex post evaluation of legislation, which can take the form of an appraisal of an 
individual	rule,	or	of	a	group	of	rules;	or	the	partial	appraisal	of	specific	impacts	(e.g.,	
administrative burdens; environmental impacts; impacts on SMEs, etc.). In this respect, 
and in line with our previous point, we argue that the most appropriate way to evaluate 
the stock of existing rules is to analyse a group of homogeneous rules (e.g., climate 
change legislation; energy and environmental regulation) to capture their cumulative 
and interactive impacts. For primary legislation especially, the scope of the evaluation 
should focus on the effectiveness and coherence of the rules, i.e., on whether they are 
helping the country progress towards its many long-term goals. If a decarbonisation 
pathway	has	been	defined,	 the	evaluation	of	 the	stock	of	existing	 legislation	should	
indeed lead to an assessment of whether the implementation of existing legislation is 
putting the country on track towards the achievement of its decarbonisation goals. If 
problems or risks emerge, or new risks emerge in the future, administrations should 
then proceed towards an ex ante impact analysis of possible alternatives to mitigate 
those risks or further improve the effectiveness of the rules at hand.
All these phases represent a full policy cycle, which goes from the initial ex ante 
assessment phase to ex post evaluation, and then again ex ante assessment of possible 
reforms.	International	experience	shows	that	this	policy	cycle	approach	offers	significant	
opportunities for governments willing to learn how to regulate in a more effective way 
(OECD 2015). At the same time, international practice shows that this process becomes 
even more effective if a strong, adequately skilled and cleverly positioned regulatory 
oversight body is established, with a mandate to ensure coherence of legislation with 
long-term goals, rather than the reduction of red tape.
A policy cycle approach can, of course, prove more complex in practice than the one outlined 
above. Typical complicating factors are the horizontal coordination between institutions 
within the same jurisdiction (e.g., government with parliament; independent agency with 
government); and multi-level governance setting in which implementation is dealt with by 
institutions at a different level of government than the one where the rules was enacted 
(e.g., regional governments or local authorities in charge of implementation). As we will 
discuss below, both problems arise in the case of the EU, requiring adequate mitigation 
strategies. 
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2.  DECARBONISATION AND THE 
EU: GETTING READY FOR THE NEW 
PARADIGM
The European Commission recently observed that “the transition to a low carbon, resource-
efficient	 economy	 demands	 a	 fundamental	 shift	 in	 technology,	 energy,	 economics,	
finance	and	ultimately	society	as	a	whole”;	that	the	Paris	agreement		“provides	important	
opportunities, notably for jobs and growth”; and that “the transition will stimulate 
investment and innovation in renewable energy, thereby contributing to the EU’s ambition 
of becoming the world leader in renewable energy, and increase the growth in markets for 
EU	produced	goods	and	services,	for	instance	in	the	field	of	energy	efficiency”.36 Altogether, 
these resounding statements demonstrate a strong ambition to lead the world by example 
and aim towards decarbonisation by means of a whole-of-government, all-encompassing, 
far-reaching strategy touching upon industrial policy, trade policy, innovation and investment. 
In this section, we take this ambitious statement very seriously, and focus on the way in 
which the EU can promote systemic innovation and diffusion that will provide a decisive 
contribution towards climate change goals. Our view of innovation policy, as explained in 
the previous sections, is broad, since innovation can be affected, in both its intensity and 
direction, by incentives and stimuli generated both by market forces and by legal rules. The 
latter, in turn, can be inspired by long-term needs to a larger extent than happens today. 
This chapter of the report is therefore divided into three main sections. Section 2.1 maps 
some of the most important misalignments currently existing in EU policy, including cases 
in which the misalignment is caused by divergences between EU member states. Section 
2.2 looks at EU innovation policy stricto sensu, and discusses ways to increase the diffusion 
of existing innovations that are key to decarbonisation. Finally, Section 2.3 discusses EU 
better regulation, and the misalignments between methods and procedures currently 
adopted in the EU policy process, and the ones that would be most useful to guide Europe 
towards its ambitious long-term decarbonisation goals in a timely and effective manner.
36See Communication From the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, “The Road from Paris: 
assessing the implications of the Paris Agreement” and accompanying the proposal for a Council decision on the signing, on 
behalf of the European Union, of the Paris agreement adopted under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change.	COM/2016/0110	final.
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2.1 Mapping misalignments in key EU policy areas 
Like all industrialised economies, the EU and its member states have adopted a vast array 
of	policies	that	directly	and	indirectly,	explicitly	or	implicitly	exert	a	significant	effect	on	the	
environment and the climate. Within these policies, along with remarkable results, a number 
of inconsistencies and misalignments have also emerged, sometimes due to the need to 
face	concomitant	social	and	economic	emergencies	(e.g.,	the	financial	and	economic	crisis	
that still partly rages in Europe), and sometimes due to more political factors that hamper 
the transition towards a more sustainable economy. Without claiming to be exhaustive, 
below we illustrate some of the most evident examples, distinguishing between types 
of misalignments. We do this with reference to several areas of policymaking, which we 
consider to be the most relevant for the purpose of our report. These include the following:
• Fossil fuel subsidies as existing at the EU or member state level. These can (or will) be 
potentially addressed at the EU level, either under the common EU Energy Policy, or 
under State Aids rules where appropriate.  
• The EU Emission Trading System	(ETS),including	its	first	three	phases	and	the	future,	
post-2020 phase. Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and the Council 
Establishing a scheme for GHG emission allowance trading within the Community 
(hereinafter the ETS Directive) and its amendments.
• Air quality rules ssuch as the LCPD (Large Combustion Plants Directive); the NEC 
(National Emission Ceilings) Directive and the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED).
• EU legislation on energy efficiency, including the Energy Performance of Buildings 
Directive (2010/31/UE) recast, the Construction Products Regulation (305/2011), the 
Energy	Efficiency	Directive	(2012/27/UE),	products	regulation	such	as	the	Eco-Design	
Directive (2009/125/EC) and the Energy Labelling Directive (2010/30/EU).
• Legislation on transport, including rules on emissions generated by light duty and 
heavy duty vehicles, non-road mobile machinery, and environmental rules in aviation 
and shipping.
• The EU acquis related to the common agricultural policy.
 
• Legislation on the circular economy, in particular related to waste.
• A variety of demand-side policies, including green public procurement, taxation on 
carbon-intensive products, and various forms of behavioural incentives.
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37BERR	(2008)	and	Centre	for	International	Economics	(2006)	specifically	discuss	the	timing	of	standardisation:	here	too,	
the message is that standardisation should neither occur too early or not too late to stimulate and encourage innovation. 
An early standard can kill alternatives (e.g., the GSM standard for mobile communications), creating more intra-standard 
competition. If the standard is imposed too early, it can generate an undesirable lock-in effect, which leaves society trapped 
in a suboptimal standard. Similarly, the selection of a rigid, non-scalable standard can inhibit both incremental and disruptive 
innovation, and as such is highly damaging to social welfare and progress.
38Ashford et al. (1985) claim that “although excessive regulatory uncertainty may cause industry inaction on the part of the 
industry too much certainty will stimulate only minimum compliance technology. Similarly too frequent change of regulatory 
requirements may frustrate technological development.” More generally, it is fair to state that whenever innovation requires 
large	investment	in	R&D,	the	absence	of	reasonable	stability	or	certainty	in	the	regulatory	framework	can	significantly	hinder	
innovation. Our case study of competition rules applied in the e-communications sector below can contribute to shedding 
some light on this aspect of uncertainty.
Key	 aspects	 of	 regulation	 that	 affect	 innovation	 include	 stringency,	 time,	 flexibility	 and	
certainty	(Ashford,	1985;	Pelkmans	and	Renda,	2014).	Stringency	relates	to	how	difficult	
and/or	costly	it	is	for	firms	to	comply	with	new	regulatory	requirements	using	existing	ideas,	
technologies, processes and business models. The amount of time that a regulation gives 
to the targeted stakeholders for compliance with the regulatory requirements is essential 
to stimulate innovation, but timing is a double-edged sword: too little time might discourage 
innovation and determine an unsustainable increase of compliance burdens, too much time 
might crystallise innovation efforts due to the lack of pressure to meet the requirements.37 
Flexible, performance- or outcome-based regulation stimulates innovation more than 
purely prescriptive regulation, provided that it is coupled with adequate monitoring and 
enforcement (see i.a., Coglianese, 2015). Uncertainty has also been found to act as a driver 
and an inhibitor of innovation depending on the circumstances.38 Against this background, 
the	types	of	misalignments	that	we	will	highlight	are	classified	as	follows:
Type 1. Inconsistent policies 
Type 2. Incomplete or non-existent policies. 
Type 3. Lack of stringency. 
Type 4. Lack of effectiveness due to problems of implementation, monitoring and 
enforcement. 
Cases in which the scope and direction of the policy is not in line with the goal of 
decarbonising	the	economy	as	officially	set	by	the	EU.	
Cases in which there was no policy action, or where there is legislation but it does not 
cover essential aspects that would be key for long-term decarbonisation.  
Cases in which policies lack stringency, and thus are unlikely to be incentivising behaviour 
that would fall in line with EU’s decarbonisation goals.
Cases in which there are problems with time, since market players are given either too 
much or too little time to comply; compliance itself is taking too long; or policymaking occurs 
too slowly; or cases in which the scope of the policy is in line with overall decarbonisation 
objectives, but enforcement is too weak to secure compliance over time. 
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39Support	to	fossil	fuels	can	be	classified	in	the	following	categories:	i)	Producer	subsidies	–	reducing	the	cost	of	production	
(for mining and burning coal), i.e. with cash hand-outs, by building public energy infrastructure, or giving funds for research 
and development purposes; ii) Consumer subsidies – governments pay the difference between the market price of energy 
and	the	price	for	companies	and	households.	For	instance,	they	do	this	by	fixing	the	energy	prices;	iii)	Tax	cuts	–	subsidising	
high energy users by lowering their energy tax rates by giving mining companies free access to public land (no payments of 
royalties), by giving water rights for free; iv) Capacity payments – paying coal companies to keep their plants operational, in 
case there is peak demand so they can quickly turn the coal units on; v) Export credits – providing international (development) 
finance	for	coal	projects	abroad;	and	vi)	Transition	–	giving	money	to	regions	and	mining	operators	to	rehabilitate	former	
mining areas, pay for early retirement of ex-coal workers etc.
40European Commission (2013), “European Commission Guidance for the Design of Renewables Support Schemes”. NERA 
(2014)	correctly	criticises	the	methodology	used	to	arrive	at	this	figure,	since	it	relies	on	the	OECD	inventory	of	fossil	fuel	
subsidies,	which	explicitly	reports	figures	per	country	built	with	different	methods	and	classifications	of	what	constitutes	a	
subsidy.	Accordingly,	summing	up	the	figure	to	reach	26	billion	Euros	is	not	a	correct	approach.	
41The	IMF	provides	the	following	definitions:	
• Pre-tax subsidies are based on a comparison of pre-tax end-user prices with a benchmark price. For traded products, 
the benchmark price is based on an international benchmark price adjusted for distribution and transportation costs. 
The IMF assumes margins for distribution and transportation are similar across all countries. For non- traded products 
– mainly electricity – the benchmark price is “is the cost recovery price for the domestic producer, including a normal 
2.1.1 Type 1. Inconsistent policies
2.1.1.1 Example 1: Persistence of fossil fuel subsidies
This type of misalignment is one of the most serious and normally self-evident. We would 
say it is uncommon in the case of the EU, which adopted several pieces of legislation in 
view of a transition towards a low-carbon economy. However, cases of actual misalignment 
between	 specific	 policies	 and	 overarching	 long-term	decarbonisation	 goals	 can	 present	
themselves,	most	often	due	to	one	of	the	following	factors:	existence	of	other,	conflicting	
policy goals such as protecting existing jobs; responding to incumbents or other vested 
interests representing the status quo; the need to reduce prices (e.g., of energy) in the 
short	 term;	 following	 a	 specific,	 high-carbon	 smart	 specialisation	 strategy	 in	 regional	
policy; etc. The most evident examples are provided by the persistence of various forms 
of subsidies to fossil fuels in Europe,39 and by the excessive weight of taxation on labour 
relative to carbon. Below, we analyse these two examples. 
While the use of renewables is increasing in most of EU member states, it is equally true 
that there is no sign of a concrete reduction in the use of fossil fuels, which should in 
principle be phased out over the coming years, with most of the reserves (especially for 
coal) remaining buried in the ground. But a recent European Commission document still 
reported	a	figure	of	€26	billion	as	the	total	level	of	support	received	by	fossil	fuels.40 This 
figure	largely	relied	on	government	documents	and	heterogeneous	methodologies	used	
by different countries, however. In June 2015, the International Monetary Fund published 
a report indicating post-tax fossil fuel subsidies projections for 2015, and attributed a much 
higher	figure	to	EU	Member	States	(202	billion	dollars	for	2015).41 In addition, the study 
reported that in the EU alone coal companies received 10 billion euros annually (in the 
years 1970-2007) in the form of pre-tax subsidies. Figure 7 below, which uses OECD data, 
shows	that	Germany,	the	UK,	France,	Belgium	and	Italy	are	the	countries	providing	the	
highest support for fossil fuels.
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Figure 7 - OECD Inventory: Five Countries Providing 
Highest “Support” in 2011
Source: NERA (2014) on OECD data.
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Calculations based on data by the IEA suggest that European coal power emissions must 
fall by at least 8% on average every year until 2040, and this is not happening fast enough. 
In 2015, 22 EU countries were still burning coal in a total of 280 coal power plants. Only 
six countries are coal power free: Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and 
Malta. These 280 coal power stations produced 18% of total European greenhouse gas 
(GHG)	 emissions	 in	 2014.	 In	 five	 countries,	 the	 contribution	 of	 coal	 power	 stations	 to	
total national GHG emissions was over a quarter or more, with 44% of GHG emissions 
produced by coal power stations in Bulgaria, followed by 34% in Greece, 33% in the Czech 
Republic, 33% in Poland and 28% in Germany42. From the standpoint of economic theory, 
that of fossil fuel subsidy is a textbook case of market failure, aggravated by government 
support. More precisely, the negative externalities generated by fossil fuel extraction are 
not internalised by the producing companies, or by the downstream players that make 
use of electricity generated with fossil fuels. All these support schemes hamper the 
development	of	renewable	energy	both	by	maintaining	artificially	low	prices	for	electricity	
return to capital and distribution costs”.
• Post-tax	subsidies	compare	end-user	prices	 inclusive	of	all	 taxes	with	a	benchmark	price	 that	 reflects	assumptions	
about a “reference rate” of VAT (or GST) and allowances for the externalities of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, local 
air	pollutants,	 and	some	 traffic	externalities	 (e.g.,	 congestion).	For	VAT,	 the	 IMF	develops	assumptions	about	what	
constitutes a reference rate of VAT: for example, in countries where no VAT is paid on the consumption of any product, 
it nonetheless assumes that the reference VAT is the same as in countries with similar incomes. The adjustment for 
GHG emissions in the benchmark price is based on an assumed carbon price of 34 USD/tCO2e, which is taken from the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency. Finally, for local air pollutants, the IMF assumes that countries have 
similar characteristics to the US and uses estimates from the US to quantify this externality.
51
ALIGNING POLICIES FOR LOW-CARBON SYSTEMIC INNOVATION IN EUROPE
Nicholas Ashford, MIT and Andrea Renda, CEPS and Duke
42See	http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_briefs/2015/pdf/eb40_en.pdf	
43See IMF (2013), Energy Subsidies Reforms: Lessons and Implications, at https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/
eng/2013/012813.pdf 
generated by fossil fuels, and by distorting investment away from renewable energies. The 
distributional	 impacts	of	this	 imbalance	are	also	significant,	as	testified	by	a	recent	IMF	
report	that	suggests	that	the	benefits	of	subsidised	energy	prices	are	mostly	captured	by	
the wealthiest parts of the population.43 
Why are fossil fuel subsidies not being fully phased out in EU member states? There 
are several concurring reasons, which include direct involvement of governments in coal 
production, the need to maintain employment in energy- and carbon-intensive industries, 
and trade policy reasons (export credits allow European countries to export coal technologies 
also outside the EU). The two most telling examples are provided by Germany and Poland. 
 
While Germany has decommissioned nuclear plants (after the Fukushima-daichi disaster in 
Japan) and gradually moved towards an increase in the use of renewables, including wind 
and solar, there has been no parallel reduction in fossil fuels consumption. The government 
still contributes approximately three billion euros a year to the industry, mainly to keep 
German coal competitive to imported coal. This support will be phased out by 2018 because 
of EU regulations. Germany also gives energy tax relief for energy-intensive processes, 
does not require mining companies to pay a royalty fee, rehabilitates lignite mining sites in 
East Germany and pays for early retirement for miners. The current government plans to 
spend hundreds of millions of euros in capacity payments for lignite power plants – a plan 
which has sparked controversy and could be challenged by the European Commission. A 
recent report by Mark Lewis for Barclays concluded that the 46,000MW of black and brown 
coal	fired	generation	currently	in	service	in	Germany	will	be	worthless	in	little	more	than	a	
decade if the country adopts the targets embraced at the Paris climate change conference. 
Coal	fired	power	generation	(without	carbon	capture	and	storage,	but	which	in	any	event	is	
considered problematic by many analysts) would have to be almost completely eliminated 
by	2030	in	a	scenario	that	would	require	a	substantial	carbon	price	(€45/t)	and	the	end	to	
the current energy market design. Importantly, this analysis also implicitly points to possible 
short-termism in deciding how to approach the energy transition path: in Germany, under 
current	policies,	total	generation	will	reduce	by	15%	under	energy	efficiency	measures	and	
its target for 50% renewables; to meet the emissions goals, however, that remaining fossil 
fuel	generation	will	have	to	come	nearly	exclusively	from	gas-fired	generation,	exactly	the	
risk that Sachs (2015) denounced after Paris, which could jeopardise what he calls “Deep 
decarbonisation” after 2030.  
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44http://www.energypost.eu/german-conundrum-renewables-break-records-coal-refuses-go-away/ 
45Ibid.
Figure 8 - The renewables share in German consumption 
(goals for 2025 and 2035)44 
Source: Agora Energiewende (2016): Die Energiewende im Stromsektor: Stand der Dinge 2015. Rückblick auf 
die wesentlichen Entwicklungen sowie Ausblick auf 2016.
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As	 argued	 in	 a	 recent	 report	 (Kucera,	 2016),	 one	 explanation	 for	 Germany’s	 continued	
support for coal is its record exports of coal surpluses to other countries, including most 
notably Austria, the Netherlands, France and Switzerland. In overall economic terms, the 
German commercial surplus, also for coal exports, seems to have become too big to be 
ignored. And if countries like Austria keep closing fossil fuel plants and shift to renewable 
energy, it is equally true that they import high-carbon, low-price electricity from Germany, 
which puts the sustainability of domestic plants (including, most notably, gas-fuelled 
plants) at risk.44
In Poland, the government is heavily involved in the coal industry in terms of co-ownership. 
Indeed, the Silesia region – partly in Poland, partly in the Czech Republic – has more working 
coal miners than the rest of the EU combined. From 1990 to 2012, the Polish government 
handed out about 16.8 billion euros in subsidies for the coal energy sector. The lion’s share 
of	coal	subsidies	go	to	state-owned	firms	 like	PGE,	Tauron,	Energa	and	Enea.	All	 these	
utilities receive free emission allowances under the EU’s Emission Trading Scheme. Poland 
uses all types of subsidies to boost the coal sector. Plants are being kept open in case 
there	is	peak	demand.	There	is	also	generous	support	for	plants	that	co-fire	coal	with	small	
shares of biomass.
There is no apparent lack of will by the European Commission to accelerate the phasing 
out of fossil fuels, and in particular coal. As a matter of fact, coal emissions rose 6% 
from 2010-13, despite massive investment in renewables and electricity demand falling. 
In 2013, coal emissions alone contributed to 18% of total EU CO2 emissions, which is as 
much as the road transport sector alone45. The problem seems even more circumscribed, 
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46See Jones, D. and B. Worthington (2014), Europe’s Failure to Tackle Coal, Sandbag.
47https://euobserver.com/opinion/129036
since	Germany,	UK	and	Poland	are	responsible	for	66%	of	coal	based	emissions,	and	also	
responsible for the entire 6% EU increase since 2010. However, and relatedly, the past 
few years have shown that this endeavour is an uphill battle due to the reluctance of large 
Member States that, heavily affected by the crisis, are in no position to accept what they 
consider to be further reductions in employment and increases in energy prices. 
In February 2015, EU member states committed to provide “biennial reports on energy 
prices, with an in-depth analysis of the role of taxes, levies and subsidies, in order to 
create more transparency on energy costs and prices”. But the subsidies element has 
since been dropped. Governments are now just committed to “greater transparency in the 
composition of energy costs and prices by means of appropriate monitoring”.46 During the 
same period, the European Commission has taken steps to actively encourage member 
states to phase out fossil fuel subsidies and even tried to use the European Semester’s 
recommendations to mandate that 11 member states be asked to tackle their fossil fuel 
subsidies.	Yet	all	11	draft	recommendations	were	dropped	from	the	final	text	issued	by	the	
Commission itself. The stated reason was that the issue of fossil fuel subsidies would not 
be tackled by the Energy Union package. 
The OECD has been seeking a compromise on coal export credits for more than a year and 
has described the phase-out of fossil fuel subsidies as “alarmingly slow”.47 Without a clear 
shift of gear, the EU will be responsible (together with other countries, such as Australia, 
Canada, Japan, the US) for the failure of this crucial goal. 
2.1.1.2 Example 2: Why tax labour and not carbon?
In order to incentivise the maintenance of high levels of employment, we need to stop 
taxing labour and start taxing the carbon footprint and pollution, as long advocated by 
Herman Daly and other ecological economists (Lawn 2004a, 2004b, 2006; see also 
Ashford, Hall and Ashford, 2012). The practice of exacting transfer payments on a per 
worker basis is a disincentive to increase employment. Alternatives such as taxes on sales, 
profits,	dividends,	or	retained	earnings	etc.	should	be	considered.	Taxing	carbon	in	lieu	of	
taxing labour would be revenue neutral (see Ashford et al. 2012). See two recent reports 
focusing on shifting the tax basis from labour to environment and energy: Wijkman and 
Skanberg (undated); Farid et al., (2016).
An IMF staff discussion note (Farid et al., 2016, p.23) reports: 
in	2012,	out	of	€5	trillion	in	tax	revenue	in	the	EU	member	states,	over	
50% was derived from labour taxes and social contributions, almost 
30% in consumption taxes and the remaining 20% was based on 
capital. Only 6% of tax revenues consisted of environmental taxes, 
mainly on energy and transport as part of consumption taxes.
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48OECD  (2015), OECD Companion to the Inventory of Support Measures for Fossil Fuels 2015, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264239616-en
2.1.2 Type 2. Incomplete or non-existent policies
In other cases, the misalignment between EU policy and long-term decarbonisation goals 
could be attributed to inaction, rather than to inconsistent action. Such inaction can be 
related	either	 to	 the	 complete	 lack	of	policy	 initiatives	with	 respect	 to	 a	 specific	policy	
issue;	or	to	the	absence	of	individual	rules	addressing	a	specific	problem	within	an	existing	
policy framework. 
2.1.2.1 Example 1: Exempting aviation and shipping from ETS emissions limits
According	to	a	scientific	study	published	recently	by	the	European	Parliament	Research	
Service, if left unaddressed, aviation and shipping could account for almost 40% of 
the world’s CO2 emissions in 2050. Such growth will render the Paris goal of limiting 
temperature increases to 1.5/2°C unachievable. Also, a letter sent to the Commission by 
the heads of seven political groups of the European Parliament’s environment committee 
demanded greater climate ambition at both ICAO and IMO, the UN bodies charged with 
regulating emissions from aircraft and ships respectively. The letter states that “there is no 
reasonable excuse to continue exempting aviation and shipping from the international and 
EU climate policies.”49 Aviation accounts for about 5% of global warming, and CO2 from 
shipping is some 3% of the global total. These sectors have CO2 impacts on a par with the 
UK	and	Germany,	respectively,	and	are	continuing	to	grow	rapidly.
The European Commission has so far simply referred to the evolution of the international 
debate. Likewise, documents circulated by the Dutch Presidency of the EU to Ministers in 
advance of the meeting appear to delegate to international governmental organisations (UN 
bodies) the solution to the problem of international transport emissions. This is possibly 
too	optimistic,	since	both	ICAO	and	IMO	have	not	been	very	active	in	this	field	since	Kyoto,	
and there is no evidence that they plan to take more leadership and responsibility, even 
after the Paris accords. As regards aviation covered by ETS and international emissions 
outside the EU 2030 targets, for aviation International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is 
developing a global market-based measure to address emissions from aviation, including 
an approach to assess lifecycle emissions from alternative fuels. It will decide on its 
implementation at the 39th Session of the ICAO Assembly in September 2016. In addition, 
the ICAO is working on a CO2 standard for aircraft, due to be adopted in 2016. For shipping 
the	EU	has	put	in	place	a	monitoring,	reporting	and	verification	regime.	The	development	
of	a	global	monitoring,	reporting	and	verification	system	under	the	International	Maritime	
Organisation is being pursued, with the expectation that it could be adopted in 2016. In 
such	a	case,	as	specified	in	the	EU	Regulation,	a	revision	would	need	to	be	considered.
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49See	 https://www.transportenvironment.org/sites/te/files/2016_04_Coordinators_letter_Dutch_presidency_shipping_
aviation.pdf.
50Zgajewski (2015). Member States’ unwillingness to timely and properly transpose and implement the Directives continues 
despite	 the	 high	 degree	 of	 flexibility	 permitted.	The	 decentralized	 approach	 chosen	 for	 some	 specific	 aspects	 and	 the	
differentiation in the application of EPBD standards between Member States do not appear optimal either. Adequate 
financial	schemes	remain	rare.	The	permanent	deficit	of	qualified	and	trained	personnel	and	the	inertia	of	public	authorities	
to make the public understand the stakes in this domain remain problematic. Hence the need to take new initiatives to reap 
the	benefits	that	the	building	sector	 is	meant	to	bring”	See	http://www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/
ep78.pdf 
51For example, the six cent/litre tax rate on heating oil in Germany is considerably below the EU average of 18 cents/litre. 
Indeed, seven Member States have a rate that is over 30 cents/litre
52http://bpie.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/BPIE_Renovating-Germany-s-Building-Stock-_EN_09.pdf 
53http://iet.jrc.ec.europa.eu/energyefficiency/node/9096;	 Read	 more:	 http://www.youris.com/Energy/Ecodesign/Building-
Retrofits-Critical-To-EuropeS-Low-Carbon-Pathway.kl#ixzz45pGKS3PN	
54Horizon 2020 and Intelligent Energy Europe projects are backing the new heating and cooling strategy of the European 
Commission	 by	 providing	 support	 for	 market	 uptake	 of	 energy	 efficient	 and	 renewable	 heating	 and	 cooling.	 A	 newly	
published review provides an overview of the projects supported by the EASME in these areas. https://ec.europa.eu/easme/
sites/easme-site/files/heating_and_cooling_projects_market_uptake_activities.pdf
2.1.2.2 Example 2: Energy efficiency of existing buildings
One key example of incomplete legislation is provided by rules on the energy efficiency of 
buildings. The European Commission acknowledged that the potential contribution of this 
policy area is huge: households are responsible for 32% of greenhouse gas emissions 
and 42% of energy consumption in Europe. In the Staff Working Document on “Better 
regulation for innovation-driven investment” the European Commission observes that 
“improved	 efficiency	 in	 buildings	 could	 cut	 Europe’s	 total	 energy	 use	 by	 over	 20%,	
reduce energy bills by EURO 70 billion and reduce CO2 emissions by 460 million tonnes a 
year”. In this area, the most relevant pieces of legislation are the Energy Performance of 
Buildings Directive (2010/31/UE) recast, the Construction Products Regulation (305/2011), 
the	Energy	Efficiency	Directive	(2012/27/UE),	products	regulation	such	as	the	Eco-Design	
Directive (2009/125/EC) and the Energy Labelling Directive (2010/30/EU). All these pieces 
of legislation are under review with different timeframes; the construction products 
regulation review being was due before the summer of 2016. 
Europe’s	 stock	 of	 buildings	 seems	 to	 be	 renovated	 at	 a	 very	 slow	 (insufficient)	 pace,	
however, and experts predict that already-existing buildings will account for as much as 70% 
of the building stock in 2050. Accordingly, while there is much to do on new buildings (also 
since	the	Energy	Performance	of	Buildings	Directive	and	the	Energy	Efficiency	Directives	
appear	 to	 be	 too	 flexible	 and	 insufficiently	 oriented	 towards	 use	 of	 new	materials,	 let	
alone	 insufficiently	enforced	and	monitored),50 the biggest challenge is how to improve 
the energy performance of the existing building stock. Ad hoc policy intervention aimed at 
stimulating ‘deep renovations’ might thus be needed to achieve the potential of this sector 
to contribute to decarbonisation goals. A recent BPIE report (2015) for the German market 
argues that over half of the potential for energy savings and investments is currently 
untapped, and that a combination of (mostly supply-side) instruments (feed-in tariffs for 
saved energy, conditional on achieving an ambitious level of energy saving; tax incentives; 
carbon pricing leading to higher energy prices; higher taxation of energy used in buildings, 
e.g., for heating oil;51	financial	support;	etc.)	could	contribute	to	unleashing	that	potential.52 
In	 addition,	 specific	 technologies	 such	 as	 ‘deep	 energy	 retrofits’	 seem	 to	 hold	 a	 great	
56
ALIGNING POLICIES FOR LOW-CARBON SYSTEMIC INNOVATION IN EUROPE
Nicholas Ashford, MIT and Andrea Renda, CEPS and Duke
51For example, the six cent/litre tax rate on heating oil in Germany is considerably below the EU average of 18 cents/litre. 
Indeed, seven Member States have a rate that is over 30 cents/litre
52http://bpie.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/BPIE_Renovating-Germany-s-Building-Stock-_EN_09.pdf 
53http://iet.jrc.ec.europa.eu/energyefficiency/node/9096;	 Read	 more:	 http://www.youris.com/Energy/Ecodesign/Building-
Retrofits-Critical-To-EuropeS-Low-Carbon-Pathway.kl#ixzz45pGKS3PN	
54Horizon 2020 and Intelligent Energy Europe projects are backing the new heating and cooling strategy of the European 
Commission	 by	 providing	 support	 for	 market	 uptake	 of	 energy	 efficient	 and	 renewable	 heating	 and	 cooling.	 A	 newly	
published review provides an overview of the projects supported by the EASME in these areas. https://ec.europa.eu/easme/
sites/easme-site/files/heating_and_cooling_projects_market_uptake_activities.pdf	
55Researchers in the ISOBIO project are developing a new approach to insulating materials, through the combination of 
existing bio-derived aggregates with low embodied carbon and innovative binders to produce durable composite construction 
materials. With these novel composites, the aim is to cut embodied energy and carbon dioxide at component level by 50%, 
and to improve insulation properties by 20% compared to conventional material. The study will also seek to demonstrate a 
reduction in total costs by 15% and in the total energy spent over the life time of a building by 5%.
56The core features of the E3P are four mutually reinforcing collaborative tools: the Data Hub, the wikEE, the Community 
and the Calls. The information collected in the E3P is organised around six thematic areas, including Buildings; addressing 
policies,	 technologies,	 and	financing	 for	deep	 renovation,	Near	Zero	Energy	Buildings	 and	districts.	Users	are	 invited	 to	
provide content on such items at their earliest convenience and by December 2016. 
potential	 for	 speeding	 up	 the	 energy	 efficiency	 of	 European	 buildings,	 leading	 to	 near-
zero emissions in the coming decades.53 These instruments, coupled with demand-side 
policies aimed at reducing consumption of energy and incentivising the purchase of highly 
energy-efficient	products,	appear	to	be	decisive,	despite	the	significant	number	of	other	
research and innovation projects already launched at the EU level to boost the uptake 
of	new	energy	efficient	 technologies.54 Other technologies that might prove important, 
if adequately supported by policy measures, include bio-based materials (a cheaper and 
more	energy-efficient	alternative	to	traditional	insulations).55 The launch, on 5 April 2016, of 
the	European	Commission	Joint	Research	Centre’s	European	Energy	Efficiency	Platform	is	
a good starting point for scaling up efforts and synergies between technologies and policy 
instruments.56 Once again, regulation can play a key role in ensuring the diffusion of these 
important innovations.
2.1.3 Type 3. Insufficient stringency
A third type of misalignment that deserves attention at the EU level refers to all those policies 
that,	 although	potentially	 in	 line	with	decarbonisation	goals,	 are	 insufficiently	stringent,	
i.e., do not provide, for lack of adequate implementation of badly selected targets, proper 
incentives to regulated stakeholders to adopt the necessary changes within a reasonable 
timeframe.	We	offer	here	 two	examples	of	 insufficiently	 stringent	 rules,	 corresponding	
to different underlying reasons: the ETS appears to lack stringency due to its inability to 
send credible price signals that drive low-carbon technologies that will enable the deep 
decarbonisation	of	the	EU	economy	to	the	market;	air	quality	rules	appear	 insufficiently	
stringent in that they set targets that are not ambitious enough to be considered in line 
with long-term decarbonisation goals. 
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57Amending acts were as follows: i) Directive 2004/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council; ii) Directive 
2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council; iii) Regulation (EC) No 219/2009 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council; and iv) Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. The latter act is the most 
relevant, as it introduces the third phase of the emissions trading scheme.
58Meaning that EUAs from Phase 1 could not be carried over to Phase 2.
59Report from the Commission, The state of the European carbon market in 2012, 14.11.2012, COM (2012)652. 
2.1.3.1 Example 1: The EU Emissions Trading System
The	 EU	 ETS	 is	 a	 cap-and-trade	 system	 first	 implemented	 in	 2005	 to	 provide	 a	 cost-
effective tool to reach the greenhouse gas (GHG) targets the EU had committed to. The 
legislation setting up the ETS is Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and the 
Council establishing a scheme for GHG emission allowance trading within the Community 
(hereinafter the ETS Directive) and its amendments.57 The EU ETS was extended to the non-
EU members of the European Economic Area (Liechtenstein, Norway and Iceland) in 2007. 
The EU ETS compliance is managed at the installation level. More than 11,000 installations 
are covered by the scheme. Each year, each installation must surrender a number of 
emission permits equal to its emissions during the past year. European Union Allowances 
(EUAs) are compliance units that represent one tonne of CO2-equivalent emissions. Other 
units that can be used to comply with this provision are Emissions Reduction Units (ERUs) 
from	Joint	Implementation	projects	and	Certified	Emission	Reductions	(CERs)	from	Clean	
Development Mechanism projects. 
The total cap for emissions is equal to the total amount of EUAs made available each year 
through free allocation or auctioning. Underneath that cap, market participants, including 
covered installations, are free to trade. The total cap for installations covered by the EU ETS 
was set to decrease every year by 1.74%, now increased to 2.2% for the post-2020 phase.
The EU ETS is now in its third phase. The characteristics of these different phases are 
discussed below. Given their different characteristics, each phase has different impacts 
on	the	EU	economy.	During	the	first	phase	(2005-07),	which	was	a	pilot	phase,	caps	were	
set at the national level through the National Allocation Plans (NAPs), which had to be 
approved by the European Commission. A maximum of 5% of the allowances could be 
auctioned; the rest was allocated free of charge on the basis of estimates of historical 
emissions. Due to a lack of good quality data and no banking provisions between phases,58 
this resulted in a sizable over-supply of EUAs, driving prices close to zero at the end of 
the	phase.	Despite	being	a	pilot	phase,	phase	1	resulted	in	significant	outcomes.	A	price	
for carbon was established. It also helped create the necessary infrastructure for future 
phases:	at	the	installation	level	this	included	monitoring,	reporting	and	verification	(MRV);	
while in the marketplace National Registries, the Community Independent Transaction Log 
and carbon exchanges were founded.
In phase 2 (2008-12), allocation was granted on the basis of the reported emissions in the 
first	phase.	This	grandfathering	process	was	considered	fit	to	solve	the	problem	of	over-
supply observed in phase 1. But the economic crisis had a clear impact and substantially 
decreased emissions in phase 2. The European Commission estimates that between 1.5 
and 2 billion EUAs were carried over to phase 3.59 The amount of allowances that could be 
auctioned was also increased, to a maximum of 10% of the total.
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59Report from the Commission, The state of the European carbon market in 2012, 14.11.2012, COM (2012)652. 
60The setting of benchmarks for industry is discussed in Methodology for the free allocation of emission allowances in the 
EU ETS post 2012. The full study commissioned by the European Commission to Ecofys (project leader); Fraunhofer Institute 
for Systems and Innovation Research; and Öko-Institut is available at   http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/allowances/docs/
bm_study-project_approach_and_general_issues_en.pdf
61Commission Decision determining transitional Union-wide rules for harmonised free allocation of emission allowances 
pursuant to Article 10a of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (2011/278/EU)
62Commission Decision determining, pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC a list of sectors and subsectors which are deemed to 
be	exposed	to	a	significant	risk	of	carbon	leakage	(2010/2/EU).
63See Andrei Marcu, Milan Elkerbout and Wijnand Stoefs, “The State of the EU ETS - 2016”, Report of the CEPS Carbon 
Market Forum, February 2016 (www.ceps-ech.eu/publication/2016-state-eu-ets-report). 
64See	http://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/building-efficiency-sector-the-2030-debate-was-a-set-up/	
65http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2015/swd_2015_0135_en.pdf
The	 functioning	 of	 the	 ETS	 saw	 some	 significant	 changes	 at	 the	 start	 of	 the	 third	
phase (2013-20). Auctioning was increased, and more than 40% of all allowances can 
be auctioned (including full auctioning for the power sector). Energy-intensive industries 
continued to receive a large part of their needed allowances for free, and have to buy any 
shortfall at auctions or in the market (as was the case during phases 1 and 2). Allocation to 
energy-intensive industries is largely determined by using benchmarks,60 established per 
product, according to Decision 2011/27/EU.61 The average carbon-intensity of the 10% best 
performers represents the benchmark for allocating free emissions. Those installations 
that meet the benchmark receive a greater percentage of free allowances than those that 
do not. The latter are thereby incentivised to catch up to their best-performing peers. This 
approach also rewards early action by industry towards reducing emissions. Free allocation 
is granted at the 80% level of the benchmark, a share which is set to decrease to 30% in 
2020 for sectors not deemed exposed to the risk of carbon leakage, and which are listed 
in the carbon leakage Decision.62 These installations received free allowances at 100% of 
their benchmarks. 
As a result of the lessons learned in phases 1 and 2, several important EU ETS functions 
have been centralised in phase 3. Member states’ registries were incorporated in the EU 
registry, and allocation is harmonised at EU level. Electric utilities now have to effectively 
buy all their allowances linked to electricity production; additional measures have 
been included to compensate energy-intensive industries, especially those exposed to 
international competition. This is based on ETS Directive Art. 10a.6, which allows member 
states to compensate for the indirect costs of emissions passed through electricity prices. 
Not all countries can afford it, however, so indirect costs are not always compensated.
The ETS legislation is a fundamental cornerstone of the EU decarbonisation strategy. By 
placing a price on carbon, it is expected to deliver those price signals that would reorient the 
market towards renewable energies. But its main problems today include the excessively 
low price it generated for EUAs, and the still-too-long list of exemptions granted to carbon-
intensive, energy-hungry industries.63
• The price of allowances is far too low. For what concerns the price of emission 
allowances, the current levels are as low as 4 euros per tonne. This is interesting if 
one considers that a recent impact assessment by the European Commission reported 
that the main driver for a 40% CO2	emissions	cut	will	be	a	€40	a	tonne	carbon	price	
by	2030,	which	will	rise	to	€264	a	tonne	by	2050.	It	is	unclear	how	these	prices	will	be	
achieved.64 The rapporteur for the ETS reform for the European Parliament, Ian Duncan 
MEP, recently observed that “clearly, something has to change, if the ETS is to be 
a driver of low carbon innovation within the industries that emit carbon”.65 He also 
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66http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/03/04/germany-austria-call-for-higher-eu-2030-climate-ambition/ 
67Martin	et	al.	(2011)	conducted	interviews	with	nearly	800	European	manufacturing	firms,	of	which	almost	450	fell	under	
EU	ETS	regulations.	Using	their	interview-based	measure	of	innovation,	they	find	a	positive	effect	of	the	expected	future	
stringency of EU ETS.
68Calel	and	Dechezleprêtre	2016,	at	174.
69At the same time, proportionality is of the essence. As Duncan recalls, “Nearly three-quarters of the 11,500 individual 
installations	 covered	 by	 the	 ETS	 collectively	 emit	 only	 five	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 total	 emissions.	 Subjecting	 these	 small	
installations - which include hospitals, distilleries and brickworks - to the same rules and the same costs as large emitters is 
disproportionate. Serious consideration needs to be given to the exclusion clause for small emitters”. 
70Andrei Marcu, Milan Elkerbout and Wijnand Stoefs, “The State of the EU ETS - 2016”, Report of the CEPS Carbon Market 
Forum, February 2016 (www.ceps-ech.eu/publication/2016-state-eu-ets-report).
highlighted that the European Commission ultimately decided not to incorporate the 
targets set in the Paris accords in the ETS reform, despite explicit requests by countries 
like	the	UK,	Germany,	and	France,	and	triggering	a	vibrant	protest	by	Germany,	Austria,	
Portugal and Luxembourg among others, whereas countries like Hungary, Lithuania 
and Italy opposed the adoption of more ambitious targets.66 
• ETS seems to have led to emissions reduction mostly determined by 
operational changes such as fuel switching, which is of limited use for long-
term decarbonisation. Delarue et al. (2008) estimate that fuel switching has the 
potential to reduce emissions by up to 300 million tonnes annually, which is no more 
than one-tenth of what is needed to meet the EU target to cut emissions by 80% 
by	2050	against	1990	levels.	(see	Calel	and	Dechezleprêtre,	2016)	In	addition	to	the	
evidence on fuel switching, a growing literature of case studies and expert interviews 
indicates	that	rather	than	developing	new	technologies,	firms	have	been	introducing	
well-known technological solutions that had simply not been economically viable 
without the EU ETS carbon price (Petsonk & Cozijnsen, 2007; Tomás et al., 2010).67 
Calel	and	Dechezleprêtre	(2016)	estimate,	by	using	difference-in-difference	analysis	on	
a	sample	of	ETS-regulated	and	control	group	of	non-regulated	firms,	that	only	2%	of	
the observable post-2005 surge in low-carbon patenting can be attributed to the EU 
ETS, and that the latter so far “has had at best a very limited impact on the overall pace 
and direction of technological change”. The authors conclude that “in its current form, 
the EU ETS may not be providing incentives for low-carbon technological change on a 
large scale”.68
• The impact of ETS reform could be targeted more effectively. A ‘tiered approach’ to 
the	carbon	list	was	proposed	by	both	France	and	the	UK	with	a	view	to	better	focusing	
allowances	among	industry.	France	also	proposed	a	‘price	floor’,	and	a	‘corridor’,	which	
outlines	a	minimum	price	below	which	 the	carbon	price	cannot	 fall.	The	UK	already	
adopted	a	carbon	price	floor	in	its	domestic	legislation.	On	the	process	of	allocation,	
there is widespread acknowledgement that better alignment of allowances to actual 
production would reward innovators and help keep us within our carbon budget.69
• Need to make the most out of the innovation fund. Consisting of 450 million 
allowances,	 the	 innovation	 fund	 is	open	 to	 industry	 to	help	new	and	first	of	 a	 kind	
technology come to fruition. But a recent CEPS report that evaluates the ETS (Marcu, 
Elkerbout & Stoef, 2016) warns that “at current EUA price levels, the Innovation Fund of 
450	million	tons	will	have	at	its	disposal	significantly	fewer	resources	than	anticipated”,	
and that “under these circumstances the direct impact of the EU ETS, and its power to 
drive change, is marginal at best”.70 
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In terms of timing, during 2016 the Commission will present the key remaining legislative 
proposals to implement the agreed 2030 regulatory framework; to set up a reliable and 
transparent governance mechanism and streamline the planning and reporting requirements 
related to climate and energy for the post-2020 period. The Parliament will work on the 
proposed revision of the ETS between April and December 2016, with the aim to vote by 
8 December in the environment committee.
All in all, the overall impression is that the ETS, alone and under current conditions, 
will not trigger the innovation investment needed in a number of sectors to achieve 
decarbonisation goals.	Even	 if	 the	ETS	were	perfectly	finetuned	to	present	a	credible	
carbon price signal in the industries affected, the high risk and uncertainties related to the 
investment	needed,	and	the	resistance	of	incumbents	and	specific	national	governments	
potentially create almost insurmountable obstacles, especially if complementary policies 
are not put in place.
2.1.3.2 Example 2: Air quality rules 
Within air quality rules, the three most important pieces of EU legislation for the purposes 
of our report are the LCPD (Large Combustion Plants Directive); the NEC (National 
Emission Ceilings) Directive; and the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED). This legislation 
could	benefit	from	more	stringent	standards,	for	the	following	reasons:
• The LCPD	 gave	 power	 stations	 a	 choice	 to	 a)	 comply	 by	 installing	 flue	 gas	
desulphurisation, or b) opt-out and limit generation 2008-15, closing by Dec-2015. This 
led to about 35GW of power station closures across Europe, but much of this was low-
load factor plant, and often back-up oil plant. A recent report by Sandbag estimates that 
opted-out LCPD power stations reduced their total emissions by 5% from 2008 to 2013. 
However, total coal emission from 2008-13 fell by only 3%, meaning that remaining coal 
power stations increased their emissions. LCPD opted-out power stations continued 
to contribute 3% of coal emissions in 2013. They must stop generating by 2016, but 
there is no certainty that this necessarily ensures a drop in total EU coal emissions. 
• The long-awaited revision of the National Emission Ceilings (NEC) comes with very 
weak targets for 2020. The EEB (2015) claims that emission levels proposed are even 
less ambitious than those under a business-as-usual scenario, i.e., levels that EU 
member states will achieve anyway merely by implementing their obligations under 
existing EU and national legislation. For 2025, no legally binding targets are proposed, 
which will result in further delays to cut air pollution. The 2030 targets are not only too 
late	they	are	also	far	from	sufficient	to	achieve	the	EU’s	air	quality	objectives	as	set	out	
in the 7th Environment Action Programmes (EAP). Moreover, the Commission missed 
the opportunity to include NEC emission reduction commitments for mercury, despite 
the recent Minamata Convention. 
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• The introduction of EU-wide standards for medium scale combustion plants was also 
criticised for setting too weak standards. The emission limit values (ELVs) proposed 
by the European Commission are extremely weak compared to levels that could be 
achieved by the use of best available techniques (BAT) and also compared to some 
member states’ existing national legislation. The compliance deadlines are also way 
too late if member states are to meet air quality standards and targets in the shortest 
timeframe possible. Not to mention the number of derogations proposed by some 
member states (e.g., upfront exclusion of MCPs located on islands, exemptions for 
refineries,	 crematoria,	 district	 heating	 plants	 bigger	 than	 5MWth	 or	 plants	 with	 a	
limited remaining life time). 
• The impact of the revision of the Industrial Emissions Directive in 2016 is also under 
the spotlight.71 The new Industrial Emissions Directive (IED), as originally proposed 
by the European Commission, and largely endorsed by the European Parliament, 
sought to tighten further the emission limit values for SO2 and to remove some of the 
flexibilities	for	achieving	NOx	reduction	by	reduced	running	and	by	trading	emissions	
permits. This would certainly have forced further power station closures from 2016, 
and	it	raised	serious	security	of	supply	concerns	in	the	UK,	Poland	and	several	other	
countries in Eastern Europe. But no coal power stations have announced closure due 
to IED, and the IED allows many coal plants to stay open if they comply with cheaper 
compliance techniques. Expectations are that many coal power stations will invest to 
stay open, which creates a high-carbon lock-in into the 2030s.72 This situation is made 
more serious by the relative lack of stringency of the limit imposed on NOx emissions 
(200mg/Ncm): the European Commission is trying to reduce the limit to 80mg, but it is 
unclear whether this will occur. Moreover, concerns have been raised that the scheme 
put in place to gradually update the BAT reference documents (BREFs), the so-called 
‘Seville process’, is incorporating in the decision-making process incumbency interests, 
due to the large presence of industry players in the Technical Working Group.73  In 
a recent report, Greenpeace observed that seven delegations (Poland, the Czech 
Republic,	Greece,	Germany,	 France,	 the	UK	and	Spain)	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	 vast	
majority of comments seeking to further weaken the limits.
71The IED is a recast of 7 previous directives (Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Directive 2008/1/EC – Large 
Combustion Plants Directive 2001/80/EC – Waste Incineration Directive 2000/76/EC – etc.) and regulates different industrial 
activities in the EU with the aim of preventing/reducing “emissions into air, water and land and to prevent the generation of 
waste, in order to achieve a high level of protection of the environment as a whole” (IED, art.1)
72The intention of IED was to require all power stations to install selective catalytic reduction (SCR) on all coal power stations 
by 2016, which reduces NOx levels by about 90%. Power stations that chose not to do this had to run limited hours and close 
by	2023.	However,	two	things	suggest	this	won’t	happen	as	envisaged:	First,	many	flexibilities	were	negotiated	by	industry	
and implementation has effectively been delayed by 4½ years. The EC introduced the concept of a “transition plan” for key 
countries, where full compliance is delayed until mid-2020. Second, cheaper NOx abatement techniques have since become 
available, allowing a wide range of compliance options. These do not abate NOx by the same levels, but they enable power 
stations to comply more cheaply and still operate high load factors. The IED limit imposed on NOx emissions is relatively high 
–	a	limit	of	200mg/Ncm,	when	80mg	is	possible	if	SCR	is	fitted.	The	EC	is	currently	trying	to	reduce	the	limit	to	80mg	for	a	
future date, but this decision is subject to aggressive lobbying by utilities and may not be introduced for many years. The net 
effect of how the IED is now being complied with means more coal power stations will be able to remain open at relatively 
high	load	factors.	Far	fewer	coal	stations	are	likely	to	close	than	might	have	been	first	anticipated.	
73See	 page	 28	 at	 http://www.greenpeace.org/eu-unit/Global/eu-unit/reports-briefings/2015/Smoke%20and%20Mirror%20
final%20report.pdf
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2.1.4 Type 4. Lack of effectiveness due to problems of
                    implementation, monitoring and enforcement
Some rules can also be imperfectly aligned with long-term goals because, however stringent 
and potentially oriented towards such goals, they either adopt a suboptimal timeframe for 
compliance, or fail to generate a timely reaction by market forces. In addition, some pieces 
of legislation, however well designed, fall short of being monitored and implemented 
effectively. Lack of effective monitoring and implementation can jeopardise the effectiveness 
of existing policies, just as bad regulatory design or misalignment between the direction of 
a policy intervention and the overarching policy goals. 
The most straightforward example is certainly the legislation on car and light duty vehicles 
emissions, which was recently subject to ex post evaluation in mid-2015, right before 
the Volkswagen scandal erupted. The ex post evaluation of the Regulations 443/2009 and 
510/2011 on CO2 emissions from light-duty vehicles, however formally elegant, did not 
include	 a	 thorough	 on-field	 analysis	 of	 the	 actual	 compliance	 behaviour,	 and	 ended	 up	
only	briefly	mentioning	that	there	could	potentially	be	a	difference	between	test	results	
and actual emission levels on the road. That divergence ended up being huge, mostly 
due to the easy manipulation of the test results based on the NEDC model. In a typical 
NEDC test, cars would go through two test cycles, urban and extra-urban, which together 
would take around 20 min (11 km). There is no simulation of prolonged motorway driving, 
the top speed achieved is between 90 and 120kph, and car manufacturers often use 
optimal settings to improve performance, such as a bare minimum of fuel and switching 
off air conditioning, removing side-mirrors, taping over any crevices (such as car doors) to 
reduce drag, top-charging batteries, or driving on unrealistically smooth roads. In addition, 
manufacturers are allowed to reduce 4% of measured consumption. The weakness of this 
test was apparently reinforced by the lack of third-party supervision and the cooperation 
of corrupted authorities. As a result, the credibility of CO2 emission reductions achieved in 
the car sector is very limited today. According to recent studies, in 2002 cars performed 
10% better under laboratory tests measuring CO2 emissions than in the real world. By 
2010, the gap had reached 24% and rose again to 35% in 2014. The widening gap can be 
attributed to car-makers improving their skills at cheating the system more than focusing 
on improving car engines. A T&E report found that on average two-thirds of the claimed 
gains in CO2 emissions and fuel consumption since 2008 have been delivered through test 
manipulations.
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74https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/Impact%20of%20energy%20labels%20on%20consumer%20
behaviour.pdf	and	http://www.energylabelevaluation.eu/tmce/Background_document_IV_-_first_findings_comments.pdf	
75Currently,	 certification	 schemes	 of	 buildings	 around	 Europe	 are	 examining	 a	 wider	 range	 of	 issues	 than	 just	 energy	
performance.	 Examples	 are	 the	 BRE	 Environmental	 Assessment	Method	 (BREEAM)	 (United	 Kingdom),	 the	 Deutsches	
Gütesiegel Nachhaltiges Bauen (DGNB) (Germany), the Haute Qualité Environnementale (HQE) (France), VERDE (Spain) and 
others.
76C  Tigchelaar, J., C. Backhaus, M. de Best-Waldhober (2011),
77In contrast, the U.S. innovation strategy appears more consistent and focused on a limited number of societal challenges 
See Renda (2016), forthcoming report for DG R&I, RISE Group.
Other examples from the same area include energy labels and the Directive on the energy 
performance of buildings:
• When it comes to energy labels the current solutions adopted at the EU level appear at 
once outdated (leading to a concentration of products in the higher classes, and empty 
bottom classes) and ineffective (leading to low consumer willingness to pay for higher 
energy classes.74 
• Moreover, the Directive on the energy performance of buildings requires member 
states	to	establish	a	system	for	certification	of	the	energy	performance	of	buildings.	
However, only buildings owned by public authorities and those frequently visited by 
the	public	and	with	a	floor	area	exceeding	500m²	are	required	to	actually	display	the	
certificate.	For	non-domestic	buildings,	the	Directive	requires	that	a	common,	voluntary	
scheme	of	certification	be	established.75 One European project, IDEAL-EPBD (2013), 
looked	into	the	effectiveness	of	energy	performance	certificates	(EPCs)	in	influencing	
homeowners’	decisions	with	regard	to	energy	efficiency.	The	final	report	indicated	that	
homeowners are generally not aware of the EPC and its recommendations, but that if 
they	were,	they	would	be	likely	to	undertake	energy	efficiency	measures	compared	to	
homeowners that do not have an EPC.76
2.2 Innovation policy in the EU: towards a more 
systemic, simple and socially relevant agenda 
Needless to say, research and innovation policies in the European Union can play a very 
important role in generating technological breakthroughs and contributing to the long-
term decarbonisation agenda. And as a matter of fact, there has been no shortage of 
initiatives in this respect at the EU level: to the contrary, the EU’s anxiety when it comes 
to the so-called ‘innovation emergency’ has led to a proliferation of initiatives that today 
portrays a rather confusing picture of where most important research efforts are.77 Today, 
there is a need for consolidation of the various communities and spaces offered by the 
EU:	Research	Infrastructures,	Knowledge	and	Innovation	Communities	(KICs),	European	
Innovation Partnerships (EIPs), Joint Technology Initiatives (JTIs), and many more. 
Likewise,	the	governance	of	innovation	policy	at	the	institutional	level	should	be	simplified	
to enable seamless communication between the research and innovation community and 
the policy community. Within this context, a recent CEPS Task Force on Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship (2016) proposed a ‘3S’ framework for EU innovation policy, aimed at 
making it:
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78https://ec.europa.eu/research/eic/index.cfm 
79http://www.vinnova.se/upload/EPiStorePDF/va_15_07_T.pdf 
• Socially relevant. Since entrepreneurship and innovation are means, not ultimate 
policy goals, innovation and entrepreneurship policy should seek to incentivise those 
entrepreneurial ventures and innovation efforts that help address the outstanding 
societal challenges that Europe faces, including most notably decarbonisation. In this 
respect, socially relevant can be understood also as ‘challenge-led’.
• Systemic. As previously stated, innovation is broader than industrial R&D, and includes 
other forms, such as social and user innovation, and new business models are just as 
important when it comes to addressing Europe’s thirst for new solutions to outstanding 
challenges.	This	variety	should	also	be	reflected	in	the	choice	of	innovation	policy	tools	
and entrepreneurial support schemes. 
• Simple. Entrepreneurs and innovators do not often have the time and resources to 
dedicate to complex procedures and administrative requirements; the governance 
of EU and national innovation and entrepreneurship policies does not often offer the 
single points of contact and multi-stakeholder platforms that entrepreneurs need to 
test their ideas and apply for funding, mentoring and support.
In summary, many emerging societal challenges call on innovation policy to depart 
form sector-specific industrial policy, and take a more systemic and transformative 
approach that crosses sector boundaries. Herein, EU policy should enable experimentation 
and learning, and avoid creating biases in favour of incumbent business models: this 
requires the creation of policy instruments for testing new business models and services 
that	can	benefit	end-users	and	workers,	without	lowering	protection	levels	for	consumers.	
How to achieve this goal should be the main concern of EU policymakers in the coming 
years, starting from the revision of Horizon 2020 and the governance of EU innovation policy, 
from its R&D-centric ‘innovation policy’ today to an enabling and holistic understanding 
of ‘policies for innovation’. In March 2016, the European Commission launched a call for 
ideas to shape the powers and functions of a prospective European Innovation Council. 
Commissioner Moedas observed that “Europe lags behind in disruptive innovation and in 
scaling start-ups into world-beating businesses”, and that “a European Innovation Council 
[EIC]	could	contribute	to	solving	this	problem”.78 Our opinion in this respect is that another 
EU agency is unlikely to solve the problem of systemic innovation in Europe, unless the 
overall	governance	of	innovation	policy	at	the	EU	level	is	simplified.	
A recent CEPS Task Force report on innovation and entrepreneurship (2016) proposed 
to	embed	the	EIC	 in	a	new,	simplified	governance	structure	for	EU	innovation	policy,	 in	
which two councils (ERC and EIC) would create an interface between science, innovation 
and policymaking, critically contributing to the shaping of roadmaps and pathways to be 
integrated into future impact analysis, and highlighting emerging policy problems such as 
the need to amend legislation to incorporate new technological developments, or encourage 
efforts in basic or applied research to address long term societal challenges. These two 
councils would then be complemented by a limited number of agencies (e.g., the EIB 
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and the EIT), which would be called to launch and orchestrate challenge-led, streamlined 
platforms	where	 research,	development,	demonstration	are	 tackled	 for	specific	societal	
challenges in a multi-stakeholder fashion, open to new entrants, new technologies, new 
business models, and citizens. There would be only one such platform for every emerging 
societal challenge, with cooperation across platforms in case of overlapping issues. And 
within	this	simplified	framework,	as	argued	also	in	a	recent	report	on	the	role	of	national	
research and innovation councils as an instrument of innovation governance (Serger et al., 
2015), the added value of the EIC could rest in its ability to orchestrate “systemic action 
across policy domains”: provided that the powers and functions of the EIC are adequately 
shaped to reach this result.79
Last, but not least, the upcoming review of the Horizon 2020 programme will be an important 
milestone, and an opportunity to strengthen efforts towards sustainable solutions to the 
deep decarbonisation challenge. The proposed new governance would enable a more 
coherent and high quality debate on how to achieve this result. This is important, also for 
the effectiveness of EU innovation policy in and of itself, if one considers that a recent study 
found that the EU Framework programmes have not directly contributed to major radical 
innovations (JIIP, 2015), which makes a compelling case for a sea change, and the adoption 
of more effective, mission-oriented programmes. After so many years and seven editions 
of the Framework programme, it is also time to embrace a truly EU dimension in national 
programmes, which still today account for the bulk of the public investment in R&D and 
is thus fundamental to achieve a higher level of policy coordination beyond collaborative 
projects. Rather than adding more and more instruments (JPIs, for instance), member 
states should become more integrated with the pan-European innovation framework in 
the setting up of their programmes, giving actual preference to networks like COST and 
Eureka that can then orchestrate coordination and pull together available national means.
   2.3 Tapping the potential of the EU Better
         Regulation agenda 
The EU Better Regulation agenda was largely reformed and relaunched in 2002, when 
the	 Commission	 adopted	 its	 first	 better	 regulation	 package	 (Renda	 2006,	 2011,	 2015).	
That package already introduced a commitment to assess the prospective economic, 
social and environmental impacts of major new policy initiatives included in the European 
Commission’s yearly legislative work programme, as well as new, more ambitious standards 
in terms of stakeholder consultation. The main milestones in the evolution of the better 
regulation system were the Itern-Institutional Agreement on Better Lawmaking, signed 
by the Commission with the Parliament and the Council in 2003 and later reinforced as 
the ‘Common Approach to Impact Assessment’; the relaunch of the system with stronger 
emphasis on economic impacts and competitiveness and new, more structured guidelines 
in 2005; the creation, in 2007, of an Impact Assessment Board in charge of quality assurance 
within	the	Commissions’	Secretariat	General;	the	launch,	during	the	same	year,	of	the	first	
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80In	the	US,	only	secondary	legislation	(i.e.,	federal	regulation)	is	subject	to	ex	ante	RIA,	limited	to	economically	significant	
rules.
pan-European measurement of administrative burdens and the subsequent creation of an 
ad hoc High Level Group (dismantled by the Juncker Commission); the launch of ex post 
evaluations	 and	 the	“evaluate	 first	 principle”	 in	October	 2010	with	 the	Communication	
on Smart Regulation; the creation of the European Parliament’s IMPA Directorate (later 
integrated	into	the	EPRS)	in	2012;	the	launch	of	comprehensive	REFIT	(regulatory	fitness)	
exercises and cumulative cost assessments in various industry sectors since 2012; and the 
new better regulation package of May 2015, which marked important changes in the overall 
organisation of the system.
Within the new package, it is important to mention the creation of a Regulatory Scrutiny 
Board, which replaced the Impact Assessment Board and is characterised by the presence 
of three independent members; the expansion of impact assessments into the domain 
of implementing and delegated acts; the introduction of new forms of consultation (in 
particular a 12-week consultation on “inception Impact Assessments” for major new 
proposals,	an	8-week	consultation	after	the	Commission	proposal	is	finalised	and	a	4-week	
consultation for impact assessments on implementing and delegated acts); and a proposed 
new inter-institutional agreement on better regulation (IIBR), which is being negotiated 
with the European Parliament and the Council.
The Better Regulation agenda of the EU aims to improve the overall quality of EU legislation, 
but	has	so	 far	met	with	significant	obstacles	and	constraints.	These	 include	 the	 lack	of	
clarity	 on	 the	 overall	methodology	 to	 be	 adopted	 in	 impact	 assessments	 (cost-benefit	
analysis, or multi-criteria analysis); the relatively poor quality of some impact assessments, 
also due to weak oversight; the lack of compliance, especially on the side of the European 
Parliament and the Council, with the commitments of the (recently re-launched) Inter-
Institutional Agreement on Better Lawmaking; and the widespread lack of familiarity with 
better regulation in EU member states (see Renda, 2015). In addition, a number of features 
of the Better Regulation agenda make it less likely to secure coherence with long-term 
goals	such	as	decarbonisation	than	might	have	been	the	case.	Below,	we	briefly	outline	
these	features	and	constraints.	These	will	be	subject	to	specific	policy	recommendations	
in Section 3 below.  
2.3.1   Misalignments with decarbonisation in better regulation   
           tools and methods used at EU level
A peculiar feature of the EU better regulation agenda, compared to many other countries 
and most notably the US, is that impact assessments and ex post evaluations are performed 
with respect to a variety of instruments, both binding and non-binding, featuring also 
primary legislation such as cross-cutting, far-reaching EU directives and regulations.80 This 
means that, compared to other systems that gauge through policy appraisal the most 
efficient	way	 to	 implement	 existing	 pieces	 of	 legislation	 adopted	 by	 their	 parliaments,	
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81See the ECEEE report “Evaluating our future”, 2015, at http://www.eceee.org/policy-areas/discount-rates/evaluating-our-
future-report.
82See	http://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/building-efficiency-sector-the-2030-debate-was-a-set-up/	
the European Commission actually uses better regulation to compare alternative policy 
agendas, and then also their implementation. This is a very important but often neglected 
feature of the EU system (Renda, 2011).
The feature becomes even more important if one considers that ex ante Impact Assessments 
typically	 require	 the	 use	 of	 cost-benefit	 analysis.	As	 explained	 above,	 in	 section	 1.2.3,	
the	use	of	cost-benefit	analysis	does	not	constitute	a	perfect	match	for	policies	aimed	at	
triggering transformational change and long-term impacts. And if its use for secondary 
legislation is already controversial, for primary legislation some of the limitations of this 
methodological approach become too evident to be overlooked. We refer to distributional 
impacts, long-term impacts, problems related to measuring well-being and sustainability, 
and general problems related to methodological individualism (Renda, 2011). In many 
respects, the debate on CBA mirrors, at the macroeconomic level, the debate on GDP as 
opposed to other measures of prosperity and well-being. Use of CBA is linked, especially 
for	benefit	assessment,	 to	measurement	of	 the	willingness	 to	pay	 (wtp)	of	 individuals,	
and as such takes consumption (especially in the case of revealed preferences) as well as 
wtp (which often is indeed ability to pay) as an indication of intensity of preferences. This 
‘bottom-up’, often distortionary proxy for social welfare cannot take into account longer-
term impacts, especially during times of economic crisis, in which individuals typically 
have less propensity to focus on the long term, or on future generations. The problem of 
selecting	an	appropriate	discount	 rate,	especially	 for	benefits,	 is	pervasive	and	 remains	
unresolved: and indeed there have been cases in which the choice of the discount rate has 
led to a major battle inside the Commission and among stakeholders, as was the case for 
the	energy	efficiency	directive.81 Likewise, the collective action problems that intervention 
to	foster	decarbonisation	addresses	would	inevitably	be	reflected	in	the	limited	willingness	
to pay of individuals to contribute to the low- or zero-carbon economy.
Looking	more	 specifically	 inside	 the	methods	 used	 by	 the	 European	 Commission,	 the	
issue becomes even more tangible. The new better regulation guidelines do not even 
dedicate a section of the toolbox to assessing environmental impacts, while several other 
impacts (administrative burdens, competitiveness, culture, fundamental rights, SMEs) are 
specifically	addressed.	The	Commission	still	recommends	a	relatively	low	discount	rate	of	
4% in CBA, but also shows awareness that “discounting at even modest rates (i.e.,4%) 
reduces	the	value	of	costs	and	benefits	effectively	to	zero	over	very	long	time	periods”	(IA	
Toolbox, at 377).82 
All in all, and despite the relative sophistication reached by DG CLIMA in the modelling 
of impacts, there seems to be little attention to long-term decarbonisation goals in the 
current	EU	 IA	 framework.	This	 is	also	due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	cost-benefit	analysis	 (or	 ‘net	
benefits’	calculation)	transforms	the	ex	ante	impact	assessment	into	an	exercise	aimed	at	
identifying	the	option	that	maximises	neoclassical	economic	efficiency.	When	assessing	
the impacts of primary legislation, however, which typically entail much larger distributional, 
as well as more long-term impacts, we contend that the focus should rather be placed on 
the coherence and effectiveness of the proposed alternative options in achieving the EU’s 
medium- and long-term goals. As one of us already wrote on several occasions (Renda 
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83See the evaluation of the CO2 emissions of cars and LDVs, formally very elegant, but completely overlooking the VW 
scandal. 
84For example, on the web page dedicated to the Natura 2000 Fitness Check, the Commission explains that “Fitness checks 
provide an evidence-based critical analysis of whether EU actions are proportionate to their objectives and delivering as 
expected. They cover environmental, economic and social aspects, and concern all EU policy areas”. See http://ec.europa.eu/
environment/nature/legislation/fitness_check/index_en.htm
2011, 2014, 2015), linking the better regulation agenda with the Europe 2020 agenda for 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth would probably have led to a win-win strategy for 
both, marking an improvement in the usefulness of ex ante impact assessments (and in 
their usability by the European Parliament, the Council and national governments), as well 
as embedding more effectively Europe 2020 within the EU policy process. 
Finally, the European Commission often compares alternative policy options on the basis 
of	benefit/cost	ratios	(or	cost-effectiveness	analysis),	rather	than	net	benefits	calculations.	
These two techniques, normally considered as substitute methods by impact assessment 
guidelines (including the EU ones), in reality yield very different results. While the technique 
of cost-effectiveness analysis can be considered preferable to the calculation of net 
benefits	since	it	avoids	the	substantial	problems	created	by	the	monetisation	of	benefits,	
the	Commission	actually	uses	 it	 to	compare	monetised	costs	with	monetised	benefits,	
actually defeating its advantages. This can lead the Commission to express preference 
for more conservative policy options, which entail very small compliance costs compared 
to	the	baseline.	Suffice	 it	 to	recall	 two	recent	examples:	 the	 impact	assessment	of	 the	
Directive on periodic roadworthiness tests (2012), and the impact assessment on the 
Proposal for a Regulation on Requirements relating to Emission limits and Type-approval 
for Internal Combustion Engines for Non-road Mobile Machinery (2014). In both cases, the 
Commission	ended	up	choosing,	on	the	basis	of	CEA	(benefits/costs),	an	option	that	would	
have	been	discarded	under	CBA	(benefits	–	costs),	with	negative	consequences	for	the	
stringency of the resulting rules. More generally, while using these alternative techniques 
can	 provide	 some	 flexibility	 in	 accepting	 policies	 otherwise	 rejected	 under	 a	 strict	 net	
benefits	approach,	 they	suffer	 from	several	problems	 including	monetising	 conventions	
of questionable validity and time discounting practices, which biases choices against far-
future outcomes.
The framework for ex post evaluation is, however, different from the ex ante one. Typically 
ex	post	evaluations	of	 individual	rules	focus	on	criteria	such	as	effectiveness,	efficiency,	
relevance and coherence. And apart from more minor remarks (i.e., the relevance of 
the rules should probably be assessed before the effectiveness, whereas the opposite 
usually occurs; and the enforcement and compliance phases should taken seriously),83 this 
framework appears far more suitable for the incorporation of long-term goals. But here 
too,	 badly	 formulated	objectives	or	 time	horizons	 that	 are	 too	 short	 to	 realise	benefits	
might lead to distortions in the appraisal of criteria such as effectiveness and relevance; 
whereas linking the evaluation effort to medium- and long-term decarbonisation goals, 
on	the	basis	of	a	well-defined	deep	decarbonisation	pathway	for	the	EU,	would	certainly	
provide a more accurate perspective to the evaluators. 
The disconnect between the needs of long-term strategies and the short-termism of 
the better regulation agenda becomes more evident when it comes to the REFIT and 
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85http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/refit/index_en.htm
Cumulative Cost Assessments, which constitute the two most comprehensive types of 
ex post evaluation carried out by the Commission. More	specifically:
• REFIT exercises are methodologically the most complete forms of evaluation, potentially 
incorporating	also	cumulative	costs	and	benefits,	and	to	some	extent	also	co-benefits.84 
However, they end up being almost always focused on cost reduction and are conducted 
mostly by means of stakeholder consultation, which inevitably embeds incumbents’ 
interests into the analysis. Future generations, unfortunately but not surprisingly, are 
under-represented in today’s stakeholder consultations. Recent examples include the 
consultation	 on	 financial	 regulation,	 in	 which	 the	 European	 Commission	 is	 asking	
stakeholders	to	identify	and	locate	the	burdens,	and	the	interactive	costs,	of	financial	
rules.	The	simplification-oriented	nature	of	REFIT	is	confirmed	by	its	slogan	(“making	
EU law lighter, simpler and less costly”) and the description given by the European 
Commission on the dedicated website (“action is taken to make EU law simpler and to 
reduce regulatory costs, thus contributing to a clear, stable and predictable regulatory 
framework supporting growth and jobs”).85
• Cumulative	cost	assessments,	 led	by	DG	GROW,	typically	differ	from	fitness	checks	
carried	out	under	the	REFIT	programme	since	they	focus	on	a	specific	industry	sector,	
rather	than	on	a	specific	policy	area.	So	far,	they	have	been	carried	out	for	important	
industry sectors that are also very relevant for the purposes of decarbonisation, such as 
steel, aluminium, chemicals, furniture, glass and ceramics. These actions are typically 
undertaken in close cooperation with existing trade associations and companies, with 
a view to lighten the burden of various pieces of EU legislation on their accounts to 
improve their cost competitiveness. Even when the analysis reveals the use of different 
technologies	with	different	levels	of	efficiency	and	performance	(as	was	the	case	for	
steel),	no	action	is	taken	by	the	European	Commission	to	promote	energy	efficiency.	The	
exercise	is	mere	fact	finding,	which	entails	the	collection	of	data	at	the	plant	level,	but	
entails neither the formulation of a technology roadmap, nor a comparative analysis of 
the	(energy	efficiency	of)	technologies	used	in	the	EU	and	in	main	competing	countries,	
nor any strategic outlook of how the industry could reasonably migrate to higher levels 
of	competitiveness,	or	of	energy	efficiency.
All in all, the difference between the policy cycle described in section 1.2.3 above and 
the current EU better regulation agenda is remarkable. Recently, the issue of how to 
use better regulation in support of growth and innovation has been under the spotlight 
in Brussels, with a number of new proposals and orientations being formulated in the 
European	Commission	and	among	industry	stakeholders.	We	briefly	comment	on	those	
recent developments below. 
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86Initially 13 CEPS in 2013, then became 22. The 22 CEOs sent a letter to President Juncker upon his election.
87http://www.riskforum.eu/uploads/2/5/7/1/25710097/innovation_principle_one_pager_5_march_2015.pdf 
88http://www.riskforum.eu/uploads/2/5/7/1/25710097/monograph_innovation_principle.pdf
89See EPSC (2016), Towards an Innovation Principle Endorsed by Better Regulation, Strategic Notes, Issue 14, June 2016. At 
http://ec.europa.eu/epsc/pdf/publications/strategic_note_issue_14.pdf. 
2.3.2.1 The Innovation Principle
The innovation principle was proposed in 2013 by a group of industry representations, think 
tanks and large companies’ CEOs, and was vibrantly advocated as a necessary change in 
the EU policy process.86 Its aim is to ensure that “whenever policy or regulatory decisions 
are under consideration the impact on innovation as a driver for jobs and growth should be 
assessed and addressed”.87 One of the key concerns voiced by the signatories is the negative 
effect that increasingly risk-averse legislation is having on European innovation; that said, 
the innovation principle is said to be complementary to the precautionary principle. The 
innovation principle is also said to be open to “anyone who is interested in promoting an 
‘innovation friendly’ and environmentally responsible regulatory environment in Europe”, 
which potentially makes it consistent with long-term decarbonisation objectives, which 
appear to be the only responsible way to tackle environmental issues today. 
The innovation principle was articulated in a more comprehensive way over the past 
year,	as	exemplified	in	a	recent	monograph.88 In addition, it was recently endorsed by the 
Competitiveness Council conclusions of the Dutch presidency, and described in some more 
detail by a new note of the European Political Strategy Center.89 That said, the methodology 
behind the innovation principle is still not very detailed, whereas methodological quality 
would be a decisive factor for the usefulness of adding yet another test to the already quite 
complex ex ante impact assessment process. 
At	first	sight,	our	 reaction	would	be	 that	 impacts	on	 innovation,	as	all	economic,	social	
and environmental impacts, would not need a dedicated test in the impact assessment 
process. At the same time, however having a dedicated screen for innovation could ‘force’ 
administrations to address innovation impacts when appraising new policies or evaluating 
existing ones. We consider that a ‘sustainable development test’ – aimed at assessing 
Four main trends can be observed with respect to the use of better regulation tools to 
foster innovation: the adoption of an ‘innovation principle’ in the ex ante impact assessment 
process; the proposed creation of a European Innovation Council (EIC); the consideration 
of possible ways to foster ‘innovation-driven investment’ through better regulation; and 
within this framework, the introduction of a non-legislative approach termed ‘innovation 
deals’,	to	tackle	regulatory	obstacles	to	innovation.	Below,	we	briefly	describe	these	three	
new proposed arrangements.
2.3.2 Fostering innovation through better regulation: recent 
         developments 
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2.3.2.2 Better regulation for innovation-driven investment
At the end of 2015, the European Commission published a Staff Working Document that 
outlines a relatively new approach to better regulation, more oriented towards innovation.90 
The document, initiated by DG Research and Innovation and endorsed by Commissioner 
Moedas, goes a long way towards acknowledging the potential role of better regulation 
as a driver of innovation. In addition, the document acknowledges the systemic nature of 
innovation and its role in addressing societal challenges. 
Among the problems highlighted by the document (which widely quotes a previous CEPS 
report by Pelkmans and Renda (2014) with respect to the existing regulatory framework, 
some are particularly relevant for the purposes of this report. First, the Commission services 
highlight cases in which the regulatory framework i) is de jure or de facto prescriptive in 
technology choice and discourages different solutions and new entrants; ii) establishes 
a	level	of	stringency	which	is	inconsistent	with	available	cost-efficient	technology,	hence	
delaying investment and deployment of solutions or iii) allows too-frequent changes in 
standards that may also limit the incentive for investment if a technology is relatively 
recent. Driverless cars are among the examples mentioned. 
Second,	the	Commission	cites	cases	in	which	the	regulatory	framework	is	not	sufficiently	
innovation-friendly due to i) lack of interoperability (sic) of the regulation across sectors 
and cases in which rules block cooperation and the development of open innovation based 
on	multi-technology	sourcing;	 ii)	 cases	 in	which	 regulations	 that	are	 technology	specific	
are not adapted in a timely way to technological progress or iii) cases of inconsistencies 
between regulations, which give rise to legal uncertainties and unnecessary additional 
compliance costs. Among the examples mentioned in the document, the most relevant 
for	the	purpose	of	this	paper	is	related	to	energy-efficient	buildings.	There,	the	document	
identifies	a	number	of	pieces	of	EU	legislation	that	would	have	to	be	reviewed	to	boost	
innovation in the sector, including a recast of the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive 
the impact of proposed regulatory interventions in terms of progress along indicators of 
sustainable development, and thus through multi-criteria analysis – would probably be 
more useful than an innovation principle for the simple reason that innovation is a means, 
not an end, for policymakers. In addition, any innovation-related test that is relevant for 
sustainable development and decarbonisation should avoid any incumbency constraint and 
be open to systemic, disruptive innovation. But we share a number of the concerns voiced 
by the proponents of the innovation principle: in particular, the lack of a focus on coherence 
in the current better regulation agenda (in particular with respect to Europe 2020 goals; 
and	the	lack	of	a	framework	for	using	scientific	and	technological	inputs	in	policymaking.	
Finally,	it	may	well	be	that	the	EU	suffers	equally	or	more	so	from	a	diffusion	deficit,	rather	
than	from	an	innovation	deficit.	
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91https://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-deals/index.cfm?pg=home. 
92“To	offer	a	pragmatic,	flexible	and	transparent	approach	to	timely	address	innovation	obstacles	to	trigger	growth	and	jobs	
whilst fully respecting EU law, without derogating from the existing legislative framework”. 
(2010/31/UE), a review of the Construction Products Regulation (305/2011) and of the 
Energy	Efficiency	Directive	(2012/27/UE),	plus	the	evaluation	and	review	of	the	Eco-Design	
Directive and the Energy Labelling Directive. 
Third,	the	Commission	identified	cases	in	which	the	implementation	of	innovation-friendly	
regulations can also discourage investment and limit the marketing of innovative products, 
when: i) legislation is not uniformly or not appropriately implemented across member 
states; or ii) European and national legislation duplicates, overlaps or is not fully consistent 
or repetitive controls and authorisation procedures are maintained. Here too, examples 
include	relevant	areas	for	decarbonisation	such	as	eco-design	for	resource	efficiency,	again	
energy-efficient	buildings,	and	electrified	vehicles.
Finally,	 the	Commission	 document	 identifies	 some	areas	 in	which	 there	 are	 regulatory	
gaps that might affect innovation, especially by creating fragmentation that could hamper 
the emergence of innovative products. Examples include again road vehicle automation, 
and also low carbon hydrogen in transport.
This document is, in our opinion, a Commission initiative that offers a promising perspective 
on the policy alignment initiatives that could be achieved at EU level. We strongly endorse 
the overall approach adopted by the document, and further encourage the Commission to 
pursue its efforts with a view to promoting systemic innovation, not simply by listening 
to incumbent stakeholders but to permanent, multi-stakeholder platforms that would 
engage in backcast (or double backcast) exercises to offer policymakers input on what set 
of	measures	would	be	needed	to	stimulate	systemic	innovation	to	the	benefit	of	long-term	
decarbonisation. The problem remains, however, that incumbents may not adequately 
represent future disrupting innovation more likely to be generated by new entrant displacing 
incumbents’ technologies.
2.3.2.3 The Innovation Principle
In the same Staff Working Document on “Better Regulation for Innovation-driven 
Investment”, the European Commission also announces that it would pilot so-called 
“innovation	deals”,	and	indeed	a	first	pilot	was	launched	through	an	open	call	for	expressions	
of interest in June 2016.91	The	Commission	has	clarified	that	these	deals	would	be	a	new	
way to address EU regulatory obstacles to innovation in an open and transparent manner, 
in the form of voluntary cooperation between innovators, national/regional/local authorities 
and Commission services to better achieve EU policy objectives. In addition, Innovation 
Deals are being piloted as one of the actions under the Circular Economy Action Plan. An 
important	feature	of	Innovation	Deals	is	that	they	seem	to	be	destined	for	specific	cases	in	
which	legislation	must	be	clarified,	or	interpreted,	not	amended.	They	are,	in	this	respect,	
presented	as	a	tool	for	addressing	cases	in	which	legislation	is	difficult	to	interpret	for	new	
players, but never as a way to change EU or national law.92
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In a companion paper for the European Commission, DG Research and Innovation, Renda 
(2016, forthcoming) analyses more closely the virtues and possible challenges of such 
an instrument, by looking also for equivalent experience in the US (in particular, in so-
called negotiated rulemaking, negotiated implementation and negotiated compliance; see 
Ashford and Caldart, 1999). Based on this past experience, while Innovation Deals might 
end	up	becoming	an	important	tool	for	the	clarification	of	EU	legislation	and	the	removal	
of ‘perceived obstacles’ to innovative product and service offerings, there are greater 
concerns about the suitability of innovation deals for systemic innovation addressing long-
term decarbonisation. To mitigate such concerns, it is essential that Innovation Deals are 
not	underpinned	by	a	belief	that	‘less	is	more”,	and	that	‘clarification’	of	regulation	should	
always mean red tape reduction and slashing of regulatory requirements in the name of 
innovation. On the contrary, as we have amply demonstrated in earlier research, regulation 
often has a positive impact on innovation, and certainly a clearer regulation, other things 
being equal, is better than an obscure one. But this does not mean that less regulation 
should be the objective in innovation deals. Similarly, the red tape rhetoric, also originated 
in the Netherlands (according to which reducing admin burdens by 25% would lead to 
remarkable	GDP	 increases)	was	not	 confirmed	empirically	 after	 years	of	experimenting	
with the Standard Cost Model.
Second, the likely nature of innovation deals makes them potentially ill-suited for more 
disruptive, systemic innovation. Due to their negotiated nature innovation deals might 
suffer from an ‘incumbency’ problem, and as such would lend themselves more easily to 
incremental	 innovation	rather	 than	substantial	market	 reshuffling.	Adequate	control	and	
monitoring by EU institutions would thus be essential to ensure that incumbency problems 
do	not	exert	a	disproportionate	influence	on	the	way	Innovation	Deals	are	handled.	
 
Third,	and	relatedly,	the	governance	of	Innovation	Deals	should	be	clarified	in	a	number	
of aspects: how will Innovation Deals be selected; where would the applications originate 
(REFIT stakeholder platform), would there be multi-stakeholder advisory boards to avoid 
incumbency problems, would the Regulatory Scrutiny Board advise on their implementation 
and compatibility with existing regulatory frameworks; how would trust be built and 
nurtured,	and	what	arrangements	will	be	in	place	to	sufficiently	avoid	adverse	selection	
problems	(offering	an	easy	way	out	to	firms	that	cannot	comply	with	legislation	for	reasons	
related to their own inadequacies)? In addition, there are important questions over how 
to offer legal certainty (guidelines on selection, due process, time horizon, monitoring of 
compliance, evaluation); how to ensure technology neutrality and avoid the incumbency 
problem; and how to deal with multi-level governance, especially for what concerns 
the	 powers	 of	 the	European	Commission	 to	 request	 clarifications	 in	 national	 and	 local	
legislation? Since it seems clear that it will be member state authorities that will have 
to report on their implementation and results, it is still unclear how Innovation Deals are 
going to work, in a context in which communication between the EU and national level is 
not always effective and rapid. The involvement of all levels of government should also be 
accompanied by the involvement of all relevant stakeholders. And also, a weak rule of law 
in	specific	member	states	should	be	taken	into	account.	
Overall, it is important to offer more certainty as regards the scope of the instrument. If 
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93Evidence backing proposed amendments may help support the institution’s position in trialogue negotiations, as well as 
improve advance knowledge of likely effects. Guidance for committees in using these EP impact assessment services are set 
out in the Parliament’s internal ‘Impact Assessment Handbook’, adopted by the Parliament’s Conference of Committee Chairs, 
and most recently updated in November 2013.  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/impact_assesement_handbook_en.pdf 
2.3.3 Misalignments in better regulation: beyond the European
         Commission
Better regulation, of course, does not end with the work of the European Commission, 
and indeed it would be unfair to expect the Commission to shoulder all the responsibility 
for the alignment of EU policies with long-term goals such as deep decarbonisation. And 
as a matter of fact, other EU institutions are still much less advanced than the European 
Commission	in	the	use	of	better	regulation	tools.	More	specifically:
• The European Parliament	only	recently	developed	specific	capacity	to	perform	policy	
evaluation, thanks to the creation of a dedicated Directorate for Impact Assessment 
and European Added Value in 2012. The Directorate, now moved to the new European 
Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), routinely summarises and appraises the 
strengths and weaknesses of Commission IAs accompanying legislative proposals and 
is available to provide, upon request from the relevant EP committee, more in-depth IA-
related services, such as complementary or substitute impact assessments, in cases 
where certain aspects have been dealt with inadequately or not at all in the original 
Commission IA, and impact assessments of substantive amendments.93 The EPRS 
now also includes dedicated units for ex post evaluation, European Added Value, and a 
scientific	foresight	unit	(STOA).	The	methodology	used	by	the	EPRS	is	still	not	entirely	
sharpened, however, and the methodological approach (typically oriented towards use 
of	cost-benefit	analysis)	does	not	entirely	match	the	type	of	scrutiny	that	MEPs	want	
the	Innovation	Deals	are	only	related	to	possible	“clarification,	enhanced	guidance,	existing	
flexibility	and/or	demonstration	of	the	innovative	solution”	(see	the	SWD	of	15	December	
2015), then it is also important to clarify that their use is not going to be a ‘magic bullet’ 
solution that will bring Europe back to growth, let alone sustainable development. If 
anything, it would be a sign of greater attention given to possible obstacles to innovation 
disseminated throughout the ‘downstream phase of EU legislation, i.e., the delivery and 
enforcement phases. The reasonable expectation is that most of these obstacles will be 
found in national legislation: that said, it is not clear whether the Commission’s attempt to 
clarify or streamline national legislation will be well received by member states, or if it will 
be seen as a wild card for the Commission, which will lead it to go ultra virus and bypass 
other EU institutions to recommend and de facto impose regulatory changes on member 
states.
All	in	all,	Innovation	Deals	might	prove	useful	in	specific	circumstances,	but	will	have	to	be	
accompanied by a much more ambitious, whole-of-government effort to promote systemic 
innovation through policies that have in mind swift action for shorter goals, consistently 
with a longer-term view of societal well-being.
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94Possible exceptions are Sweden, Poland and Estonia. But even in these countries the situation is far from optimal.
to carry out on Commission proposals. Indeed, one possibility for the future of the 
EU better regulation system would be for the EPRS to play the role of ‘guardian of 
long-term goals’ by performing a coherence check between Commission proposals 
and long-term sustainable development goals, including decarbonisation goals. We 
would very much advocate this change, to ensure that EU legislation is subject to this 
double testing, and amended on the basis of policy coherence, rather than on alleged 
efficiency	grounds.
• The Council has initially run a limited number of pilot impact assessment on some of 
its own major amendments shortly after signing the Inter-Institutional Agreement on 
Better Lawmaking, but soon abandoned the project. Since then, for more than a decade 
very little has been done, with the exception of a growing use of Commission IAs in 
Council	working	parties	at	an	early	stage	of	the	debate	on	specific	legislative	proposals.	
In the past years, at least a third of the EU Member States have exerted pressure on 
the Council to set up at least a small IA unit, but so far no concrete step has been made 
in that direction. In the future, it would be good if, either through an upgraded Inter-
Institutional Agreement or through a stand-alone initiative of the institution itself, the 
Council could start motivating its amendments on the basis of their potential impact on 
decarbonization and other important medium- and long-term goals of EU policy.
• For member states, it is fair to say that the landscape is very uneven. While countries 
like	the	UK	(now	exiting	the	Union)	have	a	very	consolidated	experience	 in	the	field	
of better regulation, and even of ex post cumulative analysis (e.g., in DEFRA on 
environmental issues), the remaining member states either have a better regulation 
system almost exclusively focused on regulatory costs (Germany), compliance costs 
(the Netherlands) or administrative burdens (France, Sweden, Belgium, the Czech 
Republic); or still make very sparse and occasional use of better regulation tools, 
despite	official	commitments	towards	ex	ante	impact	assessment.94 As a result, when 
legislation is adopted at EU level, its transposition and implementation are most often 
not subject to a comprehensive appraisal and monitoring at the member state level, 
which leaves EU policy incomplete even where a relatively complete analysis has been 
carried out at EU level. And Brexit will only exacerbate this problem by depriving the EU 
of its most advanced member state in the domain of better regulation.
2.3.4 Coordinating policies: the absence of better regulation and
         sustainable development in the European Semester 
Beyond the better regulation system, long-term goals have gradually become less visible 
and salient in the governance of the European Semester, which came to represent the most 
prominent existing mechanism for the coordination of public policies enacted at the EU 
and member state level. This happened along with the gradual demise of the Europe 2020 
strategy,	which	gradually	lost	momentum	in	Europe	first	as	a	result	of	the	financial	crisis,	
later	due	to	the	Greek	and	eurozone	crises,	and	finally	due	to	the	new	course	adopted	by	the	
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95See EPSC (2015) “Europe 2020. From Indicators and Targets to Performance and Delivery”, EPSC Strategic Notes Issue 6, 
September 2015. At  http://ec.europa.eu/epsc/pdf/publications/strategic_note_issue_6.pdf. 
Juncker Commission, more focused on the “ten priorities” and less interested in sustainable 
development. As a result, the proposed review of the Europe 2020 strategy never took 
place. Two years ago, in view of the announced mid-term review, one of us proposed to 
relaunch the strategy and place it at the core of the European Semester (see Renda, 2014). 
Within the Europe 2020 strategy, originally the so-called 20/20/20 by 2020 goal had been 
formulated (20% CO2 emissions reduction, 20% renewable energy, and 20% improvement 
in	energy	efficiency).	 In	the	meantime,	the	October	2014	European	Council	adopted	new	
targets,	to	be	fulfilled	by	2030:	at	least	40%	CO2 emissions reduction; at least 27% renewable 
energy	“binding	at	EU	level”	and	at	least	27%	improvement	in	energy	efficiency.	A	revised	
strategy would need to take into account the 2030 goals (EPSC 2015), but also longer-term 
goals to avoid falling into the medium-term target trap denounced by Sachs et al., (2015) and 
help Europe proceed towards deep decarbonisation.In trying to achieve this goal, a number 
of changes in the current European Semester would be needed, and this will be far from 
easy:
• The Europe 2020 strategy should be reviewed and updated to 2030 (and where 
appropriate	2050)	to	reflect	also	the	SDGs;
• The National Reform Programmes sent by Member States to the European Commission 
within the European Semester should include reforms aimed at reaching the new 
2030/2050	goals.	These	should	reflect	deep	decarbonisation	pathways	agreed	upon	at	
the pan-European level (possibly as part of a broader national sustainable development 
plan),	and	made	specific	for	each	Member	State.
• The	 Country-Specific	 recommendations	 issued	 by	 the	 European	 Commission	 should	
comment on the alignment between the proposed national reforms and each individual 
Member State’s decarbonisation plan.
• The Annual Growth Survey should become an Annual Sustainable Development Survey, 
or at least contain sections dedicated to sustainable development targets and goals.  
  
We are aware that political opposition to this proposal would be harsh, although we believe 
that supporters will be numerous. At the same time, we believe that there will be little 
prospects for decarbonisation in Europe absent a real coordination of reform programmes 
between different levels of government. A recent publication by the EPSC, the Commission’s 
in-house	 think	 tank,	 confirmed	 this	 view	 by	 observing	 that	 Europe	 2020	 never	 featured	
prominently in the European Semester, “not the least because it has no legislative ‘teeth’. 
Therefore, in addition to the limitations of the Open Method of Coordination, member states 
did not fear sanctions for not being on the planned trajectory towards their self-proclaimed 
goals. This also explains why several National Reform Programmes become a mere list of 
actions	 undertaken	 by	 governments,	 in	 response	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 Country-Specific	
Recommendations. Rather than an instrument for peer learning and a driver of change, 
reporting on the targets has been interpreted as a ‘check-box’ exercise to be completed not 
for the sake of the member state itself but to satisfy ‘Brussels’.95
The EPSC also proposed moving from static to dynamic, internationally benchmarked 
indicators and selecting a limited number of “working themes”, which could correspond 
to	what	we	defined	grand	societal	challenges	in	the	previous	chapters	of	this	report.	This	
would be a way to bring the Europe 2030 strategy closer to the idea of a mission-oriented, 
multi-level medium-term strategy that can bring Europe back on a trajectory of sustainable 
development.   
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3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
NEXT-GENERATION EU POLICY: 
TEN STEPS TO SOLVE TRADE-
OFFS AND EMBED SUSTAINABLE 
INNOVATION IN THE EU POLICY 
PROCESS
This section discusses possible ways to align EU policy to the long-term decarbonisation 
objectives, in a way that triggers systemic innovation and preserves consistency with 
overall sustainable development goals. We propose alignment in ten steps, which involve 
changes in the governance of innovation policy, in the better regulation agenda and its 
associated toolkit, and also in EU’s trade agenda. At the same time, none of the proposed 
steps requires Treaty changes, which makes our proposal more viable in the short and 
medium term. 
The ten steps are a natural consequence of our previous sections. In particular, as will be 
shown in the next pages, strengthening the evidence base and the informational input 
to policymakers should help avoiding being caught by the myths discussed in Section 
1.1 above. Reorienting the whole better regulation agenda towards coherence implies 
the detection of existing misalignments in EU policies. Improving foresight should help 
reducing problems of short-termism, and increase the consistency of individual policies 
with long-term goals. Consolidating existing platforms for research and innovation and 
establishing a more structured channel for the translation of existing knowledge into 
actionable policies aim at improving at once the effectiveness of innovation policy and 
policies for innovation. Involving the Parliament, Council and Member States in the 
development and implementation of policies for low-carbon systemic innovation towards 
long term decarbonisation also responds to existing problems in the EU policy cycle, as 
well as weaknesses in the EU Semester and inconsistencies between national policies and 
EU	goals.	And	finally,	making	an	active	use	of	the	EU	trade	agenda	in	the	array	of	policies	
is the only way to face the problem of carbon leakage and establish a global cooperation 
on decarbonisation.
Moreover, it is important to clarify, already at the outset, that while implementing all ten 
steps would be in our opinion ideal, each of the ten steps can also be implemented in 
isolation, and would already improve on the status quo by contributing either to a more 
effective	innovation	policy,	a	better	scientific	input	into	policymaking,	a	more	effective	and	
coherent inter-institutional cooperation on better regulation, a stronger and more future-
proof multi-level governance in the EU, or a more effective trade policy for the long term. 
Figure 7 below shows the logical sequence in which the ten steps have been imagined and 
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developed. As shown in the picture: 
• Steps 1, 2 and 3 deal with the provision of a more structured, informative, and 
competent input by mission-led research and innovation platforms to policymakers, 
with the help of key institutions such as the EIC and the JRC. 
• Steps 4, 5 and 6 refer to the transition of the existing better regulation agenda towards 
a more coherent inter-institutional framework, in which individual policies are linked to 
long-term sustainable development goals. 
• Steps 7, 8 and 9 deal with the future of the European Semester, and aim at improving 
the multi-level governance of the EU, at the same time re-orienting it towards long-
term sustainable development. 
• Step 10 looks at Europe’s role in the global context and advocates a stronger 
commitment towards climate diplomacy and international cooperation towards long-
term decarbonisation goals. 
Figure 9 – Steps 1-9: reforming the EU policy process
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Even before looking at how to improve the EU better regulation agenda and toolbox, it 
is important to discuss how to improve the way in which competent input is provided to 
policymakers in the form of evidence and technology/business forecasts. This could be 
achieved by slightly reorganising and re-orienting innovation policy, both at EU and member 
state level. As recently argued in a CEPS report on innovation and entrepreneurship in the 
EU (CEPS 2016), there is a strong need for consolidation of the various communities and 
spaces	offered	by	the	EU	on	research	and	innovation,	such	as	KICs,	EIPs,	EIIs,	JTIs,	etc.,	
which were created at various points in time, mostly to respond to the perceived ‘innovation 
emergency’ (which we earlier argued was equally or more of a ‘diffusion emergency’). The 
proliferation of platforms and communities, often on partly or wholly overlapping themes, 
multiply transaction costs and reduce opportunities for entrepreneurs. 
In view of the upcoming creation of a ‘European Innovation Council’ (EIC) and the mid-
term review of Horizon 2020, it would be preferable to create an overarching institutional 
framework in which agencies such as the European Institute for Innovation and Technology 
(EIT) launch and orchestrate challenge-led, streamlined platforms where research, 
development,	 and	demonstration	 are	 tackled	 for	 specific	 societal	 challenges	 in	 a	multi-
stakeholder fashion, open to new entrants, new technologies, new business models, and 
citizens. Ideally, these platforms would merge previous instruments such as the Research 
Infrastructures, the European Innovation Partnerships, the Joint Technology Initiatives, and 
obviously	the	KICs.	There	should	be	only	one	such	platform	for	every	emerging	societal	
challenge,	with	cooperation	across	platforms	in	case	of	overlapping	issues.	KICs,	in	this	
respect, are already contributing to the coordination of programmes following a ‘business 
logic’,	 resulting	 in	a	significant	 leverage	 factor	of	 coordination	 (one	euro	of	EIT	 funding	
leverages up to three euros of national and regional funding); they have the potential to 
become ‘professional brokering’ structures for the coordination of ‘societal challenges’.
In addition to consolidation, these platforms should also be entrusted with an additional 
function, i.e., that of translating their work into policy-relevant input to be transmitted (with 
the help of the EIC, see step 3 below) to EU institutions and in particular to the European 
Commission when considering new policy initiatives. As recalled by Mariana Mazzucato 
(2016) “with a mission-oriented approach and the freedom to experiment – with failure 
understood to be an unavoidable, and even welcome, feature of the learning process – 
the state is better able to attract top talent and pursue radical innovation” by leveraging 
multi-stakeholder platforms and offering industry and academic knowledge as inputs to 
a more evidence and science-based policy, EU institutions can really change the way in 
which they approach systemic innovation for sustainable development, and thus also for 
decarbonisation. 
Step 1: Set up mission-led platforms to transfer state of  
            the art information to policymakers 
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Step 2: Ask these platforms to produce options for deep
           decarbonisation pathways for the most relevant
           policy challenges 
Step 3: Set up the EIC with the right competences 
Upon their creation, mission-led, multi-stakeholder platforms would have to work towards 
the development of pathways towards long-term sustainable development, including 
of course deep decarbonisation. Challenges such as the energy transition, the future 
of mobility and shelter will have to be approached with a view to the long term, and 
accordingly also through ad hoc pathways that consider all the policy trade-offs that might 
emerge during the transition. In this respect, we consider that the work being done by 
researchers on long-term deep decarbonisation pathways can provide a crucial benchmark 
to assess policy progress and identify policy inconsistencies (IDDRI 2015; Waisman and 
Virdis, 2016). 
 
These deep decarbonisation pathways would have to be developed with attention to 
due process (and thus, openness, transparency, accountability), and in a way that makes 
them possible and actionable at the EU and member state level. Sustainable and smart 
management of the platforms and the inclusion of national research centres would make 
this goal easier to achieve. Also, pathways would need to be designed and developed in 
cooperation with EU institutions, and in particular the European Research Council, the 
European Innovation Council (see below, step 3), the European Commission Regulatory 
Scrutiny Board, the Joint Research Centre and the European Parliamentary Research 
Service	(especially	the	STOA	unit,	on	scientific	foresight).	
The European Innovation Council would play a key role in this new framework for providing 
scientific	and	technological	input	to	the	decision-making	process	of	the	European	Union.	
In our opinion, rather than becoming yet another agency with a relatively narrow mandate 
(i.e., scale-ups), the EIC should become the key intermediary between the research and 
innovation world and the policy realm. While the Joint Research Centre should contribute 
to	 the	 work	 of	 individual	 platforms,	 and	 the	 EIT	 should	 define	 and	 orchestrate	 the	
management	of	the	platforms,	the	EIC	should	primarily	be	in	charge	of	defining	methods	
and instruments for the mainstreaming of systemic innovation into the EU policy process. 
Otherwise, another EU agency dedicated to innovation would probably add to the current 
confusion	and	complexity	without	fostering	smart	policymaking	to	any	significant	extent.	
More generally, the existence of a strong EIC could be seen as a precondition for smarter 
science-based, innovation-friendly policy at the EU level, especially if coupled with revised 
better regulation guidelines oriented towards long-term societal challenges, rather than 
evaluated	in	terms	of	short-term	cost-benefit	analysis	(see	step	4	below).	At	a	time	when	
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96See http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC94069/lb-na-27019-en-n%20.pdf. 
97See	 e.g.,	McCray,	 L.E:,	 K.A.	Oye	 and	A.C.	 Petersen	 (2010),	 Planned	 adaptation	 in	 risk	 regulation:	An	 initial	 survey	 of	
US environmental, health, and safety regulation, Technological Forecasting & Social Change 77 (2010) 951–959. And 
more recently, IRGC (2015), A short introduction to “planned adaptive regulation”, at https://www.irgc.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/12/A_short_introdution_to_Planned_Adaptive_Risk_Regulation-19Nov15.pdf.
          Step 4: Modify the better regulation guidelines to
                     capture the potential of regulation-induced
                     innovation
The current better regulation guidelines, as revised in May 2015, are among the best 
examples of integrated guidelines for evidence-based policymaking worldwide. At the same 
time,	they	still	place	insufficient	emphasis	on	issues	such	as	policy	coherence,	long-term	
impacts, risk analysis, adaptive policymaking, systemic innovation and decarbonisation. In 
this respect, the following changes could be contemplated to improve the extent to which 
better regulation can become more conducive to policy alignment for the long term.
• The baseline option adopted as a basis for major new policy initiatives could be inspired 
by long-term decarbonisation pathways, possibly in a way that is made consistent 
across	policy	areas.	A	first	attempt	in	the	direction	of	common	baseline	options	across	
different Directorate General of the European Commission was made by the Joint 
Research Centre, but so far this idea has not been fully translated into the practice of 
impact assessment in the Commission.96 
• The overall methodology for the selection of the preferred policy option(s) for 
major new initiatives (corresponding to so-called ‘primary legislation’ in national legal 
systems)	should	make	use	of	multi-criteria	analysis,	where	criteria	should	reflect	long-
term societal challenges and should be measured by means of dedicated indicators. 
Such indicators could extensively borrow from the existing well-established literature 
on	indicators	of	sustainable	development,	and	should	be	refined	and	made	more	EU-
specific	with	the	help	of	mission-led	platforms	and	the	EIC	(see	above,	steps	1	to	3).	
• The role of innovation should be subject to more careful analysis in the better 
regulation guidelines, as recently evoked also by the Council conclusions of the Dutch 
presidency. However, accounting for systemic innovation does not mean leading 
Europe on a deregulatory path. On the contrary, the guidelines could devote more 
attention to the role of policy learning and experimentation by offering guidance on 
so-called adaptive policymaking, or “planned adaptation”;97 and to the consistency 
public	decision-making	faces	growing	difficulties	given	the	complexity	and	fast-changing	
nature of many policy issues, constant but evolving input from the research and innovation 
field,	 incorporating	 emerging	 business	models	 and	 socio-technical	 transitions,	 is	 going	
to be perceived as an increasingly inevitable solution to maintain the relevance of policy 
initiatives. This is even more true for the EU level, in which policy interventions are often 
started too early for fear of the long time needed to get to approval at the EU level and 
implementation by member states. And yet, they are often implemented too late. 
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of prospective policy impacts with long-term sustainable development (including, of 
course, decarbonisation). Moreover, the input offered by mission-led platforms (step 1, 
above) and by the EIC (step 3, above) should be put to use in impact assessment, in a 
way that would automatically incorporate a vision for systemic innovation into the EU 
policy process, and would also minimise the risk that incumbent interests dominate 
the policy process.
• When	attributing	monetary	values	to	regulatory	costs	and	benefits,	the	discount	rate	
chosen should be consistent with long-term policy goals. Choosing too high a discount 
rate could lead to systematically downplaying long-term goals, which would rather be 
kept	on	the	radar	at	every	step	of	the	policy	process.	Specifically	identifying	the	time	
framework over which investments and results occur, rather than using any discount 
rate, could be a preferable approach, as recommended by the use of ‘tradeoff analysis,’ 
an	alternative	to	cost-benefit	analysis	(Ashford	2007;	2008).
Step 5: Ensure that the European Parliament Research   
            Service checks policy coherence 
Even if the European Commission were not to change its better regulation guidelines to 
shift	the	focus	from	efficiency	towards	coherence,	the	European	Parliamentary	Research	
Service	would	better	focus	on	coherence	rather	than	on	stricto	sensu	cost-benefit	analysis.	
While this would contradict the spirit (but not necessarily the actual implementation) of 
the	2003	 Inter-Institutional	Agreement	on	Better	Lawmaking,	as	confirmed	 later	by	 the	
2005 “Common Approach to Impact Assessment” and also by the recent Inter-Institutional 
Agreement on Better Regulation, this would be an improvement in many respects. First, 
since its creation in 2012 the EPRS has struggled with the performance of high-quality 
economic analysis of EU legislation, be that in response to a Commission proposal or on 
an own initiative of the Parliament. Second, and perhaps relatedly, the EPRS seems to 
be	facing	difficulties	in	organising	a	meaningful	dialogue	with	MEPs,	who	tend	to	focus	
on	actual	coherence	and	specific	policy	impacts	rather	than	on	overall	evaluations	of	net	
benefits.	Unsurprisingly,	practically	no	country	in	the	world	has	been	able	to	successfully	
mainstream	cost-benefit	analysis	in	parliament,	and	the	country	that	has	led	the	way	in	this	
field,	the	US,	never	even	tried	to	launch	impact	analysis	in	Congress.	Third,	this	role	of	the	
EPRS would be more consistent with a situation in which long-term goals are embedded 
in the European Semester (step 8, below), and thus become more binding on EU member 
states. Finally, and importantly, this EPRS role would trigger a more meaningful debate 
between institutions, and in particular between MEPs and the European Commission 
services, on the extent to which proposed EU policy initiatives would help the EU move in 
the direction of long-term sustainable development.
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A similar emphasis on long-term policy impacts and sustainable development goals could 
be placed by the Council in discussing its proposed amendments to proposed new EU 
legislation. At the same time, the representatives of national governments in various Council 
formations could use long-term national sustainable development pathways (including 
decarbonisation pathways) when deciding their positions, possibly also motivating their 
decisions on that basis. This could avoid, or at least make less likely, that the Council 
adopts decisions that do not promote the well-being of European citizens, without having 
to	offer	any	justification,	especially	since	the	most	ambitious	proposals	advanced	by	the	
European Commission in its draft Inter-Institutional Agreement on better regulation back 
in	May	2015	(Renda,	2015),	(aiming	to	ensure	that	final	legislative	texts	were	accompanied	
by an updated impact assessment) were not agreed upon by other institutions and never 
made	it	to	the	final	text.
What we are proposing here is that the Inter-Institutional Agreement be gradually 
relaunched with less emphasis on the convergence of methodologies initially foreseen, 
and never achieved by the three participating EU institutions; and that it rather focuses 
on the coherence, accountability and transparency of the decision-making process in all 
three institutions, with the Parliament and the Council focusing more on the consistency 
between individual legislative texts and the overall vision of EU sustainable development 
in the long term.
          Step 6: Exert pressure on the Council to ensure it
                      motivates amendments on the basis of
                      long-term goals
   Step 7: Revise Europe 2020 in a more meaningful and
               long-term-oriented way, including a more       
               nuanced industrial innovation strategy 
Needless to say, a focus on sustainable development would be much easier to achieve if the 
EU managed to revise and re-launch its sustainable development strategy. Unfortunately, as 
already mentioned, the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth 
is	 to	 be	 considered	 in	 all	 respects	 as	 defunct.	More	 specifically,	 Europe	 2020	was	 an	
incomplete strategy from the beginning, but was at least an attempt to bring sustainable 
development, rather than pure GDP growth, into the big picture of EU policymaking 
by introducing a balanced, sustainable, multi-level, decade-long vision for Europe to be 
considered as a reference for all policies to be launched or evaluated by EU institutions 
(Renda, 2014; EPSC, 2015). Its incompleteness rapidly also became obsolescence, as 
the economic crisis made most of the targets set by Europe 2020 meaningless and not 
easily actionable. Paradoxically, as acknowledged also by the European Commission, the 
environment-related	and	energy	efficiency	targets	are	today	the	only	ones	really	achievable	
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Step 8: Have countries develop their own decarbonisation 
            pathways with adequate governance mechanisms,
            but join in a multilateral funding and technology- 
            sharing effort 
Each member state should develop a decarbonisation pathway, in line with what is 
happening under the initiative of the SDSN and IDDRI (2014, 2015). The approach of 
the deep decarbonisation pathways is to have country research teams develop national-
scale pathway analysis for deep decarbonisation by 2050, consistent with the 2°C (or 
even better, 1.5°C) limit and development objectives. Currently, the DDPP comprises 15 
Country Research Teams of leading researchers and research institutions from countries 
representing 70% of global GHG emissions and at very different stages of development.98 
But other European countries are already following a similar methodology to develop 
decarbonisation pathways.99 
(together with the education ones, which were probably not ambitious enough), but for 
the ‘wrong’ reason: the economic crisis has led to such a reduction of production levels, 
especially in industries such as construction, that emission levels have also slowed down. 
Today, Europe 2020 has been gradually marginalised by the Juncker Commission, and it 
seems very unlikely that any of the future presidencies will work on a revision that would 
no longer be mid-term, but closer to an ex post evaluation. The Juncker ‘ten priorities’ 
do not have the same similar breadth, even if elements of sustainability are present in a 
relatively scattered way across initiatives. 
Against this background, EU institutions should build a coherent vision for the next decade 
(2030) by bringing together all efforts currently being made on long-term policies, including 
i.a., those on decarbonisation, sustainable development, “beyond GDP” and the future of 
policymaking. Most of these efforts are being coordinated by the European Commission. 
This vision should not be limited to 2030, but also be checked for consistency with longer-
term goals such as the zero carbon economy. 
The development of a new EU sustainable development strategy should be accompanied by 
meaningful indicators, and methodologies for progress-tracking, and should echo the SDG 
framework being built and developed under the UN umbrella, and the shared prosperity 
framework being led by the World Bank. The centrality of the Europe 2030 agenda should 
then be ensured by providing incentives to member states to promulgate reforms that are 
in line with their SDG potential for the end of next decade (see step 9, below). 
98Australia,	Brazil,	Canada,	China,	France,	Germany,	India,	Indonesia,	Japan,	Mexico,	Russia,	South	Africa,	South	Korea,	the	
UK,	and	the	US.	
99See “Deep decarbonization Pathways (DDPs): A catalyst for the climate change debate”, by H. Waisman and M. Virdis, 
Energia, Ambiente, Innovazione, 1/2016. ENEA. At http://www.enea.it/it/pubblicazioni/pdf-eai/n-1-gennaio-marzo-2016/17-
deep-decarbonization-pathways.pdf. 
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Step 9: Embed sustainable development goals in
            the European Semester 
Once the long-term EU sustainable development agenda has been formulated in terms 
of a Europe 2030 strategy, member states should be motivated to jointly contribute to 
the agenda. The most logical way to achieve this result is to (further) mainstream the 
sustainable development dimension into the European Semester. 
First,	 in	 the	 Annual	 Growth	 Strategy	 and	 in	 the	 subsequent	 Country-Specific	
Recommendations the European Commission should devote at least equal attention 
to long-term reforms oriented towards sustainable development compared to what it 
devotes	to	financial	stability.	Currently,	the	opposite	trend	seems	to	be	in	place,	with	the	
Commission appearing more inclined to minimise the presence of environmental reforms 
100In June 2015, the Five Presidents’ Report on Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union set up a roadmap 
towards	a	deep,	genuine	and	 fair	Economic	and	Monetary	Union	 (EMU).	According	 to	 the	 report,	during	 the	first	stage	
(1 July 2015 - 30 June 2017) concrete progress towards an Economic Union of convergence, growth and jobs should rest 
on four pillars, one of which was the creation of a euro area system of Competitiveness Authorities. In October 2015 the 
European Commission presented a Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the establishment of National 
Competitiveness Boards within the Euro Area. Final adoption is expected in September 2016. See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0601&from=EN. 
The	most	difficult	issue	is,	of	course,	not	the	design	and	development	of	decarbonisation	
pathways; rather, it is the translation of such pathways into concrete, actionable and 
implemented policy initiatives. In this respect, the most effective way would be to incorporate 
such pathways into the European Semester and to make their implementation an effective 
precondition for approval of national reform programmes, and even the attribution of 
cohesion funds. In addition, given the ongoing creation of national productivity boards at 
member state level (mandatory only in the eurozone), and with the hope that such boards 
adopt	a	broad	definition	of	productivity,	 it	would	be	natural	 to	expect	 that	such	boards	
take the lead in the development of national pathways.100 Ongoing research for the OECD 
(Renda, forthcoming) is showing that even the most established productivity commissions 
(e.g., in Australia and New Zealand, and also Singapore, Denmark and Norway) and recently 
created bodies such as France Stratégie adopt a very broad approach to productivity, which 
incorporates long-term well-being. These boards are being created as possible interlocutors 
of the Commission in the European Semester, and would then be essential actors in our 
re-designed European Semester (see step 9, below).
That said, the development and implementation of national deep decarbonisation pathways 
should	 not	 imply	 that	 all	 research	 and	 innovation	 efforts	 are	 confined	 within	 national	
borders. On the contrary, member states should ensure cooperation, coordination and 
financial	support	to	the	multi-stakeholder,	challenge-led	platforms	that	we	described	above	
under step 1, in what would become single platforms for research and innovation, able to 
attract multilateral funding for the exploitation of available technologies and the piloting of 
new business models and technological solutions.
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Step 10: Use EU trade agenda and climate diplomacy to 
             ensure leverage of existing WTO rules, and 
             their revision if necessary, to effectively place a 
             price on carbon and minimise carbon leakage 
Leveraging EU trade policy in support of decarbonisation is an indispensable step, without 
which many of the other actions would be doomed to remain only partly effective. The ETC 
(2016, p. 9) recently observed that: 
101http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0601&from=EN. 
in national reform programmes. Likewise, the Competitiveness Council (possibly renamed, 
or explicitly adopting a very broad notion of competitiveness) could also be strengthened 
and placed at the same level of the ECOFIN, with both working under the coordination of 
a stronger General Affairs Council. 
Second, a ‘micro-conditionality’ linked to decarbonisation and more generally to sustainable 
development could be introduced for the attributions of cohesion funds. Currently, the 
macro-economic	conditionality	ensures	that	the	effectiveness	of	the	five	European	structural	
and investment funds is not undermined by unsound macroeconomic policies, in line with 
the European Council conclusions of 8 February 2013. Such conditionality has both a 
preventive and a corrective arm. At the same time, cohesion funds have been increasingly 
tied to the Europe 2020 objectives especially after 2014, but the current system does not 
seem	to	be	triggering	sufficient	coherence	between	member	states’	national	reform	plans	
and their decisions on how to spend funds from EU and national resources.
Third, national reform plans and proposed spending plans at the national and sub-national 
levels should be accompanied by an in-depth impact evaluation, which demonstrates 
that there are no better alternatives than the ones proposed, in order to reach Europe’s 
sustainable development goals. The National Productivity Boards should be in charge of 
policy evaluation, as mentioned in the European Commission Recommendation on the 
matter.101 This impact evaluation would have to be particularly detailed if the reforms 
proposed	entail	a	derogation	from	the	constraints	envisaged	by	the	fiscal	treaty:	 in	this	
case, national government would have to demonstrate that no available alternatives would 
at	once	be	consistent	with	the	fiscal	treaty	and	achieve	sustainable	development	goals.	
And all proposed reforms, besides the ex ante impact evaluations, should be accompanied 
by	a	plan	to	implement	the	identified	reforms,	a	monitoring	plan	based	on	clear	sustainable	
development indicators, and a time horizon for the mid-term and the ex post evaluation 
of the proposed reforms. The European Commission should then validate the plan by 
applying further conditionalities – e.g., only a country on its way to reducing the number 
of infringement proceedings, with a good track record in cohesion funds spending and 
exhibiting good progress on the (new) good governance indicators would be able to apply 
for	flexibility.
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102China’s	exports	are	eight	times	as	carbon-intensive	as	those	of	the	EU	and	three	times	as	those	of	the	US”	[Atkinson	et	
al.	2011	quoted	in	Fischer	(2015)	p.	305].
103Flannery,	B.	E.	(2016),	Carbon	Taxes,	Trade,	and	Border	Tax	Adjustments,	RFF	policy	Brief	16-02,	at	http://www.rff.org/files/
document/file/RFF-PB-16-02.pdf.
the shift in energy-intensive manufacturing to China and other 
middle-income countries has enabled high-income countries to 
offshore	 a	 significant	 percentage	 of	 their	 domestic	 emissions	 to	
offshore	a	significant	percentage	of	their	domestic	emissions	[up	to	
48%	according	to	some	estimates	(Xu	et	al.,	2011)].	
This implies not only that redesigning the WTO (and TPP) trade rules needs to be 
undertaken, but also that trade policy has to be an integral and important part of the 
overall strategy to achieve deep decarbonisation. The reader is reminded that differences 
among producing nations in the cost of mitigating global climate impacts encourages the 
export	of	manufacturing	abroad	[Fischer	(2015)	p.	298].	Not	only	may	foreign	producers	
use	cheaper	 (and	dirtier)	energy	sources,	 they	may	also	be	generally	 less	efficient	 than	
first-world	domestic	firms	in	their	manufacturing	operations.	The	consequence	is	usually	
that	the	global	prices	for	energy	go	down	as	other	[exporting]	countries	consume	more	
fossil	 fuels.	The	competitiveness	 implications	can	be	significant,	 as	can	 the	 impacts	on	
world trade activities (Carbon Trust 2009; Fischer 2015; Mavroidis and de Melo 2015; Wu 
and Salzman 2014).102
As observed by Flannery (2016), “Negotiators, economists, and policy analysts have long 
recognized that climate and trade policies appear to be on a collision course, without the 
means to reconcile differences”.103 These concerns were partly addressed by the UNFCCC 
with the insertion of provisions aimed at avoiding undesirable consequences (particularly 
Section 3.5 and 4.10). However, experts tend to agree that domestic measures such as 
border tax adjustments still face potential problems in terms of their compatibility with WTO 
obligations (Flannery, 2016; Trachtman, 2016), especially when they result in subsidies or 
free allowances provided to energy intensive, trade-exposed industries (Maruyama, 2011, 
Hillman, 2013). Trachtman (2016) observes that while border tax adjustments to emissions 
inherent in a product and its use seem to potentially comply with WTO rules, the same 
does not occur for emissions associated with the production process (e.g., from electricity 
use). In addition, he argues that differential treatment of WTO member states aimed at 
reflecting	 differing	 carbon	 intensities	 could	 end	 up	 violating	 the	Most	 Favoured	Nation	
obligation; and that in any case, to qualify for an exemption might entail a burdensome 
process of demonstrating that there were no alternatives available that would be less 
restrictive for trade.
The EU trade agenda should increasingly focus on guiding the debate on the review, 
revision, and implementation of climate-friendly WTO rules, especially for what concerns 
the possibility to place a price on carbon through global mechanisms, or through the 
clarification	of	the	legal	treatment	of	domestic	solutions	such	as	border	tax	adjustments.
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This report has sought to show, among other things, that what is needed in order to achieve 
an EU low-carbon system transformation is an integrated approach that addresses a wider 
set	of	sustainable	development	goals.	These	goals	are	reflected	in	the	UN’s	Sustainable	
Development Goals and necessarily include economic welfare (competitiveness), 
environment, and employment. The goal of an EU low-carbon system transformation is 
thus embedded in the EU’s sustainable development strategy.  This EU strategy is in turn 
nested within a global sustainable development strategy.  Since a low-carbon system 
transformation ultimately requires coordination, if not integration into the global system, 
trade policies and strategies take on special importance.
Specific	 EU	 policies/strategies/approaches	 receiving	 attention	 in	 this	 report	 are	 those	
that focus on innovation, better regulation, trade, and industrial policy/economic growth. 
The	 latter	 may	 well	 conflict	 with	 advancing	 sustainable	 development	 and	 an	 EU	 low-
carbon system transformation. Indeed, concerns for industrial competitiveness as well as 
prospects for the future of employment routinely surface, as well as the expectation that 
achieving the goals of COP21 may be quite different from achieving deep decarbonisation. 
Short- to medium-term strategies need to be consistent with and reinforcing of longer-
term strategies of deep decarbonisation.
The report serves to clarify important distinctions in this regard. If further notes that different 
levels of governance (Member States/regions/cities) may have advantages over approaches 
at the EU-level. A somewhat related point is that while some initiatives need to address 
sectoral changes, more universal structural changes that transcend a sectoral focus are 
needed. This is especially true in fashioning better regulation, focusing on the appropriate 
level of regulatory stringency as a motivator for change. The energy extraction, generation 
and transmission sector(s) differ from the intensive energy-using sectors (manufacturing, 
housing, agriculture, and transportation), and further differ from general energy use by 
consumers,	citizens,	government	and	industry	reflecting	concern	for	the	circular	economy.	
Finally,	the	limits	of	heuristics	such	as	cost-benefit	analysis,	policies	that	fail	to	distinguish	
achieving	energy	efficiency	from	energy	utilisation	and	consumption,	failure	to	distinguish	
static	 from	 dynamic	 efficiency	 –	 and	 diffusion	 from	 innovation,	 and	 theoretical	 versus	
practical advantages of prices versus regulation versus mixed instruments such as cap-
and-trade are all the subject of discussion throughout the report.
Finally, this report is intended to provide guidance to stimulate change in the process of 
policy design and implementation by the EU. While implementing all the ten proposed 
steps would be ideal from our perspective, the individual implementation of many of them 
would already add value to the current policy process at EU level. It is our hope that our 
proposal serves as impetus to the EU to think in a broader and more integrated way about 
these as yet intractable problems.
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There is a growing awareness that climate change is 
posing an existential threat to humankind, and that 
deep decarbonisation should therefore be placed at the 
forefront of public policies. This requires that existing 
policies be aligned with this crucial long-term objective, 
and that existing regulation promote the systemic 
innovations that can lead to decarbonisation.
 
In this accessible and timely report, Nicholas Ashford 
(MIT) and Andrea Renda (CEPS and Duke University) 
look at EU policies and propose ten steps to align EU 
rules with long-term objectives. As such, this endeavour 
bears important consequences for the EU’s better 
regulation strategy, innovation policy and sectoral 
policies	in	many	fields.
